by Prof. Ecaterina MAȚOI•Published on June 17, 2025

Introduction

In a June 11^th, 2025, article, the prominent Israeli media outlet Haaretz was presenting and contextualizing Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s question on what was wrong with arming and training the Abu Shabab-led militia from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Gaza Strip). Netanyahu’s question suggests there is nothing wrong with the admission, either due to the fact that it serves the designated purpose, or due to the fact that it does not have any impact due to the current state of affairs.

This analysis will reassess the conflictual state from West Asia, that oscillates between acute and relatively calm periods, with the purpose of identifying synergies between American, Israeli, allied interests and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in this region, a morphing concept and organization that coincidentally or not, is intersecting with Israeli and Western interests in the region and beyond. Furthermore, this research will contextualize the Israeli admission of supporting ISIS-linked organizations in the broader landscape of modern warfare/confrontation tools and compare this type of support with other historical tactics meant to advance interests at any cost.

ISIS: a review of hypotheses, narratives, and evolutions

The emergence of ISIS is generally associated in literature with former al-Qaida and names like Abu Musab al-Maqdisi or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Byman, 2016). The wider framework of ISIS emergence is not related to the Cold War, but the evolution of this 20^th century binary conflict appears to have initially determined American support for what later became extremist, violent armed groups threatening United States (US) and allied interests in West Asia and beyond. ISIS emergence is however directly related to the War on Terror (WoT) initiative, that represented a shift in American and allied Weltanschauung, and their role in global affairs. The hypothesis related to American holistic domination was not impacted by the change in narrative: WoT philosophy did not reassess the global order, but the scope, reach and instruments of global domination, which represented a fundamental reform in global affairs.

Among the most significant paradigm changes introduced by the US in 2001, the legitimation of unilateral and self-defined mandates to invade foreign countries can be mentioned, along with the attack of non-state organizations or individuals with or without the approval of the state on which territory the missions were carried out. Although realpolitik along national security and “national interest” had been mentioned among narratives supporting what the challengers of WoT ideology might call international relations lawlessness, further blurring of red lines was advanced by the promotion of mercenaryism, and various forms of support for questionable groups and developments, including tacit approval of events through deceptive statements instead of action according to declared and agreed-upon commitments. The results of fighting terrorism, after more than two decades, can hardly be catalogued as successful for the entire international community given the situation in West Asia and other regions, and the abrupt stop of Afghan poppy-related industry after Taliban takeover is yet another instance that emphasizes the objective need to separate declarations from actions and results.

The narratives on ISIS emergence and development include two main components that manufactured legitimation of WoT goals, and for the group itself among certain Muslim or Arab individuals: similar al-Qaeda, the group was supposed to “fight the Americans” and instate a modern, however utopic, “Islamic Caliphate.” The underlying propagandistic messages rely on the myth of founding an old-new “state,” although not on barren land but on the territory of UN-recognized states like Iraq and Syria, and on other myths like the power of self-determination, a fundamental right in post-WWII global order, and opposition to global hegemony, which would theoretically succeed struggles like anti-colonialism.

Whether ISIS fought “the Americans” or the opposite, or whether they instated a new organization are debatable outcomes in 2025, 24 years after WoT was launched and ISIS emerged. Byman’s 2016 study does not appear to contain any critical scrutiny of ISIS, on the contrary, it can be perceived as an acknowledgement of advancements when considering the choice of terms: “…punctuating its prowess…”, “… has evolved from its origins … into a transitional movement…”, “it has achieved more than al-Qaida ever has…”. Byman hypothesized that “…its ideology is also highly instrumental, giving the group legitimacy and recruiting appeal, as well as a path toward creating a state. Indeed, at the core of the Islamic State’s ideology and strategy is an effort to consolidate its existing state…” (Byman, 2016) and his grey area apologetic stance is not an exception. Similarly, while arguing for the prevention of “Western” women’s muhajirat (female migration) to ISIS-occupied territories, Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett adopt a soft stance and recommend “tailored” solutions to prevent “becoming Mulan”, a constructive but potentially impossible solution for societies that do not have a history or geopolitical flexibility to adopt complex and expensive policies (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015).

