Türkiye’s Balancing Act – Aspirations for Great Power Status

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shaking hands with President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Vladimir Putin respectively. Image sources: cnn.com

 

Abstract

In today’s great power competition between the West and the China-Russia alignment, middle powers like Türkiye play crucial roles in the global balance of power. This article explores Türkiye’s foreign policy evolution, emphasizing its strategic balancing act between traditional Western allies and emerging Eastern influences. Initially oriented towards the West under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Türkiye’s foreign policy shifted under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership towards a more assertive and independent stance, often termed “Neo-Ottomanism.” Türkiye’s relationships with the United States, NATO, and the European Union are characterized by cooperation but also tension driven by its strategic ambitions and independent policies. Concurrently, Türkiye has strengthened ties with Russia and China, balancing energy partnerships and defense cooperation with geopolitical competition. The article highlights Türkiye’s nuanced foreign policy, aiming for strategic autonomy while navigating complex global alliances. Türkiye’s strategic location, historical legacy, and proactive diplomacy underscore its significant role as a middle power influencing great power dynamics in the quest for a multipolar world.

Introduction

In the contemporary geopolitical arena, middle powers play a pivotal role in the global balance of power, particularly in the ongoing great power competition between the West and the China-Russia alignment (DiCicco and Onea 2023; Pierce 2021; Uluyol 2024). Weaker than great powers but much stronger than small powers, they wield significant influence within their respective regions and act as crucial nodes in a multipolar world, where their strategic decisions and alignments can tip the balance in favor of one bloc or another (Holbraad 1984). While Türkiye’s regional power status was debatable a decade ago, it is now indisputable (Bank and Karadag 2014). With its strategic location and historical legacy, Türkiye is a prominent middle power, playing a delicate balancing game between the East and the West in its quest for great power status and a revival of its imperial glory from centuries ago (Parlar Dal 2018). The long-term foreign policy vision outlined by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019), entitled the ‘Century of Türkiye,’ aims to strengthen peace and security in its region and bolster its position in the international sphere by continuing strategic alliances with its traditional western allies while advocating for a multipolar world. Most importantly, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is committed to making Türkiye one of the world’s top ten nations in politics, economy, technology, military, and diplomacy, prioritizing independence and the satisfaction of the country’s own interests above all else in its quest for increased international power (Ataman 2023; Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). While Türkiye undoubtedly holds significant power in its region, its defense capabilities, involvement as a mediator, and positions in multilateral organizations make it a significant global actor whose alliance is sought by many, especially in today’s restructuring of the world toward a multipolar order, where regional alliances are of much more significance in the absence of a hegemon (Aktaş 2022; Mott 2024). Although Türkiye’s foreign policy is complex, multifaceted, and has a vast global footprint, with interests in Africa and Central Asia, this text will focus specifically on its ‘balancing act,’ namely its relations with established NATO powers and the EU and their contenders, China and Russia.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy Aims and Evolution

Türkiye’s foreign policy aims have evolved significantly over time. Initially, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Türkiye pursued a Western-oriented policy, seeking integration with European institutions and maintaining a secular, modern identity (Robinson 2022; Toygür et al. 2022). However, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the increasingly strained relations with the West marked a shift towards a more independent and assertive foreign policy, often referred to as “Neo-Ottomanism,” an assertive and independent policy that seeks to revive the grandeur of the former Ottoman Empire, prioritizes Turkish interests, and aims to diversify Türkiye’s alliances to decrease dependencies on great powers (Adar 2024; Iqbal 2020; Koçak and Akgül 2022; Robinson 2022; Tekdal 2023; Uluyol 2024). Thanks to its large population, military might, active diplomacy, strong state tradition, and national identity, Türkiye has become a decisive regional power capable of taking the initiative and forwarding a proactive foreign policy that is seemingly reorienting towards the China-Russia alignment (Ataman 2019; Hovsepyan 2023; Uluyol 2024). This strategic independence is exemplified by its varied stances on issues like the Syrian Civil War, where it has opposed Syrian Government while simultaneously maintaining a complex relationship with Russia, or the war in Gaza, where Turkish President Erdoğan has declared that Türkiye has “shown the strongest reaction to the massacre in Gaza since October 7, and taken concrete measures against Israel,” although they are part of NATO and enjoy close ties with the US, Israel’s ally (MEMO 2024; Mott 2024; TRT Afrika 2024). While Türkiye represents a wider trend in global politics whereby regional powers are seeking and obtaining a more significant role in the international arena, Türkiye stands out due to its position as a NATO member, its geography, and its status as a post-imperial state, where the idea of grandeur in international affairs is emphasized by its leaders (Dalay 2023; Uluyol 2024).

