

Lebanon: the Sectarian Narration of the Tayouneh Events

By Alessandro RICCI

Executive summary: *Lebanon is facing today one of the deepest and most intense crises of the entire Middle East region. It is a mix of social, political, and economic issues, which have not been properly addressed by the political system in the past years that is currently showing its consequences. One of the reasons behind the failure of the political class to find the right answers to the numerous problems is the high degree of sectarianism¹ that permeates not only the political sphere of the country but also other aspects of the social and economic landscape of Lebanon. In this paper, it will be investigated whether and how the media sector changes its narration of the events according to its political affiliation. More specifically, it will be conducted a study on the newspaper sector by taking extracts from three different news agencies which are related to the three main different religious communities in Lebanon: Sunni, Shia, and Christian. The analysis intends to understand whether or not they openly express their affiliation and how this affects different perceptions of the same event. The facts taken into consideration in this paper will be the ones related to the 14th of October 2021 protests, when 7 people were killed in a gunfight and that made many observers call it a “new Lebanese Civil War”.*

The framework of the crisis

On the 14th of October 2021, a protest held in Beirut ended with 7 people dead and more than 30 others injured by a gunfight that started at the end of the demonstration in the central quarter of Tayouneh. These violent events – which have alarmed observers and analysts both inside and outside the country for its strong sectarian connotation – are the last

episodes of a general crisis period that Lebanon has been facing since at least the final months of 2019. As a matter of fact, in the last years, in the country, numerous protests have been going on against the tax rises, the perceived corruption of the political class, and the high rate of unemployment that Lebanon has been facing for years. For this reason, in order to fully comprehend the events

and the causes of the 14th of October 2021, it is worth doing a step back to the Autumn 2019, when an “*economy state of emergence*” was declared in Lebanon by the political establishment, as the economy fell to its point of no return, with the public debt that reached 150% of the Lebanese GDP².

To solve this difficult economic issue, a series of austerity measures were proposed in the drafting of the 2020 budget plan between September and October 2019. However, the proposed cuts and new taxes triggered the rage of a population whose economic conditions were already fragile while the political system was at the same time perceived to be highly corrupted³. Among other things, the proposed budget plan included new taxes on tobacco, gasoline, and the infamous fee on WhatsApp calls which made Lebanese people gather in the streets in October 2019⁴. It is worth noting that during these protests, people aggregated no matter the differences among their religious affiliations. The united front of the protestors shared, in fact, the same objective, namely to make Saad Hariri’s government resign and to cancel the austerity measures inserted in the drafting plan. By the end of the month, after several weeks of continuous protests, Saad Hariri decided to step down, while cutting down the salary of ministers and Members of the Parliament.

Between December 2019 and January 2020, a new government was formed under the leadership of the technocrat Hassan Diab. However, this new government was not able to deliver efficient responses due to the fact that it resigned after the massive explosion of the Beirut Port that took place on the 4th of August 2020 that killed more than 200 people, injured another 7,000 and displaced other 300,000. The Port explosion represented the last strike for a city and a country that were already on the verge of collapsing. In fact, not only has not Lebanon recovered since those events but has seen its general situation continuously deteriorate given also the impact of COVID-19. According to World Health Organization (WHO), as of the 1st of November 2021, there have been 641,339 reported cases and 8,495 deaths in Lebanon because of the pandemic⁵ over an estimated population of less than 7 million.

After Diab’s resignation from the office, a political stall, mostly generated by differences inside the Parliamentary forces, has hampered the formation of a new government until September 2021, when Najib Mikati was elected from the Parliament and assumed office as Prime Minister⁶. Personal rivalries between the two main key political figures inside the Parliament, Saad Hariri – leader of the Sunni Future Movement party and the former Prime

Minister – and Gebran Bassil – leader of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Lebanese President Michael Aoun’s son in law – have caused this long delay. Both of them have tried to take advantage of the situation to obtain a certain degree of political power, but without yielding any success⁷. This has delayed any political action that the country desperately needed to tackle from the economic to the healthcare domains.