Listing heads of extremist and violent organizations on wanted (kill) lists has been a myth that captivated global audiences due to classical American cinematography but also due to episodes like recorded killing of Osama bin-Laden. However, the relatively recent Western and allied support for Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (aka Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani) at the head of a new Syrian unelected government, a former wanted individual that reportedly led the extremist organization Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS), delegitimized the authority of listings, and expanded the grey area instrumentalized to advance interests at any cost, including that of international credibility and the rule of law.

In traditional democratic societies and academic debate, hypothesizing and arguing represent normal interaction instruments. The examples of academic literature considered above, along official declarations of global state leaders, may be considered as genuine and constructive stances, representative for certain policies, that are continuously reinforced, transformed and instrumentalized. While acknowledging the need to tackle extremism and violence, further consequences of implementations and instruments selected cannot be fully overlooked. These include an increase in the number of conflict theaters in which mercenaryism has been adopted, proxy confrontations, the increasing risk of misappropriating public funds in the interest of various groups, instrumentalization of this legitimate goal to advance neo-colonial claims or aggression against relatively peaceful states, etc. While limits of the debate cannot be set, it must be acknowledged that resources available to any country to ensure security and prosperity are limited especially in the context of developments like the 20^th century industrial pollution, and the consequences that oil- and weapons-driven supremacy inflicted on the world.

While academic research entails a set of checks and balances that traditionally guaranteed objectivity, the new and faster mass- and social media is utilized to distribute both checked and unchecked information. From this perspective, the level of detail and propaganda construction techniques from Dabiq stunned the world. Although the magazine and its characteristics will not be analyzed in detail, there are informal and questionable media reports related to ISIS alleged links with the US and Israel and these have to be mentioned because they exist, although not objective or rigorously documented. Sometimes called conspiracy theories, certain reports hint at either imaginary or unofficially declared actions or links between events. In the following paragraphs, various topics related to ISIS emergence, support and interactions with the US and Israel will be mentioned, and where applicable, their connections to other reports are indicated.

William Van Wagenen claimed that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was an American (intelligence) agent/asset. He compiled a set of various publications and claimed that American decision-makers failed to approve the strike on Zarqawi’s camp from Iraq for months, and the attack was carried out only when the argument for invasion was finalized, and the main target fled the region (Van Wagenen, 2024) (Van Wagenen W. 2., 2021). Michael Chossudovsky’s article 2004 article from 2004 on globalresearch.ca, considered a conspiracy theory/disinformation (Daigle, 2020) website, alleged that “The US intelligence apparatus has created it own terrorist organizations…” and “…it has developed a cohesive multibillion dollar counterterrorism program “to go after” these terrorist organizations” (Chossudovsky, 2004).

The conspiracy theories related to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reviewed by Varghese claimed that the next famous leader of ISIS was born to Jewish parents and carried the name Elliot Shimon (Varghese, 2014). The article also cites further (questionable) outlets claiming Edward Snowden had stated that al-Baghdadi would have been trained by the Mossad and that a strategy called “the hornet’s nest” had been employed to attract extremists in one place (Varghese, 2014).

Another affiliate of Global Research (Canada) claims that the fact that IS never attacked Israel represented a proof that ISIS is “controlled by Israel” (Freeman, 2019). Furthermore, Gordon Duff from Veterans Today, whose materials were cited extensively in the media, claimed in 2019 that: “One might assert that accusing Israel of training agents to infiltrate Arab organizations is ‘anti-Semitic’ with this exception, they admit that not only do they do it all the time, but that this is a primary Mossad purpose” (Duff, 2019).

A Daily Mail article containing videos presents the Israeli elite troops’ support operations for “Islamic militants” in Syria, having rescued reportedly 2000 people from 2013 to 2015 at a cost of 8.7 million British Pounds (Simons, 2015). The article does not specifically mention ISIS, but it does not appear to be a conspiracy theory material. Next year, in 2016, Sam Brennan was reporting that despite the alleged enmity, ISIS had not attacked Israel and Israel has not attacked ISIS, despite the latter’s presence in the Yarmouk Valley, near the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights (Brennan, 2013). A 2017 media report explains that after having attacked Israeli Defense Forces in November 2016, an ISIS-linked group from Syria “apologized” according to Israel’s former Defense Minister Mohse Ya’alon (Farand, 2017).

