
Photo: Ahmad al-Sharaa, the commander-in-chief of the Military Operations Department
Syria’s – reconstruction is unfolding within a broader struggle between militarization and civil governance, reflecting a deeper historical pattern in post-conflict states where security imperatives often override political institutionalization. As security concerns take precedence over institutional development, Syria appears poised to replicate the historical cycle in which militarized governance delays political reconstruction, weakens state institutions, and prolongs instability rather than resolving it.
The former Syrian national army, known as Jaysh al Assad, has since 2011, allegedly sided with the ruling regime against part of its own people. Over time, it has transformed into a “disciplined” yet profoundly mismanaged institution. Despite the mismanagement, the army has persisted as a symbol of law and order for many Syrians living in regime-controlled areas.[1] Consequently, amid the current prevailing domestic insecurity and tensions, prioritizing the establishment of an army remains the best viable path toward restoring stability in Syria.
The reconstruction of a national army in Syria faces significant challenges due to domestic and regional factors. Given the current geostrategic dynamics, Syria is unlikely to develop a cohesive national army in the near future and is more likely to settle for a structure resembling a domestic security organization.
Ahmad Al-Sharaa, the de facto leader, has acknowledged that “it could take up to four years to hold elections in Syria.”[2] While the government justifiably focuses on rebuilding the military, given the current internal security situation, this urgency carries risks. A delay in the development of civic governance could lead to a situation where the country’s governance structure becomes de facto military rule, undermining the long-term goal of establishing a functioning civilian administration.
This scenario would likely mirror the experience the Syrian people they had with national army in the past. It would further complicate the relationship between the government and the people by risking confining the military’s role to that of a “domestic security organization,” severely limiting its capacity to evolve into a fully functional national army and delaying the broader process of institutional reform essential for Syria’s long-term overall development.
Numerous historical parallels to Syria’s situation illustrate that nations relying on military rule after uprisings or revolutions often face enduring political instability, economic decline, and social unrest. For example, Egypt’s 1952 revolution ushered in a series of military-backed regimes that, even today, practice systematic oppression, contribute to economic stagnation, and perpetuate crises of legitimacy. Algeria’s independence in 1962 saw military dominance through the FLN, resulting in political exclusion, corruption, and long-term factionalism that led to the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002). Libya’s 1969 coup, where weakened state institutions led to permanent “Army General” rule. The Soviet Union, after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, relied heavily on the Red Army, sparking many tensions and reinforcing authoritarianism under Stalin’s actions.
Amid the current intense situation in Syria, and drawing lessons from Baghdad’s experience,[3] the new rulers have granted amnesty to former Syrian Army soldiers.[4] Additionally, foreign fighters, including Uyghurs, have been appointed to high-ranking positions within the armed forces as Damascus seeks to transform fragmented rebel factions into a cohesive and professional military.[5]
This approach has two key dimensions: incorporating all groups involved in overthrowing the Assad regime into the structure of the new army help to centralize their diverse influences within a single institution, reducing the risk of fragmentation and lending the military greater legitimacy. However, the inclusion of foreign fighters raises questions about the army’s national identity, potentially undermining its perception as a unified and sovereign institution. Instead, it may result in the army being perceived as a “Rebels’ Army,” a coalition of disparate groups rather than a genuine embodiment of national unity.
The current government’s primary concern is to normalize daily life for the Syrian people, which seems genuine. Yet, on the political front, the composition of the Syrian army is shaped by an urgent need for internal security. While this focus is essential for short-term stabilization, it risks entrenching a governance model heavily reliant on militarization, delaying broader institutional reforms. Such a model may hinder the development of a balanced and sustainable political and administrative framework, ultimately affecting the long-term reconstruction and stability of the state.
The current Syrian government is a coalition of factions who were united by their shared opposition to the al-Assad regime. These factions seem to recognize the significant influence of external powers, including the United States, Türkiye, and, to some extent, Israel over Syria’s political build-ups. Consequently, smaller factions pragmatically align with the broader framework of the government to avoid marginalization, particularly given the strong regional and international backing for the al-Sharaa government. Therefore, this may not be regarded as a comprehensive national reconciliation.
A pertinent example of such complexity can be seen in Afghanistan.[6] After the departure of Soviet troops in February 1989, “the government increasingly relied on para-military groups (militias) rather than regular troops to perform key functions.”[7] “The Mujahedeen splintered into warring factions, plunging the country into civil war and paving the way for the Taliban’s rise. Similarly, after the Taliban’s fall in 2001, Afghanistan’s coalition government, supported by the U.S. and NATO, initially united rival factions under Hamid Karzai. However, by 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal, the coalition collapsed, and the Taliban swiftly retook power, highlighting the failure to build unified institutions.[8] This demonstrates how an overemphasis on military factors in nation-building can undermine civil governance. In Syria’s case, this approach could set the stage for a resurgent insurgency, as explored further below.
From Militias to Command
What distinguishes armed forces from other groups such as militias is their formal affiliation with the state. Not only are they authorized to use violence in its defence, but their soldiers are also prepared to sacrifice their lives for it.[9] The very raison d’être of the armed forces is rooted in the defence of the state, nation, or a particular regime, and is never free-floating. The challenge facing Syria is that militias currently fill the role of the state, and this is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.