In these voids left by the State, the local actors have thrived and come to be perceived as the real forces that are able to find a solution for the practical needs of the civil society. For example, in August 2021, Lebanon has suffered from a serious shortage of fuel which led to an unprecedented oil scarcity due to impossibility for the country to pay for its imports. Not only has this provoked a general problem with fuel for private citizens but also the electricity generators did not have any fuel to work properly, leaving Beirut to experience continuous blackouts that caused the shutting of many important activities such as hospitals and bakeries⁸. The Shia and Iran-backed party Hezbollah has exploited the situation by bringing Iranian fuel without any permission given by the central authority, although gaining huge popular support⁹. Not only has Hezbollah achieved an important position inside

the civilian world, but also at the international level. At the end of October 2021, Saudi Arabia has cut diplomatic relations with Lebanon, after having expressed a “domination of Hezbollah [and Iran] over the politics of the country”¹⁰.

The 14th of October 2021 protests: an outlook from the outside

As already mentioned, the 14th of October 2021 protests are just one episode of the deep crisis that Lebanon has been facing during the past years. In fact, as the economic crisis worsened, also the social fabric of the country has gradually deteriorated. Sectarian divisions have risen again both in the political arena and on the social stage. In this sense, the 14th of October protests are a perfect example of a renewed use of sectarian affiliation to reach a political aim, after the abovementioned cross-sectarian mobilization of 2019. Notwithstanding the fact that numerous rounds of protests have taken place in Lebanon since at least the end of 2019, these last demonstrations, instead, have had a clear sectarian stance. First of all, the protest was organized by Hezbollah with the sole support of its ally, the Amal Movement, another Shia actor. During the protests, violence erupted in the Tayouneh neighborhood and the surrounding area as six protesters were shot dead, allegedly from snipers

belonging to the Christian-Maronite, right-wing militia, the Lebanese Forces. The leader of the militia, Samir Geagea, has denied any responsibility for the deaths of the protestors, accusing instead Hezbollah to be the only responsible¹¹. The gunfight between the protestors – which were heavily armed – and the other side has been going on for hours wounding dozens of civilians and killing a woman in her house.

The eruption of the violent events can be better understood by mentioning why the protests were organized in the first place. On the days before the events, Hezbollah asked for the removal of the appointed judge Tarek Bitar who is currently investigating the events related to the Beirut Port explosion. Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, accused Bitar of being biased, conducting a politicized investigation¹². These demands made by the Shiite party, however, were not received by the political establishment. For this reason, Hezbollah, with the support of its ally, the Amal Movement, organized the protest on the 14th of October 2021.

Although the responsibilities for the explosion are yet to be determined, it must remember that in the immediate days following the explosion, Hezbollah was the first actor to be in part responsible for the explosion because of the control it exercises over the Port. However, the investigations

are still ongoing to assess the responsibilities even if the recent conflicts have slowed them.

The print sector in Lebanon

Before diving into the main question of the paper, it would be of certain interest to make a first sketch of the media condition in Lebanon. As a matter of fact, Lebanon has historically acted as an important free harbor for the media sector in the broader Middle East region, particularly for what concerns the print sector. In the second half of the 20th Century, the print sector in Lebanon has enjoyed a high degree of liberty and diversity, due to its very political structure. This condition has permitted the circulation of numerous newspapers free from the governmental monopoly over the news sector, which represented a unique condition in the landscape of the other Arab countries, where the press and the media sector were strictly firm in the hand of the government¹³. Even if politics had long tried to bring the press sector under its control, the golden age of the press in Lebanon has lasted until the Civil War: in 1977 a censorship law was passed because the media sector was accused of intensifying the conflicts. This was just the first of other decrees that limited the range of action of the print sector that would follow in the next years¹⁴. As