Another set of materials that underlines American support for extremist groups in Syria, including Operation Timber Sycamore, is Ben Norton’s 2024 article, emphasizing that after having received billions in support and weapons from the US, the al-Qaeda-linked “rebels” said they “loved Israel” (Norton, 2024).

In the so-called WoT and the alleged confrontation of ISIS by the US, Israel and allies, there has hardly been any advance on the frontline, should one consider that there was one. The so-called defeat of ISIS might be associated to continuous repositioning in Iraq, Syria and beyond. However, the willingly or unwillingly apologetic Reuters June 2025 report (Rasheed, Azhari, & Georgy, 2025) on the Islamic state “comeback” is bringing on the main stage a long history of dubious language, actions, and results of American fight against terrorism. The title “Islamic State reactivating fighters, eying comeback in Syria and Iraq” implies a series of hypotheses/narratives that reopen parts of the initial and later ISIS account. Coincidentally or not, this “announcement” precedes or is simultaneous to the Israeli attack on Iran. The liberal but unequivocally propagandistic use of the term Islamic State may leave room for interpretation related to the juridical form of the extremist group, and “risks granting a degree of legitimacy to the entity created”, as explained by Hoyle at all (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015). “Reactivating fighters” fails to underline the extremist and violent nature of the group and potentially hints at a continuous presence and development of the group, with the potential to activate and de (Webb, 2017)activate military assets as a country does as, for example, part of defense and foreign policy, which is certainly not the case. The article also cites reports implying that the cause of this renewed emergence would be “emboldened by the chaos in Syria” (Colonel Abdul Ameer al-Bayati, Iraqi Army’s 8^th division) (Rasheed, Azhari, & Georgy, 2025). This narrative is relativized by the claim that the overall number of ISIS attacks has decreased after Assad’s fall, but instead of assessing American and allied achievements in tackling violence and extremism in West Asia, the authors detail on group’s expansion in Africa and mention the term “sleeper cells,” allegedly activated after Assad’s fall. Consequently, the latest Western-backed state reconstruction experiment debuted with the so-called reactivation of ISIS.

After 2001, the US began a war on terrorism that expanded rather than contracted. Instead of attacking and destroying military bases, or Israel, the so-called Islamic or Islamist entities contributed so far, willingly, or not, to the containment of Iranian influence in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. It must be emphasized that the language of various Western outlets or research papers, as well as official declarations, does not suggest an unequivocal condemnation of ISIS or an adversarial stance. ISIS is not a state and it never was, despite controversial formulations discussed in the above. It did not have recognized institutions, and narratives attempting to develop on how it had collected taxes in controlled territories might have contributed to the utopian sequence of ideas that Eastern Syria had been a taxable and probably rich enough region, allowing the so-called “Islamic State” to generate income, buy weapons although it was banned, and face world’s greatest army and its allies. These surreal scenarios contradict realities: not even large, long-established, rich, and organized countries like Iran manage to oppose American resolve, as the illusory narratives on ISIS claim. There was no ISIS defense academy or research institution teaching or developing combat, weapons development, or propaganda. Hence, filtering out the myths and narratives that attempt to create a false image of the confrontation on the ground is required by reports that cannot be simply equated to conspiracy theories, like the reports on Israeli support for militants in Syria, declassified American Operation Timber Sycamore, reported declarations like Moshe Ya’alon’s preference of ISIS over Iran (Ditz, 2016). Furthermore, reports on Eprahim Benjamin’s arrest in Libya, an alleged Mossad agent, are consistent with concepts of sleeping cell and infiltration, even if they were not officially explained in detail.

Consequently, there are various fundamental and evidence-related arguments that prevent a full rejection of potential relations, whatever these might be, between ISIS on one hand, and the US and Israel on the other hand. Is there something wrong with that?

Unrestricted warfare: old and new paradigms in West Asia conflicts

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s defense of his approval to arm ISIS-related groups through the question from the title certainly has merit. Either due to age, experience or confidence, Prime Minister Netanyahu basically asserts that there is nothing wrong in arming Abu Shabab’s group.

From the perspective of a perpetual war, which is confirmed by the post-1948 continuous war it has been involved in, unconventional warfare, that includes divisive tactics, deception and thus reduction of losses by employing proxies, appears as a more sustainable confrontational stance. Kissinger’s concept of potentially seeing both Iraq and Iran losing, if possible, is an ideal outcome when two competitors are fighting, and this represents a principle compatible with the divide et impera suggested by Israel supporting ISIS-linked groups.

