by Larisa-Nicoleta PĂTRAȘCU •Published on February 3, 2026

The Board of Peace (BoP), as unveiled at the World Economic Forum in Davos, has been framed by many as controversial, illegitimate, or even as a challenge to the United Nations system. There is, however, a straightforward perspective too. BoP as it was presented does in fact comply with the United Nations Security Council resolution that approved it. If there is a “culprit”, it is the language of the resolution that allows for such a structure of the BoP in the first place.

Charter logic, stakeholder governance, and gentrification

 The UNSC resolution explicitly welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace as a transitional administration with international legal personality and authorizes it to set the framework and coordinate funding for the redevelopment of Gaza according to the Comprehensive Plan. It also specifies that this process is to be funded through voluntary contributions and BoP funding vehicles, relying on the participation of member states and donors rather than on compulsory mechanisms[1].  The Board’s charter follows this logic closely. It defines the BoP as an international organization operating in accordance with international law, structured around member state participation, with each member state represented by its head of state or government, and funded through voluntary contributions from states, organizations, or other sources[2].

From the sustainability of the project point of view, this makes sense. The Board itself follows capitalist and corporation-like principles. By involving stakeholders directly as funders, it effectively turns them into future guarantors of the developments. Those who invest have an interest in protecting outcomes and ensuring continuity. It is a model that mirrors familiar western approaches to development. In this context, one can legitimately argue “gentrification”. Reconstruction is tied to investment, investment to security, and security to political control. This logic was visible during the Davos ceremony, where security was presented as a precondition for investment, and investment as the engine for jobs and stability[3].

Security doctrines and the USA–Israel–Iran triangle

 The challenges lie in humanitarian approaches and security doctrines. As much as popular opinion would not like to admit it, the fact of the matter is that US interventions in the region, with the exception of Iran, are more balanced than they are often portrayed. The Trump administration is playing a complex game of give and take with Netanyahu’s government, at times restricting and interfering with Israeli objectives, while at the same time opening new venues of cooperation. This approach is consistent with the broader US strategic posture outlined in the newly published National Defense Strategy, which emphasizes a resource-sustainable approach, delegation to regional partners, and avoiding over-involvement that is seen as a waste of resources[4].

In the UN resolution, and as far as it looks in Trump’s view as well, Israel is only a part of the conflict that needs to be ended, not an actor exempt from constraints[5]. Israel does retain a preferential position with regard to the USA, as it remains the biggest US ally in the region. But that position does not go above American objectives. When Israeli actions risk destabilizing the region too much, particularly in Gaza and Syria, US intervention becomes visible – in the case of the West Bank not so much.

Israeli public statements continue to focus on the elimination of Hamas, the return of hostages, and the reinforcement of anti-Palestinian resentment. Behind this, however, Israel still needs to comply with the decisions linked to the BoP. Israel’s entry into the Board itself had to be made a controversial topic in order to maintain a perception of control.

Israel, for its part, sees the Executive Board as contrary to its objectives and has strongly condemned the involvement of Türkiye and Qatar. Israeli officials have argued that including states with long-term links to Hamas bolsters the group’s political standing, and Netanyahu has publicly rejected any Turkish or Qatari role on the ground[6]. However, this position reads more like short-sightedness on Israel’s side, as it places too much certainty in the relationship with the United States. This dynamic is clearly visible in the handling of the Rafah crossing.

Opening Rafah was inevitable. It is the central future node where the entire project is supposed to start. Yet it was used for political capital points, with Israel conditioning reopening on the return of hostage remains and proposing mechanisms that would allow indirect control over the crossing[7].  Subsequent reporting shows Israel agreeing to a limited reopening as part of Trump’s 20-point plan[8], under US pressure[9], and against internal resistance from far-right ministers.

This logic does not apply in the same way to the United States. In Trump’s approach, Hamas disarmament is more a language and security projection issue tied to the implementation of the 20-point Plan. The USA needs to project security. How that security is achieved matters less. It can also happen through a win-win situation, where a large part of Hamas ends up being involved in future developments. Prominent figures will face consequences, but most members could end up profiting from reconstruction. While Israel has conditioned itself in terrorist rhetoric and cannot be perceived as backing down – otherwise, what were the last two years for? – the USA goes ahead with Kushner’s development plan, not stressing disarmament as an absolute condition, as it may happen organically[10].  Winning over Hamas would also be a blow to Iran’s axis of resistance. Destroying it has proved unachievable so far. That is because radicalization cannot be killed in battle, but through soft-power means and integration.

A key point in the success of the project is Palestinian civil society. Humanitarian access and international organisations, even the ones Trump opted out of , need to be allowed to intervene, and basic needs must be assured as fast as possible. The UN resolution itself makes clear that Gaza’s future cannot be shaped without Palestinians, authorizing the supervision of a Palestinian technocratic committee and the delivery of humanitarian assistance as part of the BoP framework. The White House framing of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza similarly emphasizes technocratic governance and restoration of services as the foundation for longer-term stability[11], however, with the deliberate omission of the word “Palestinian”[12].