Trombetta (2018) puts it, in post-war Lebanon, the media sector has represented a new ground where the sectarian affiliations have played a primary role. Newspapers and TV channels have gradually become associated with political and/or religious parties, relegating them to the role of groups' propaganda. This has become possible because of a general funding crisis that has struck the Lebanese print sector – in a mix of disillusion towards the partisan news system by the readers, the boom of internet-based news sharing, and the economic crisis. The post-war period led the newspaper sector to find new investments in order to avoid closure as happened to many newspapers in the last years. Therefore, funding started to flow in the print sector from privates tied with the different communities, bringing the newspapers' sector into the sectarian arena¹⁵. The last newspaper that incurred this fate is the English language daily “the Daily Star”, which shut its activities down at the beginning of November 2021, given the financial problems¹⁶.

After the assassinations of Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and the subsequent so-called “Cedar Revolution”, the country split again among the March 8th Alliance – pro-Syrian, mostly sustained by the FPM as well as Hezbollah and Amal – and the March 14th Alliance – with has an anti-Syrian

stance, today led by Saad Hariri. This division has been another line along which the Lebanese media sector has found new ground for politicizing itself and creating new alliances and enmities¹⁷.

The newspaper narration of the 14th of October 2021 protests

For the aim of the study, the research will be conducted on articles extracted from the online version of three newspapers, as the research is conducted outside Lebanon. All the articles are written in Arabic and come from the respective section of the websites that addresses Lebanese internal questions. Obviously, it will not be possible here to go through every single article published on the Tayouneh events, which, as it can be imagined, have made the journalists pour rivers of ink. What will be done, instead, is a summary of how the different newspapers address the question taking into consideration those elements which appear to be more significant than others in the descriptions, titles, and articles, citing whenever necessary a specific article believed to be of certain importance for the purpose of this study.

The three newspapers chosen for this research are the *Al-Mustaqbal* (“the Future”), a daily newspaper which is tied with the Sunni community – more precisely with the Future Movement Party with whom share also its name –

as it is owned by the Hariri family since decades. As a matter of fact, a section of the website is dedicated exclusively to the activities and the news from the party. For the Shia community, instead, the choice of the newspaper has fallen on the *Al-Akhbar* (“the News”). This newspaper is daily and is generally recognized to adopt an uncritical stance regarding Hezbollah, even if an official declaration of affiliation has never been released. Lastly, for the Christian community, the chosen newspaper is an online-based information portal that is owned by the FPM party, *alTayyar.org*. In the same way, as happens with *Al-Mustaqbal*, the website hosts an entire section dedicated to the Party and all the news related to President Aoun.

Al-Mustaqbal

The Sunni newspaper largely seems to adopt a very critical stance in regards to the Shia and Christian communities. In general, for what concerns the protests and the violence that followed, *Al Mustaqbal* mostly focuses on how these events harm Lebanon and how the political establishment is unable to keep the country together. In this sense, it will not surprise that the most important accusations fall on Hezbollah and other actors perceived as sectarian, not only for the consequences of the Tayouneh events but also for the

general critical situation, spanning from the opposition to Tarek Bitar to the sectarianization. Still present but in a lesser measure are the accusations toward the Christian President Michael Aoun, mostly for his incapacity to hold still against Hezbollah. The Lebanese State is also criticized because of the fact the army did not intervene in order to block the violence.

The articles that can be found on the *Al-Mustaqbal* are mostly of three types. The first consists of classic news pieces about the events, which are typically very short. The second type is represented by interviews from politicians, spokespeople, and other journalists, which, as it can be imagined, mostly come from people close to the Sunni side or that criticize the other communities. For example, in an article is reported an interview released by the media coordinator of the Future Movement party – Abd al-Salam Moussa – on the subject of the opposition to the investigations of Bitar by Hezbollah and Amal, where he criticizes both Nasrallah and Aoun, saying that they are allied in bringing Iran in Lebanon, by “*spreading ignorance*” in the country¹⁸. Another example is an extract of an interview with Samir Geagea, where he criticizes Hezbollah and hopes that the government will resist “*the blackmail*” of the Shia party¹⁹. After the shootings of Tayouneh, Samir Geagea has found

an extraordinary place in the media, both for what concerns the responsibility of the Lebanese Forces for the violence and for the accuses he brings against Hezbollah.