Besides the Palestinian Problem, that has represented the core problem for most regional confrontations, Israel is caught between euphoric concepts like Greater Israel and a relatively hostile environment resulting from centuries of confrontations between ancient empires, medieval crusades and the post-Ottoman Empire instability determined by a brief colonial period and its replacement with the Cold War. Beyond the settler-colonialism and antisemitism ongoing debates, and the numbers of Palestinian victims and displaced after 1948, which represent all sensible topics for the two Semitic peoples, Israel has been continuously supported from abroad in its endeavor to solidify and extend influence in the region. The support was primarily military, from the US and other allies, but also financial and economic. It is either the reporting or the numbers themselves that hint at a very low to insignificant impact of the war Israel was involved in during recent years upon its economy, which might be unprecedented in world history if it was correctly reflecting the situation on the ground: there was no significant decline in GDP throughout 2024 – but growth, no currency depreciation, and no significant increase in foreign debt. Inflation was comparable to the one of other countries, for example Greece, not a wartime number. Despite an increasing number of people leaving the country (Arnaout, 2024), Israel’s outlook and economic perspectives cannot be explained through normal assessments, not even when considering the official American support. Its position is apparently not impacted by war, or by the rather unconventional political landscape in which ministers like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Haim Katz were sentenced in Israeli courts of justice, and various Israeli officials are sanctioned by governments around the world due to the War on Gaza. The International Criminal Court arrest warrants from November 2024 for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (International Criminal Court, 2024) also do not appear to impact Israel’s outlook, which appears to be embarked on a regional expansion project that is not depending on its economic performance or own resources. From this perspective, Israel could be eventually perceived either as an independent actor that has the necessary leverage to ask for what is need for its agenda, or as the tip of the spear for wider Western and global interests, that is incentivized, from an ideologic and economic perspective, to carry out missions with global and historical impact.

Unconventional warfare tactics have been deployed by Israel from its inception. An initial concept of Hasbara as propaganda strategy for improving Israel’s perception, attributed to Nahum Sokolov, was reportedly associated to three main directions: victimhood of the Jews, the necessity to establish Israel for survival and the existence of a permanent threat to Israel (Baqeri, 2025). These criteria are formulated in another manner by an article published on the Jewish Voice for Labor: Judaism cannot be separated from the Zionist Project (IHRA definition of Anti-Semitism), Israel as the only “Jewish state,” Palestinians’ responsibility for their own oppression, Jewish history defined by persecution (Saps, 2024).

Israel Project’s 2009 Global Language Dictionary (Dr. Frank Luntz, 2009) can be equated to a Hasbara guide. It contains guidelines and examples on how to implement Israel’s image around the world, in general but also in specific cases: when addressing leftist Americans, with the United Nations, etc. There are precise instructions on how to address the Palestinian Problem in public, or Iran, and Chapter 12 equates the Right to Return with the Right of Confiscation, in order to shield from a Palestinian return.

As it stands, there is a clear delimitation from the story line and facts in Israeli policy, hence the entire set of arguments that advances interests represents an independent direction of action. Unless this was a conspiracy theory, US Representative Ron Paul’s statement that Hamas was “… encouraged and really started by Israel … to counteract Yasser  Arafat…” (Youtube/TheFlexEffect, 2011) outlines an assertive divide et impera pattern that was only repeated in the case of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s support for the ISIS-linked group against Hamas.

The example above is far from being an exception. Another example of arming and weaponizing groups against a state or non-state actor is the support granted by Israel starting with 1979 to the so-called Free Lebanon State / State of Free Lebanon, i.e. a puppet separatist (non-Islamic) “state” that was supposed to challenge Lebanese authority and reclaim a strip of territory at the border with Israel. The association of a potential Kurdish independent state with “a second Israel” during the 2017 protests in front of Israeli Embassy to Ankara prompted the evacuation of this facility in what was described by Utku Reyhan as a “declaration of war by US imperialism and Israeli Zionism against countries in the region” (Surkes, 2017). The pattern of weaponizing a group against the other because the latter became dominant may be considered a strategic victory, but at the same time, it also diminishes trust in the orchestrators, with potential systematic effects. However, the dilemma of entering into agreements with parties that have a track record of expansionist ambitions or resisting them is not a simple yes and no question, and deception adds complexity. The War on Terror did not end with a success story and an increase in global peace. Starting with Brexit and then in 2022 and 2025, the unpredictability of major international actors decreased gradually, as an apparent rule of the strong, with decreasing commitment to international law and transparency appears to have emerged in various forms: the cancellation of JCPOA, the conflict from Ukraine in addition to the one from Syria, a wave of political assassinations or assassination attempts, like the killing of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, tariffs, sanctions and an apparently overall increase in violence and rearming.