Militia groups have historically only succeeded in forming a cohesive army when unified under strong leadership. For example, local militias in the American colonies came together to form the Continental Army under George Washington, whose strategic vision and discipline were crucial to their success.[10] Similarly, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began as a collection of communist guerrilla forces during the Chinese Civil War, with leaders like Zhu De and Mao Zedong playing key roles in transforming these fragmented militias into a disciplined and strategically effective fighting force.[11] In Vietnam, Võ Nguyên Giáp, led militias to fighting against Japanese occupation, then transformed it into the People’s Army of Vietnam, which defeated the French and American forces.[12]
The Arab world provides similar cases, yet, mostly marked by a recurring pattern of failure. Military-led regimes in the Arab world have consistently struggled to achieve stability and long-term state-building. Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Pan-Arab vision collapsed after Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War, undermining his goal of regional unity. Muammar Qaddafi’s – rule left Libya post-Qaddafi fragmented and in chaos. In Syria, the Assad regime’s reliance on military dominance has not ended well, while Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric and centralized power isolated Iraq, leading to its ultimate collapse. These examples highlight the dangers of excessive centralization, militarization, and an inability to adapt to changing political and social realities, resulting in persistent instability across the region.
Assessing the future role of the Syrian army in comparison to the current state of other Arab armies could provide insight into its own future and its potential to contribute to nation-building efforts. Norvell B. De Atkine argues that Arab armies have historically struggled with effectiveness, facing repeated defeats in confrontations with Israel and challenges in countering insurgencies. These struggles stem from a combination of internal issues, such as rigid hierarchies, over-centralization, and a lack of trust within ranks. External pressures also play a role including geopolitical fragmentation, shifting alliances, and dependence on foreign military support. Together, these factors highlight the systemic challenges within the Middle East’s security landscape, where structural deficiencies within armies intersect with complex regional dynamics.[13]
Regional Challenges
Regional security dynamics, dominated by Israel’s regional military supremacy, alongside domestic challenges, would hinder the reconstitution of a robust Syrian army, likely confining its role to internal security rather than substantial combat operations.
Since the fall of Damascus, Israel has systematically dismantled much of Syria’s military infrastructure.[14] These actions, aside from rhetorical condemnations, were largely met with regional silence, reflecting a security framework in which Syria is tacitly compelled to align with to avoid escalation. Syria’s calculated inaction during events like the 2007 Israeli airstrike on the Syrian nuclear reactor and attacks on military research centers in Masyaf and Jamraya highlights this dynamic.[15]
Israel’s pattern of airstrikes, particularly in Syria, reflects its persistent but undeclared war, or what is known as the “war between wars,”[16] aimed at weakening the Syrian army’s capabilities. This strategy, which has faced little significant resistance despite repeated attacks, focuses on pre-emptively weakening adversaries’ infrastructure and combat capabilities ahead of potential open conflicts.[17] It was demonstrated during Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah, which employed pager-triggered explosions.[18]
The established dynamics between Israel and Syria are likely to shape their future interactions, as evidenced by Israel’s territorial advances in the Golan Heights following the fall of the Assad regime, highlighting the complexity of their relationship. The 1982 Lebanon War providing important context. After suffering heavy losses,[19] Syria adopted a restrained posture, avoiding direct escalation and instead leveraging indirect influence in Lebanon. This pragmatic response establishes Syria’s recognition of the risks involved in confronting Israel’s superior military. The al-Sharaa government’s limitations dictate calculated restraint, which mirrors these past examples, aiming to mitigate further destabilization and prevent both regional and international punitive actions.
Furthermore, growing security cooperation between Israel and Arab states, significantly shape Al-Sharaa’s strategic priorities. The weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, combined with potential punitive measures against the Houthis in Yemen, imposes substantial constraints on Syria’s government. Consequently, the regime is unlikely to adopt rhetoric cantered on Arab nationalism, explicit support for the Palestinian struggle, or ideological ventures akin to the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief rule in Egypt. These limitations compel Syria to pursue pragmatic policies focused on regime survival rather than ideological ambitions.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) designation as a terrorist group and its historical ties to al-Qaeda complicate its position in regional politics. Despite efforts to distance itself from its jihadist past, HTS remains under scrutiny, particularly from Arab states that view Islamist movements as existential threats. Its governance in Idlib province has drawn criticism from hardliners for perceived leniency in implementing Sharia law, a contentious issue given the conservative Sunni Muslim majority in the area. These factors place HTS at the center of regional security concerns, influencing how Arab states approach Syria’s evolving political landscape.[20] On a national level, this becomes even more complex, as Syria’s diverse religious landscape makes any move towards either extreme risky.