This approach aligns with the U.S. National Defense Strategy too, and it focuses on maintaining the ability to act decisively when U.S. interests are at stake. The BoP is central in this sense, because it motivates multiple powers to be involved financially, reducing the need for direct US ownership of the process.

Participation in the Board is therefore driven by access and leverage. States want a direct line to the White House, a seat where contracts, corridors, crossings, and timelines are decided, and participation also functions as insurance against future exclusion[13]. Russia’s reported willingness to contribute significant funding from frozen assets[14], mentioning the Palestinian people as central in the process, even while remaining outside the Board for the moment, further underlines this logic.

Regional agency: the Arab League, Europe, and fragmented ownership

 A central question in this framework is the role of regional actors. Where is the Arab League in all of this? The UN resolution explicitly references a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee “as championed by the Arab League”, which is tasked with overseeing Gaza’s day-to-day civil administration. As a whole, the Arab League is therefore included in the UN framework. However, beyond this reference, there are no further mentions of concrete responsibilities assigned to the Arab League.

The Board of Peace charter, meanwhile, is structured primarily through member states. While it does allow the chairman to invite relevant actors and organizations to participate in proceedings, which would include the Arab League as an entity, more advantageous positions are clearly achieved through member state quality rather than organizational participation. In practical terms, it therefore makes more sense for Arab League states to join individually in order to follow and protect their interests, rather than relying on the League as a collective channel.

Europe occupies a similarly marginal position. Europe is not considered for playing a big part, and once we look beyond public declarations related to the humanitarian situation, human rights, and international law, it becomes clear that Europe itself prefers to make use of existing frameworks to provide some assistance, while at the same time showing little interest in becoming too involved politically. This is supported by the EU’s role at the Rafah crossing, where it will have a mission to monitor and carry out checks, acting as a bridge between the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and Israel[15]. European leaders broadly supported Resolution 2803, but most have avoided the BoP, citing concerns over its mandate and implications for the UN system[16]. This distance reflects caution and political risk management, as the universality of the BoP is not restricted to Gaza, and entering into a Trump-centric framework could then pose new challenges for NATO and the Greenland issue.

Final Considerations

In practice, the fact that Trump’s BoP is controversial for all sides may contribute to its success. Nobody applauds the involvement of war leaders in peace. But idealistic views aside, when has that ever stopped the world from moving on? The Board operates in the space created by dissatisfaction, prolonged conflicts, and competing interests. It does not rely on consensus or principles. It relies on economic interests.

At the same time, it is important to notice a structural limitation. As a UN-authorized mechanism, the Board lacks coercive measures. The chairman holds significant decision-making power, but the charter provides no direct instruments to enforce compliance. Beyond Trump’s well-known unilateral tools – sanctions, tariffs, economic pressure – the BoP has no way to force implementation. This raises an important question. What happens if a close, vital US regional ally decides not to implement the plan?

Considering all this, the Board of Peace is not necessarily a break from the international system. It is a reflection of how it currently works, with the shocks coming from how unfiltered foreign policy approaches have become under Trump’s administration. Additionally, it is not yet a certainty. While the 20-points plan has diminished the level of violence in Gaza, the first phase can hardly be considered a full success, even as the second phase is rapidly approaching.

[1] https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025)

[2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-charter-of-trumps-board-of-peace/

[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trump-launches-board-of-peace-at-ceremony-in-davos

[4] https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF

[5] https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025)

[6] https://www.jns.org/board-of-peace-explained-how-it-works-and-who-is-running-it/

[7] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260126-egypt-rejects-israeli-demands-over-rafah-crossing-as-negotiations-stall/

[8] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-agrees-limited-reopening-rafah-crossing-netanyahus-office-says

[9] https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-rafah-crossing-to-reopen-when-idf-finishes-search-for-last-hostage-body/

[10] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trump-launches-board-of-peace-at-ceremony-in-davos

[11] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/01/statement-on-president-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/

[12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/1/26/israels-war-on-gaza-live-pressure-mounts-on-netanyahu-to-open-rafah

[13] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/21/trumps-board-of-peace-who-has-joined-who-hasnt-and-why

[14] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp9jj1j74ggo

[15] https://english.alarabiya.net/webtv/media/2026/01/26/rafah-crossing-reopens-under-european-supervision

[16] https://ecfr.eu/article/welcome-to-the-jungle-trumps-board-of-peace-goes-global/

Larisa-Nicoleta PĂTRAȘCU

Junior Researcher at the Middle East Political and Economic Institute (MEPEI). Her research and professional interests center on peacebuilding, diplomacy and conflict resolution, international cooperation, and MENA geopolitics.