The third and most important kind of article for the purpose of this research is what we could define as the “*opinion*” one. This type of piece is usually longer than the others and more often than not comes with a provocative title. These articles usually give a direct or indirect judgment on the topic that is described: it is possible to find numerous examples of this type. On the 15th of September 2021, it has been published an article titled “*Wild activities*”²⁰ referred to the deaths of the shootings. An article published on the 29th of the same month called “*the polytheism of the State*”²¹ represents another perfect example of this opinion piece: it criticizes the sectarian partition of Lebanon which only causes corruption and divisions, of which the Tayouneh events represent one of the possible outcomes. According to the article, from one side, the country is in the hand of corrupted people – which do not have any intention to improve the system – and, on the other hand, the Lebanese citizens are accustomed to this state of things.

Al-Akhbar

For what it concerns the *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, it is possible to say that the speculations over its unofficial affiliation with Hezbollah are respected in this case as well. *Al - Akhbar*, in fact, appears to adopt a more aggressive attitude for what concerns the Tayouneh events than the *Al-Mustaqbal*, mostly for what concerns the role of the Lebanese Forces and the person of Samir Geagea. On the website of the newspaper is also possible to read and download the paper edition of any given day. This makes it possible to have a clearer and more complete sight of the events we are investigating. The edition of the newspaper of the 15th of October 2021²² opens with a strong caricature of Samir Geagea dressed and posing as a Nazi leader, titling with the word “*hattaman*”, an adverb that has the meaning of ineluctability. In the following pages, the *Al-Akhbar* journalists go on with very long and provocative articles on the gunshots and the dead people. As a matter of fact, the articles are mostly used as a platform to attack every actor both inside and outside the country, from the Prime Minister Mikati to President Aoun, to Saudi Arabia to Israel, not forgetting other news media which had sided against Hezbollah or that have designed it as the responsible for the violence. What is also important to

note is that the seven dead people have become martyrs (“*shuhada*’”) in the narration of the newspaper. In addition, about the victims the newspaper gives a very pathetic description of their broken lives, of their families’ sorrow, highlighting the responsibilities of the Lebanese Forces which “did not shoot for error”.

On the edition of the 16th of October 2021, the newspaper starts again with a provocative title: “*America menaces Mikati: it is forbidden to remove Bitar*”²³. The opening image is a photo taken during the funerals of the victims of Tayouneh of a coffin wrapped in the Hezbollah flag, transported by an immense crowd. Unquestionably, given the image and the title, the newspaper sides one more time with Hezbollah, by supporting his request to remove the judge Tarek Bitar on one hand, and indirectly showing the strength of the Shiite Party, on the other hand. By doing so, it also takes a stance against the United States, Hezbollah, and Iran’s rival. As the edition of the day before, the entire first part of the newspaper is dedicated to the Tayouneh events. The tones of the articles do not change and new accusations are moved towards the “Christians”, which intimidates their enemies with their militias. The emotional section is again present with the necrologies of the dead peoples, again labelled as “martyrs”. Interestingly enough, two pages of the

newspaper are dedicated to the civil war, hosting an editorial on how the Tayouneh violence could escalate into a civil war with possible intervention of external powers.

In the same vein, in the edition of the 20th of October 2021, the newspaper fiercely attacks the Sunni side by tilting the edition of the day: “*Saudi Arabia mobilize his supporters behind Geagea*”²⁴. In this article, the newspaper denounces an alliance anti-Hezbollah formed by important Sunnis and Christians political figures of Lebanon, supported internationally by Saudi Arabia and the United States. According to the article, this alliance will sustain Samir Geagea against Hezbollah in the future. The editions of the *Al-Akhbar* from this day onwards focus less on the Tayouneh events than the first days. Only small portions of the newspapers would address the question, in the cases political exponents release some statement about the topic, maintaining a generally positive or negative attitude based on the specific person.