If HTS were to gradually adapt to a broader notion of secular governance (الحكم المدني), it could risk losing its Islamist character (التوجه الاسلامي). Such shift could foster internal hostility and fragmentation within HTS’s ideologically diverse ranks. The Syrian government’s success rests on two key factors: distancing itself from Islamist tendencies, and carefully moderating its rhetoric toward Israel. However, both approaches risk backlash from its ideologically diverse and, at times, hardline ranks. Regarding Israel, Al-Sharaa reaffirmed Syria’s commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement,[21] urging international enforcement of Israeli compliance. He also called for an end to Israeli airstrikes and withdrawal from territories occupied since Assad’s fall, emphasizing that Syria’s war-torn condition precludes new confrontations.[22]
Consequently, the Syrian army by fulfilling its sole domestic role of generating security and stability may endure but within the limitations described above, as a domestic security organisation. Yet, on the long run, given the established factionalised nature of this army – competing interests, factionalised groups, ideological offspring, interest groups, disparity between major cities and remote regions, may surface to challenge the function of this security architecture.
[1] Khaddour, K. (2016). “Strength in Weakness: The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience”, Carnegie Middle East Centre, retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/03/strength-in-weakness-the-syrian-armys-accidental-resilience?lang=en¢er=middle-east.
[2] Reuters (2024). “Syria’s De Facto Leader Says Holding Elections Could Take Up to Four Years”, 30 December, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-de-facto-leader-says-holding-elections-could-take-up-four-years-2024-12-29/.
[3] Sissons, M., & Al-Saiedi, A. (2013). “A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq”, International Centre for Transitional Justice, retrieved from: https://www.ictj.org/publication/bitter-legacy-lessons-de-baathification-iraq.
[4] Ahram Online (2024). “Syria’s New Leaders Integrate Former Assad Loyalists into Military”, 30 December, retrieved from: https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/536693.aspx.
[5] Reuters (2024). “Syria Appoints Some Foreign Islamist Fighters to Its Military, Sources Say”, 30 December, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/.
[6] While Afghanistan and Syria have different political structures, both share similar historical processes of fragmentation driven by internal conflict and external influence. Afghanistan’s divisions stem from ethnic tensions and foreign interventions, while Syria’s fragmentation, marked by history of Civil War and rampant corruption, which since the fall of Damascus, demonstrates the challenges in rebuilding a fractured state.
[7] Rubin, B. R. (1996, December 1). Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis. WRITENET, retrieved from: https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/writenet/1996/en/96430.
[8] See, Maizland, L. (2023, January 19). “The Taliban in Afghanistan”, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.
[9] Gaub, F. (2014). “Arab Armies: Agents of Change?” Chaillot Paper No. 131. European Union Institute for Security Studies, retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182218/Chaillot_Paper_131_Arab_armies.pdf, p. 13.
[10] Orrison, R. (2021). “Militia, Minutemen, and Continentals: The American Military Force in the American Revolution”, American Battlefield Trust, 15 December, retrieved from: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/militia-minutemen-and-continentals-american-military-force-american-revolution.
[11] Xu, X. (2018). “The Origins and Growth of the Chinese Communist Movement,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press, 28 March, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.131.
[12] Barnes, B. (2013). “Military Leader Vo Nguyen Giap Defeated French, U.S. Forces in Vietnam Conflicts”, The Washington Post, 4 October, retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/military-leader-vo-nguyen-giap-defeated-french-us-forces-in-vietnam-conflicts/2013/10/04/897ffff2-c5da-11df-94e1-c5afa35a9e59_story.html.
[13] Norvell B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1, September 1999, retrieved from: https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/why-arabs-lose-wars.
[14] Wall Street Journal (2023). “Israeli Airstrikes Target Syrian Chemical-Weapons Systems”, retrieved from: https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrikes-target-syrian-chemical-weapons-systems-743f18a2.
[15] Şaban, N. (2023). “Israel’s Response to Iran in Syria”, Middle East Institute, retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2023-11/Saban%20-%20Israel%E2%80%99s%20Response%20to%20Iran%20in%20Syria.pdf.
[16] Skin, S. (2021). “The Consequences of Israeli Intervention in Syria”, Strategy Paper 05, NESA Centre, 10 February, retrieved from: https://nesa-center.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021-02-10-Strategy-Paper-05-The-Consequences-of-Israeli-Intervention-in-Syria.pdf., p. 1.
[17] Skin, S. (2021). “The Consequences of Israeli Intervention in Syria”, p. 1.
[18] Clarke, C. P. (2024). “The Biggest Question About the Hezbollah Pager Attack Is Why Now”, Foreign Policy, 17 September, retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/17/hezbollah-pager-attack-israel-gaza-lebanon/.
[19] Siboni, G. (2007). “The Military Campaign in Lebanon”, in S. Brom & M. Elran (eds.), The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, pp. 71–77.
[20] Al-Lami, M. (2024). “Syria’s Rebel Leaders Say They’ve Broken with Their Jihadist Past – Can They Be Trusted?”, BBC News, 20 December, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ldj04p0q2o.
[21] United Nations News. (2024, December 12). UN urges adherence to peace agreements in Syria amid ongoing challenges. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158131.
[22] Orion, A. (2024). “Israel and the Fall of Assad: Rejoice, Repel, Reach Out, Reload,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 18 December, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-and-fall-assad-rejoice-repel-reach-out-reload.
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About the author:
Dr. Nath Aldalala’a is a Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science and Madani Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.