by Ms. Diana Maria Dumitru•Published on March 29, 2025

The Arab plan for the reconstruction of Gaza is facing significant challenges from the U.S. and Israel after positioning itself as a viable alternative to Trump’s Riviera.

The Cairo Summit, organized by the Arab League, ended in the formulation of a realistic plan to replace Trump’s vision of displacing Palestinians and building a Gaza Riviera. The Arab plan has managed to garner the support of many officials, but it is being harshly criticized by the U.S. and Israel for being unrealistically optimistic about the habitability of Gaza and for failing to address the issue of Hamas and its arsenal.

Background

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has entered a new stage of developments prompted by the plan put forward on the 4^th of February 2025 by United States President Donald Trump in a conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held at the White House. Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” proposal entails the mass displacement of approximately 2 million Palestinians and their relocation to Egypt and Jordan, while the Gaza Strip would become a stylish place of entertainment for the rich under the long-term control of the United States.

Needless to say, international backlash was sparked by this plan, and firm opposition from the Arab states ensued, with many officials arguing that this course of events would lead to regional instability and a modern-day Nakba. In this sense, practical questions have been raised by the international community concerning the economic feasibility of the plan and the integration of Palestinians in the already unstable states of Jordan and Egypt, but also more abstract ones, such as the nature of the right to self-determination of people and the purpose of international organizations like the United Nations.

The Arab Plan for the Reconstruction of Gaza

On the 21^st of February 2025, officials from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan began to formulate a rival plan for Trump at an informal meeting in Riyadh. The absence of Palestinian officials from the meeting attracted the disapproval of Oman, whose officials did not attend the meeting either. This meeting was followed by a summit held in Cairo on the 4^th of March 2025, which the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did not attend. During the summit, a more concrete plan for the reconstruction of Gaza started to take shape under the guidance of the Arab states, which proposed a 53-billion-dollar reconstruction in three phases. The first phase would be called the “Early Recovery Phase” and would benefit from a budget of 3 million dollars in order to take care of mine and unexploded ordnance removal, debris clearance, provision of temporary housing, and renovation of partially damaged buildings, as is stated in the official document detailing the Arab proposal. The second stage would mark the beginning of reconstructions and would cover the establishment of infrastructure, service networks, permanent housing units, and the reclamation of 20,000 feddans, having an allocated budget of $20 billion and 2027 as an estimated time of completion. Finally, the last phase marks the conclusion of reconstructions and promises the completion of infrastructure and the establishment of industrial zones, fishing and commercial ports, and an airport. The allocated budget for the last phase amounts to $30 billion, and the estimated time of completion is 2030.

Support and opposition

This plan has been welcomed by all Arab states and has received the support of the European Union, with the latter stressing the importance of reaching an agreement favorable to both Israelis and Palestinians in a statement published on the European External Action Service website. Hamas has also agreed to relinquish its control over Gaza as long as Palestinians are in charge of their territory, but has adamantly refused to comply with a request for disarmament.

On the other hand, Israel has placed itself in firm opposition, while the United States does not have a clear position yet, claiming that the Arab plan is not practical and does not address critical issues, such as the future of Hamas, the governing capabilities of the Palestinian Authority, and the reality of living conditions in Gaza.

The Future of Hamas in Gaza

Since the Arab plan failed to disentangle the future role of Hamas, several actors have stepped in to assert their position on this matter. Unsurprisingly, Israel has been very vocal about neutralizing the threat that Hamas poses to its security, a fact that is also agreed upon by the European Union, which recognizes Hamas as a terrorist organization. In response to these demands, a senior Hamas official has proclaimed Hamas an integral part of the socio-political life of Palestinians, putting forward a model where the organization would retain military power while a separate authority would govern political affairs. At the moment, Hamas’s arsenal represents a critical bargaining chip, and the only way to ensure its disarmament would be the creation of a Palestinian state, which is the very outcome Israel is trying to prevent.

The Role of the Palestinian Authority

While the Arab plan proposes the transition of Gaza to the control of the Palestinian Authority over the course of half a year, the viability of this initiative is questionable, as the PA has become a deeply unpopular institution under the rule of President Mahmoud Abbas. President Abbas’s legitimacy has been eroded by the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of his rule and by the security deals made with Israel to expand its occupation in the area, so a return of the PA in Gaza has to come after a period of reform and compromise, which would only hinder the efforts of reconstruction.

Moreover, a coordination of the West Bank and Gaza under the same authority would only serve as a catalyst for the creation of a Palestinian state. Thus, Israel also vehemently opposes the presence of the PA in the Gaza Strip, hoping to enforce at the political level what it achieved geographically: to separate the Palestinian population.

Living conditions in Gaza

The dire nature of living conditions in Gaza might prevent states from proceeding with an agreement, since it is necessary to conduct a realistic and thorough assessment of the damage made by the war and to account for unforeseeable additional costs of reconstruction. Gaza is virtually uninhabitable, with critical infrastructure destroyed, and almost 1.9 million people of its population internally displaced and living in poverty.

Recent Developments

Although the Arab proposal had initially achieved international traction, there are already cracks coming to the surface within the plan, as the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has given his approval to temporarily relocate up to 500,000 Gaza residents in northern Sinai, thus shattering the newfound hope of Palestinians living on their ancestral land. Moreover, it was reported that the UAE has been lobbying the United States to reject Egypt’s plan for post-war Gaza, since it could not oppose it outwardly at the summit in Cairo. Lastly, besides claiming the killing of the head of Hamas military intelligence, Israel set out to establish a government agency that would oversee the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, an agency which would be under the supervision of the Defense Ministry.

Conclusions

All things considered, the Arab plan positions itself as the first project proposal that seeks to ensure Palestinian control over the Gaza Strip, having been well received by the international community. However, for the plan to take shape, the issue of the future position of Hamas in Palestinian society has to be settled, and the Israeli quest for the Palestinian territory has to be halted by the U.S., which is the only superpower in a position to strongarm the Israelis into a more submissive role.

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Ms. Diana Maria Dumitru

Ms. Diana Maria Dumitru is a BA student in International Relations and European Studies at the University of Bucharest. Her research interests are centered around the process of cultural globalization, with a particular focus on the role of the media in shaping identities and desires. Other areas of interest are history of international relations, international law, and literature. She is a intern at MEPEI.