AlTayyar.org

Lastly, the *AlTayyar* website will provide the point of view of a Christian news agency on the question. It will be of interest to see how this particular news agency addresses the question because it must be remembered that the relationships between the FPM and the Lebanese

Forces are not straightforward as one may think given the sectarian framework. In fact, they fought each other during the Civil War and today the FPM maintains strong contacts with Hezbollah. In 2016 the two Christian sides became allied for the elections of Michael Aoun as President, but in September 2020, another crisis sparked inside the Christian front, dividing it again²⁵. In general, most of the articles published on the website seem to adopt a less politicized vision of the events. This sensation is given by the type of articles that could be found on the website. Most of them are just narration of what has happened during the Tayouneh events, giving numbers and figures or reporting statements of the key political figures, Sunni, Shiite, and Christians alike. The vast majority of the articles are very short – which may be given also to the fact that the newspaper is online-based – and the majority of times, the articles reported are extracts from other newspapers.

However, there are some original pieces that give – although quite indirectly – some opinions of the editorial board. In an article called “*How appeared Tayouneh today*”²⁶ and published on the 15th of October 2021, the newspaper describes the situation in Tayouneh on the day after the events. In general, it says, the calm seems to have returned to the neighborhood. It appears, however,

that the responsibilities for the events fall only on Hezbollah and Amal, while the Lebanese Forces and Samir Geagea are not mentioned at all. On the other side, a great emphasis is posed the political establishment – in the person of President Aoun and Prime Minister Mikati – that has the role of rebuilding the peace inside Lebanon. This does not mean, however, that AlTayyar takes the defense of the Lebanese Forces. In fact, over the days, numerous interviews are reported from political and civilian spokespeople who accuse Geagea and the Militia for the chaos, apparently to a greater extent to what happens with Hezbollah.

A peculiarity not found in the other newspapers and that highlights the affiliation of the news agency is that the words of Christian authorities on the events are reported. Extracts from sermons of the Patriarch of Antioch, Youssef al-Absi, as well as the Maronite Patriarch, Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, are reported. They invite to peace and calm after a situation that resembled the Civil War, inviting the population to have faith in the political establishment²⁷. Using the words of Boutros al-Rahi, in fact, the news agency reports a eulogy to the Lebanese democratic system, as well as the armed forces²⁸. What is also important to notice is that in most of the articles published on AlTayyar, as already seen with *Al-Akhbar*, the

victims of the shootings are labelled as “martyrs”, denoting a common approach on the description of innocent victims of the shootings, which in this case, crosses even religious differences.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this paper has shown that it is possible to confirm that the different newspapers adopt different stances and interpretations of the same event based on their affiliations as theorized in the last years. In fact, none of the three newspapers tried to describe the Tayouneh events with a neutral approach – with the sole possible exception of the *AlTayyar*, but for reasons that are explainable with its structure. On the other hand, the denouncing of the sectarian divisions inside Lebanon, which causes only harm to the country, by freezing its activities and the quest for finding the solution to the crisis, is a common element to all the three news agencies. This apparent paradox is explicable, however, bearing in mind the very nature of the sectarian framework, which creates a vicious cycle where the most sectarian actors are the ones who also criticize the behavior. Sectarianization is also a theme that generates sensationalism, which for the media sector remains a way to generate more income. Therefore, as described by Salloukh, et al. (2015), the main question

remains the fact that from their owned media politicians “either demonize their opponents or advance their own sectarian interests”²⁹. From the words of the articles analyzed in this paper we have witnessed how, more often than not, enemies are attacked, while defending, at the same time, the side to which the newspaper belongs.

The Sunni *Al-Mustaqbal* maintains a general critical outlook on all the opposing forces – from the State forces, such as the Army, to the Christian and Shia parties. It must be remembered, however, that in the events of the 14th of October 2021 protests, the Sunni community has played a marginal role. Nevertheless, it remains of great interest to see how inside the broader sectarian conflict the Sunni community has perceived and reported the events.