Relations with the West

Türkiye’s relationship with the United States and NATO is complex and multifaceted, shaped by both cooperation and tension. As a key NATO member, Türkiye plays a crucial role in the alliance’s strategic considerations, particularly given its geographic position bordering both Europe and the Middle East. However, its independent policies, such as the purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems, have strained relations, resulting in sanctions and removal from the F-35 program (Mott 2024; Robinson 2022). This independent streak extends to Türkiye’s handling of Sweden’s NATO membership bid, leveraging its position to demand the extradition of individuals it accuses of terrorism (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Dalay 2023; Inanc 2023). Türkiye’s military operations in northern Syria and support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have further exemplified its assertive foreign policy, often putting it at odds with U.S. policies in the region (Inanc 2023). The repatriation of Turkish gold holdings previously kept in the US also signifies Türkiye’s diminishing trust in Washington (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). Additionally, Erdoğan’s willingness to engage with Russia and China and his assertive foreign policy, including military interventions in Libya and Syria, have caused further friction within NATO, as seen in the cooling relations with the West driven by his ambition to remake Türkiye as a significant global power (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Dalay 2023; Hess 2021; Robinson 2022). Erdoğan was especially outspoken in his denunciations of the West after the 2016 failed coup d’état attempt for not extraditing Fethullah Gülen, the man who is believed to have planned the coup and who has been living in the US since 1999, and of the EU for granting asylum to Gülenists in Europe (Tekdal 2023; Uluyol 2024).

Regarding its European allies, Türkiye’s ambitions for EU membership have stalled, and Ankara is unlikely to become an EU member primarily due to concerns over democratic backsliding and authoritarianism under Erdoğan, resulting in a transactional and often conflictual relationship (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Robinson 2022; Toygür et al. 2022). Despite this, Türkiye’s strategic importance to Europe, especially in managing migration and energy transit, ensures it remains a vital partner for the EU (Aydintasbas 2021). The 2016 refugee deal, where Türkiye agreed to curb the flow of migrants into Europe in exchange for financial aid and political concessions, weaponized Türkiye’s strategic geographical position as well as its leverage and willingness to apply coercive pressure on Europe (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). Although full EU membership remains unlikely due to political costs for both sides, pragmatic cooperation in areas like trade, migration, and defense continues to be essential. Türkiye’s growing ties with Russia and China, along with its independent foreign policy moves, also pose issues to its relations with EU allies (Adar 2024; Hess 2021).

Relations with Russia and China

On the other side of the ‘balancing act’, relations are significant continuously improving, yet cooperation is limited by NATO security considerations (Inanc 2023). Türkiye’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Halkan Fidan, recently announced that Türkiye wishes to join BRICS instead of the EU, in order to reduce dependence on the West (Wang 2024). If the desire will be followed through, this could mark the new era of Türkiye’s foreign policy.