The wider regional picture is also influenced by great power confrontation, that positions Israel along its traditional partners the US and the UK and potentially other supporters. Although Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf neighbors appear to have signaled the desire to normalize relations with Israel, and Türkiye maintains hydrocarbon supplies to Israel despite a supportive stance for the Palestinian cause, no party appears to trust the other in cementing peace. The deals recently announced between the US and Persian Gulf Arab states, that reportedly amount to 2 trillion of US Dollars, would have represented a mutual guarantee of cooperation, but the recent escalation between Israel and Iran may significantly impact the viability of regional megaprojects like NEOM, that require peace in order to achieve goals. Hence, the question whether a stable peace can be achieved, given the way the existing status quo was accomplished and the growing confrontational stance, becomes ever more pressing.

There is probably nothing wrong with supporting Abu Shabab’s group self-proclaimed Popular Forces from Israel’s perspective. It would not be a first to select and weaponize groups from within and try to destroy either declared opponents or alleged former partners like Hamas. From the opposite perspective, the militant groups that were supported by the US to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan also became enemies, and this conflict reportedly spread around the world. However, it might not be the support itself that was being questioned, but the revelation of the relation. From a confrontational perspective, the group of Abu Shabab might not serve Israeli interests anymore, and pointing out the (potentially former) relation might be an invitation for Hamas and its allies to target the group. Another hypothetical scenario might render the relevance of ISIS for the regional power balance and confrontation as outdated and less consequential. In all cases, the potential to increase intra-Palestinian violence increased, and this might serve indirectly certain interests. Hence, the direct consequences for Israel might be very limited, but does this apply to the global confrontational landscape?

`Potential effects of disclosing Israeli relations with an ISIS-linked group

After the October 7^th, 2023, attack carried out by Hamas, resulting in the killing of approximately 1200 Israeli victims and 250 hostages, Tel Aviv’s response appears to have surpassed all expectations in terms of Palestinian victims, material destruction and war tactics. The tacit support of particularly Western peers and India, was reflected in declarative opposition, often paralleled by a continuous supply of weapons and munitions. The symbolic arrest warrants issued by International Criminal Court appear to vindicate the West, but they did not produce any tangible consequence for the situation in Gaza. Likewise, the apparent discontent that one may associate with the British sanctions against Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich in early June 2025, did not prevent the UK from sending military assets to help Israel to confront Iran.

Regarded from the West to the East, Israel has delivered sufficient arguments in order to secure the understanding and support of allies. However, the support for Israel’s security has not been provided in a classical and defensive manner, but in offensive actions like the attack on Iran. The assertive nature of Israel’s regional stance is not equivalent, but potentially similar in terms of international relations stance with European and American push to expand influence in former Soviet territories, like Central Asia. In the newer, unconventional warfare development, a potential usage of false flags like ISIS or similar in order to achieve geopolitical goals might be just one of the many proxy or coup files, and nowhere near newer influence tools like social media propaganda industry or satellite networks turned on in order to fuel potential uprisings (Ferrechio, 2025).

Regarded from the East to the West, especially from Tehran, the efforts to achieve peace in Occupied Palestinian Territory through various means have failed. Furthermore, Iran’s bid to achieve regional influence was set back after 2022, along with Russian refocus on its vicinity rather than remote bases like Syria. Since 1979, Iran maintains a rather high interest to achieve relations with Europe and the US, but fundamental rifts appear to hinder this cooperation. As the BRICS initiative appears to become more popular, a wider competition and conflict could emerge, and Iran is slowly sliding towards Asia and particularly China, as the Russian Federation does as well.