Al-Akhbar, on the other hand, is the newspaper that takes the strongest and clearer stance on the question. It finds the responsibilities of the deaths exclusively on the Lebanese Forces, as Samir Geagea is continuously denounced as the responsible for the deaths, as the picture on the first page of the edition of the 15th of October 2021 suggests. In addition, critics are also moved toward all the political spectrum as the newspaper finds in external power, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, the foreign actors that finance a sectarian, anti-Hezbollah network.

Lastly, the FPM-owned *AlTayyar*, given its strong relations to the Presidency of the Republic does not appear as critical of the political establishment as its counterparts. However, it does not publish as *Al-Mustaqbal* and *Al-Akhbar* the same amount of independent editorial and news. Therefore, it is possible to say that the *AlTayyar* website is more an amplifier for the FPM than a classical news agency: President Michael Aoun seems in fact to be overrepresented for his declarations and actions on the news portal. Definitively, *AlTayyar*

remains more cautious about denouncing the structural problems of Lebanon.

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¹ The term “sectarianization” will extensively be used throughout the paper. It must be intended exclusively as the exploitation of primary identities such as the religious and confessional membership to achieve political ends by a State or a Party. Therefore, it is not to be intended as an incompatibility for the different religious communities to live in peace and harmony because of alleged ancient hatred based on their difference of creed and traditions. Lebanon is one of the Countries where the sectarian conflict has always played a pivotal role in shaping its history. Therefore, understanding the sectarian panorama in Lebanon is of primary importance to fully comprehend its social and political dynamics. Today, a “sectarian war” is mostly played at a regional level between Saudi Arabia and Iran through the creation of networks of allies and enemies based on shared or opposed confessionalism.

² AP News. (2019, September 2). Lebanese officials declare state of economic emergency. Retrieved October 2021, from AP News: <https://apnews.com/article/15174b976df24e4bab316474f1a347af>

³ In the very same days of the 2020 budget law drafting, premier Saad Hariri was accused of having transferred 16 million dollars to a South African top model with whom he had an affair. Even if the money has not been taken directly from the State, the timeframe in which this story happened contributed to fueling the protests.

⁴ Al Jazeera. (2019, October 17). Protests erupt in Lebanon over plans to impose new taxes. Retrieved October 2021, from Al Jazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/17/protests-erupt-in-lebanon-over-plans-to-impose-new-taxes/>

⁵ <https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/lb>. Website accessed on November 1, 2021

⁶ It is worth remembering that the most important political positions in Lebanon are divided among the Christian, Sunni, and Shia communities: the President of the Republic must come from the Christian-Maronite community, the Prime Minister, instead, must be chosen among the Sunni community while the Speaker of the Parliament from the Shia community. This

kind of “institutionalized sectarianization” is the result of the Taif Agreement which concluded the Lebanese Civil War.

⁷ Young, M. (2021, May 12). Their Suicide Pact. Retrieved October 2021, from Carnegie Middle East Center: <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/84507>

⁸ Bassam, N., & Eltahir, L. (2021, August 13). Lebanese leaders at loggerheads as fuel crisis worsens. Retrieved October 2021, from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanese-oil-directorate-importers-must-supply-stored-fuel-original-purchase-2021-08-13/>

⁹ Abdallah, I. (2021, September 16). Feted with petals, Hezbollah brings Iranian fuel into Lebanon. Retrieved October 2021, from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-brings-iranian-fuel-into-lebanon-al-manar-tv-says-2021-09-16/>

¹⁰ L'Orient-Le Jour. (2021, 31 October). L'Arabie saoudite dénonce “la domination du Hezbollah” sur le Liban. Retrieved November 2021, from L'Orient-Le Jour: <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1279887/larabie-saoudite-denonce-la-domination-du-hezbollah-sur-le-liban.html?fbclid=IwAR2jZFzI2OkdF19v14-6KleNdSXawXczrsIiUcA37GPrCUVnvZU8ENzy7tk>