Türkiye’s relations with Russia are characterized by a mix of cooperation and competition. Despite political tensions, energy cooperation remains a cornerstone of their bilateral relations, with Türkiye relying heavily on Russian gas imports (Siccardi 2024). Projects like the TurkStream pipeline and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant highlight the strategic energy partnership between the two nations (Aydintasbas 2021). The TurkStream pipeline, for instance, transports Russian natural gas to Türkiye and further into Southern and Southeastern Europe, reinforcing Türkiye’s role as a crucial energy transit hub (Cook 2023; Robinson 2022). Additionally, Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia signifies Ankara’s willingness to diverge from NATO norms to secure its strategic interests (Aydintasbas 2021; Robinson 2022). This defense cooperation, along with President Erdoğan’s close rapport with President Putin, underscores Türkiye’s strategic independence. However, their relations are also marked by competition, as seen in conflicts like Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, where Türkiye and Russia support opposing sides (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Aydintasbas 2021; Hess 2021). Despite these conflicting interests and actions, Russian-Turkish ties have not suffered, and Erdoğan has shown his willingness to improve them further (Hess 2021). Türkiye’s nuanced stance during the Russia-Ukraine war, balancing its support for Ukraine with opposition to Western sanctions on Russia, exemplifies its diplomatic maneuvering to maintain a pragmatic relationship with Moscow while upholding its own strategic interests (Dalay 2023). Still, Türkiye has been sanctioned by NATO allies for its unwillingness to comply with sanction impositions through the delayed sale of American F-16 warplanes and public criticism (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Cook 2023; Inanc 2023; Mott 2024; Robinson 2022). Still, its involvement in the mediation process has allowed Ankara to be, in Mott’s (2024) words, ‘the most important non-combatant in the Ukraine war,” as it has allowed western powers to keep their communication channels with Russia open but also improved its international standing as mediator, successfully managing to allow the export of Ukrainian grains through the Black Sea without fear of Russian interception and offering to host repeated peace summits. This role underscores Türkiye’s strategic importance and diplomatic capabilities in the region.

Türkiye’s relationship with China has grown significantly in recent years due to economic interests and diversification policies, and Ankara and Beijing have been strategic partners since 2010 (Hovsepyan 2023; Tekdal 2023). As part of its broader strategy to diversify international partnerships and reduce dependency on the West, Türkiye has actively sought Chinese investment, foreign aid, and cooperation (Aydintasbas 2021; Hovsepyan 2023; Robinson 2022; Tekdal 2023). Türkiye’s inclusion in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aligns with its goal of becoming a central hub in Eurasian trade and transport networks and allows many economic benefits (Alonso-Trabanco 2022; Güneylioğlu 2022; Tekdal 2023). This participation has facilitated infrastructure development, such as the Trans-Caspian-East-West Corridor, enhancing connectivity between China and Europe via Türkiye (Adar 2024). Bilateral trade between Türkiye and China has also surged, with China becoming Ankara’s largest import partner in 2021 (Robinson 2022). Chinese investments in Turkish infrastructure and substantial export volumes to Ankara underscore the deepening economic ties, yet these are not balanced, with import levels much higher than export levels, and thus not strong enough to compare with Turkey’s trading relations with the EU, which is Türkiye’s largest export destination (Tekdal 2023; Uluyol 2024). However, Türkiye’s engagement with China is not without challenges. Balancing relations with Western allies, particularly regarding sensitive issues like the treatment of the Turkic Uyghur Muslims in China, which Türkiye has remained relatively silent about, requires careful diplomatic management (Aydintasbas 2021; Robinson 2022; Tekdal 2023; Uluyol 2024). Another aspect to consider is China and Türkiye’s competing interests in Central Asia, where both countries are trying to increase their influence (Hovsepyan 2023). Despite these complexities, Türkiye continues to navigate its foreign policy with a focus on strategic autonomy, seeking to leverage its relationships with both China and the West to bolster its economic and geopolitical standing and profit off of both sides of the great power competition.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Türkiye’s foreign policy reflects its strategic ambition to navigate the multipolar world by balancing its relationships between established Western powers and emerging Eastern influences. As a middle power with significant regional influence, Türkiye’s ability to pivot between the East and the West showcases its desire for strategic autonomy and a more assertive global role. The evolving geopolitical landscape has compelled Türkiye to diversify its alliances, reducing dependence on traditional Western allies while engaging deeply with global powers like Russia and China. Still, Türkiye’s relationships with Russia and China are marked by both cooperation and competition and shall remain limited in comparison to those with the West because of Türkiye’s NATO membership (Güneylioğlu 2022; Tekdal 2023). Its financial dependencies and its deep integration into Western economic and security structures will continue Türkiye’s balancing act for years to come and will insure its important role in the international political arena (Adar 2024). While the resurgence of a neo-Ottoman great power role for Türkiye in the 21st century seems unlikely, its strategic and pragmatic power play as a middle power is significant and shall continue to influence great power competition between the East and the West in its quest to be a standalone power.

 

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