The revelation of supporting an ISIS-linked group by Israel is not sanctioned as a first in any consulted material. Combined with other unconventional warfare tactics, like the detonation of Hezbollah pagers, Israel’s actions are paralleled by propagandistic and vindicative arguments. However, whether these are fully justified or not, or whether more peaceful alternatives can guarantee its security in the region is difficult to assess. Likewise, whether unparalleled level of deception can lead to a stable peace and eventually survive a potential economic and military decoupling from the West cannot be easily addressed. However, the practice of deceptive tactics for defensive purposes or otherwise by Israel, is probably being studied and quantified with Artificial Intelligence models, by countries that might be impacted, for example, through ISIS-like projects. These include both the Russian Federation and China, but Iran, Pakistan, and a series of African countries as well, to reference just a few.

The ever-increasing Israeli expansion in the region, which can be associated to American interests as well, officially through territorial increase or unofficially, through influence networks, has the potential to destabilize the region. India is not supporting Iran in the conflict with Israel, but a potential fall of Iranian government might impact its Chabahar Project and the trade route towards Afghanistan and the Russian Federation, a key crude oil supplier for Indian refineries in recent years and a potentially large customer for Indian exports. This would result in a potential acceleration of Chinese trade in Central and West Asia amid the development of Belt and Road Initiative and other connectivity projects, unless disruptions from networks like ISIS cripple operations. A further push to destabilize the regional balance of power through influence networks or otherwise, that would eventually result in an unstable Iran, can represent a threat to Russian defense doctrine potentially comparable to Ukraine’s NATO accession: the two countries do not have a land border, but communicate through the Caspian Sea, while Tehran represents a counterbalance in the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict as well. Finally, assuming that all roads in Asia might also lead to Beijing in the future, ISIS-like networks may play a role in the diplomatic and security stance of China, in the region and beyond.

Security in West Asia has long surpassed the question of proportionality and fairness, especially after the fall of Ottoman Empire. The narratives are changing continuously and rapidly, and while acknowledging Israeli support for an ISIS-linked group may be just another predictable operation in the long confrontation with its neighbors and other countries from the region for an external observer, the number of casualties in West Asian armed confrontations are beginning to pile up at an increased rate. Every escalation and preparation for confrontation might precede a growing conflictual landscape, as the US might seek to regain a dominance that is not as clear as it was in 1991, whatever the cost.

Conclusions

This article evaluated perspectives related to the Israeli official admission of supporting an ISIS-linked group acting in the Gaza Strip, with the purpose of identifying potential answers to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s related question: “what’s wrong with that”. The WoT premises and evolution are assessed at more than two decades after it was initiated Furthermore, reports labeled as conspiracy theories, and official or credible reports that contain information about Israeli or American support for ISIS were reviewed. Without resorting on questionable theories or reports, evidence like videos with Israeli special forces, documents, declarations, and statements, as well as a confrontation between ISIS and the US and Israel that is not representative for regional dynamics hint at a possible relation/coordination or alignment between Israel and US goals on one hand and ISIS on the other hand. Coincidently or not, ISIS-related dynamics served Israeli and Western interest in the region, like in the case of Abu Shabab’s group from Gaza, that was reportedly armed and supported to weaken Hamas.

Israel’s economy and military capability does not appear to be influenced by the War on Gaza, or by the presence of groups like ISIS. This underlines Israel’s dependence on exogenous resources, but potentially requests as well. Apart from this, unconventional warfare tactics like supporting an ISIS-related group have been long employed by Israel: it was the case of supporting the puppet State of Free Lebanon, or the reported supported by Israel to Hamas in order to counter the influence of Arafat.

Whether disclosing support for an allegedly opposing group represents an issue or not depends on the current importance of such a relation, on the potential effect of the disclosure, and on the perception angle. For Israeli allies, this might not be relevant, especially in the context of a long list of unconventional and assertive war tactics, but for the regional inhabitants and peace-oriented observers, the admission of Israeli support for ISIS-linked organization raises questions related to its intentions to reach peace, those of its allies and fundamental questions related to the means one can use to achieve goals. With Hasbara support or not, Israel appears to follow a lion path as the only alternative to achieve security and guarantee its existence, but in the context of an all-encompassing exogenous support it has been receiving since its foundation, this strategy may be impacted by a potential shift in global economy and international relations. And the relations with influence-projecting networks as well.

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