¹¹ Abi Nassif, C. (2021, October 15). Making sense of the Beirut clashes. Retrieved November 2021, from Middle East Institute: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/making-sense-beirut-clashes>

¹² <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211019-hezbollah-s-campaign-against-beirut-blast-judge-paralyses-lebanon-s-government>

¹³ Ayish, M. I. (2008). The New Arab Public Sphere. Germany: Frank & Timme, p.122

¹⁴ Dajani, N. (2019). The Media in Lebanon: Fragmentation and Conflict in the Middle East. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, pp. 29-30

¹⁵ Trombetta, L. (2018). Lebanon - Media Landscape. European Journalism Centre (EJC)

¹⁶ ANSA Med. (2021, November 2). Lebanon: Daily Star closes definitively due to crisis. Retrieved from ANSA Med: https://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/culture/2021/11/02/lebanon-daily-star-closes-definitively-due-to-crisis_0311da94-c5c9-4453-9043-bd9c165918d7.html

¹⁷ Dajani, N. (2019). The Media in Lebanon: Fragmentation and Conflict in the Middle East, p. 37

¹⁸ Moussa to Al-Arabiya: “Hezbollah” and Aoun want to blow up the investigation... and Nasrallah “instead of what would make her blind”! Available at: <https://mustaqbalweb.com/article/موسى لـ“العربية”: “حزب الله” وعون يريدان تطيير التحقيق.. ونصر الله “بدل ما يكحلها عماها!”,>

¹⁹ Geagea: “on the President of the republic and the Government to resist the blackmailing of Hezbollah”. Available at: <https://mustaqbalweb.com/article/1جججج: على رئيسي الجمهورية والحكومة الصمود أمام ابتزاز “حزب الله”>

²⁰ نشاط بري " Wild activities. Available at: <https://mustaqbalweb.com/article/نشاط بري>

²¹ "الشرك بالدولة", the polytheism of the State. Available at: <https://mustaqbalweb.com/article/الشرك بالدولة/>

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- ²² https://www.al-akhbar.com/PDF_Files/4464/alakhbar_20211015.pdf
- ²³ https://www.al-akhbar.com/PDF_Files/4465/alakhbar_20211016.pdf
- ²⁴ https://www.al-akhbar.com/PDF_Files/4467/alakhbar_20211020.pdf
- ²⁵ Perry, T., & Francis, E. (2020, September 17). 'Boiling again': Lebanon's old Christian rivalries rear up amid crisis. Retrieved November 2021, from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-tensions-christians-int-idUSKBN26824Q>
- ²⁶ "كيف بدت الطيونة اليوم... ", How appeared Tayouneh today. Available at: <https://www.tayyar.org/News/Lebanon/439876/?..كيف بدت الطيونة اليوم..>
- ²⁷ "العبيسي يستنكر العودة إلى أجواء تعيد للذاكرة الحرب الأهلية" , - AbsiAl-Absi denounces the return to an atmosphere that recalls the civil war. Available at: <https://www.tayyar.org/News/Lebanon/440079/العبيسي يستنكر العودة إلى أجواء تعيد للذاكرة الحرب الأهلية>.
- ²⁸ "الراعي يستنكر أحداث الخميس: المس بالسلم الوطني وحسن الجوار الأخوي مرفوض أيا يكن مصدره" , Al-Rahi condemns Thursday's events: harming national peace and brotherly good-neighborliness is unacceptable, regardless of its source. Available at: <https://www.tayyar.org/News/Lebanon/440182/الراعي يستنكر أحداث الخميس: المس بالسلم الوطني وحسن الجوار الأخوي مرفوض أيا يكن مصدره>
- ²⁹ Salloukh, Bassel F., Rabie Barakat, Jinan S. Al-Habbal, Lara W. Khattab & Shoghig Mikaelian. The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon. London: Pluto Press, 2015, p 154.

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