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The State Council of the People’s Republic of China announced on July 23rd, 2024, that 14 Palestinian factions signed the Beijing Declaration, reportedly “strengthening” Palestinian national unity (english.gov.cn/Xinhua, 2024). The reactions to this relatively unanticipated announcement were diverse, prompting the question whether it represents indeed a significant shift in the Gaza Strip war and regional geopolitics. Current article analyses briefly the Beijing Declaration and the main paradigms it may relate with or impact, since it represents a new step for both Palestinian factions and Chinese peace diplomacy.
The Palestinian Beijing Declaration in brief
The talks held by Palestinian factions in the Chinese capital city took place between July 21st and 23rd, and materialized in the signed Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian Nation Unity (english.gov.cn/Xinhua, 2024).
The 14 Palestinian factions that undertook negotiations and signed the declaration (Maan News, 2024) will be briefly mentioned in the next paragraphs, in order to emphasize the complexity of both Palestinian politics and talks recently concluded.
Two major parties to the declaration were the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) and Palestinian Resistance Movement (Hamas). Their agreement appeared to be very significant, since American news outlets published headlines mentioning these two organizations (Jeffery, 2024), (McCarthy, Yee, & Salman, 2024).
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was also a signatory to the declaration. The think-tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) states that PFLP is reportedly “…the second largest faction and the main opposition force to Fatah within the PLO” (Palestinian Liberation Organization) (ECFR 1, 2024). Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Popular Front General Command / Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) also attended and are being classified by ECFR as “PLO Groups” (ECFR 2, 2024). Other PLO factions signing the declaration were Arab Liberation Front (ALF), Palestinian Arab Front (PAF) and the Vanguards of the People’s Liberation War (Thunderbolt/Lightning Forces, as-sa’iqa – theoretically a PLO member connected to Syrian interests).
The Palestinian National Initiative Movement (al-mubara – member of the Socialist International) and the Islamic Jihad Movement also signed the declaration (english.gov.cn/Xinhua, 2024).
The declaration entails, among others, the commitment of signatories to unite efforts in confronting aggression and war, determine an end to the (Israeli) occupation, pursue the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital according to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 181 and 2334, and put an end to divisions. The document also mentions the formation of a national consensus government (a new National Council) based on a presidential decision, that is expected to unify institutions across the territories “of the Palestinian state” (Maan News, 2024). Equally important, an implementation mechanism and a timetable are mentioned as well.
Reactions to the Palestinian Beijing Declaration and broader context
On July 23rd, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Israel Katz accused Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority leader, of “embracing” Hamas and hinted that “… Abbas will be watching Gaza from afar” (Katz, 2024).
In an (Israeli) Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) insight, Galia Lavi assessed the Beijing Declaration (Lavi, 2024). The author presumes that “…China is essentially indifferent to the outcomes of the talks…”, but the existence of negotiations would help present Beijing as “…a responsible power and effective ‘mediator’ that cares about the rights of the Palestinian people”. The paper also stresses that the representation of the factions was relatively low, and despite signing the paper, certain factions withdrew their support for the declaration immediately after. A Times of Israel media report also affirms that, for example, Palestinian Islamic Jihad still rejected the formula that recognized Israel and asked for PLO’s withdrawal of Israel’s recognition (AGENCIES AND TOI STAFF, 2024). Lavi’s paper emphasizes that China legitimized Hamas and other factions by hosting them, and Israel should not overlook this aspect (Lavi, 2024).
Prof. Menachem Klein from Bar-Ilan University in Israel states, however, that the Beijing Declaration is different not in terms of reconciliation potential, but Hamas position. His analysis established that Hamas basically aligned with the Fatah-proposed principles for founding a unitary state based on the two UNSC resolutions, i.e. 181 and 2334. Professor Klein concludes that perceiving Hamas as a merely religious organization without a political plan would be “a serious mistake in understanding reality”. Additionally, he claims that the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh is connected to the concept of removing Hamas (completely), asserted by Israeli security officials. This view would be significantly different from the Beijing Declaration setting, which envisions the inclusion of Hamas in the new national consensus government. Professor Klein characterizes the Beijing Declaration as “an opportunity to change the current miserable situation that must not be missed” (Prof. Klein, 2024). Klein’s view is thus more optimistic related to the Beijing Declaration achievements and considers the opportunity to include Hamas in a larger Palestinian political structure positive.
This view is not relatively similar to that of the US Department of State shared by Spokesperson Matthew Miller at the July 25th, 2024 press briefing (Miller, 2024). After sharing concerns on the potential of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas, justified indeed by previous unsuccessful attempts, Spokesperson Matthew Miller states that Hamas did not agree in fact with the PLO principles in the Beijing Declaration. He stated that Hamas did not renounce violence, among others, and did not commit to non-violent political means. While acknowledging that the two findings consider different backgrounds, the views might refer to distinct aspects of the Palestinian declaration. Professor Klein identifies Hamas as the signatory of a document mentioning UNSC resolutions 181 and 2334, whereas Spokesperson Matthew Miller asserts essentially that there are no specific texts mentioning Hamas (new) commitments. Both views appear to be factual and correct, but they address completely different aspects of the Beijing Declaration and have the potential to trigger various responses across the world. Hence, the contexts of conclusions/statements are decisive.
In all cases, Beijing appears to have pursued effective mediation indeed. Before presenting the Chinese assessment of the Beijing Declaration, it is important to identify the main coordinates of this mediation. Hosting all Palestinian factions mentioned above would not have been possible in the United States or the European Union, since these jurisdictions designated some of them as terrorist organizations subject to sanctions. Reaching such a deal in the Russian Federation after Moscow talks earlier in 2024 might have been more contested by certain Western powers. Hence, Beijing appears to have been the most appropriate venue offered to the Palestinian factions.
The mediation role of China is indeed relatively new and rather seldom so far, but not a first for the Middle East: Beijing also mediated successfully the Iranian-Saudi restoration of diplomatic ties in 2023. China did not appear at any time during negotiations to pursue any of its interests, but invited diplomatic envoys from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Qatar, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Russian Federation at the closing ceremony, where it clarified own position on the negotiations and the Declaration, as well as the Palestinian Question.
Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned during the closing ceremony that the Chinese President Xi Jinping presented proposals for addressing the Palestinian Question, detailing on the Chinese “Three Step Initiative”: a comprehensive ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, upholding the principle “Palestinians governing Palestine” and working to promote a post-war governance in Gaza, and finally including Palestine as a full member in the United Nations and starting to implement the Two-State Solution. Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised the Palestinian Beijing Declaration and called it “an important historical moment in the Palestinian liberation cause” (english.gov.cn/Xinhua, 2024).
Final assessment and conclusions
The Beijing Declaration represents a new step in the national unity quest of Palestinian factions amid an ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and growing risk of a broader regional war. Although at least some of its aspects were perceived or presented negatively by certain Israeli voices, there are other Israeli and third-party views that assess this step as positive.
The potential of this Palestinian commitment to impact significantly the Gaza war and regional geopolitical landscape has been assessed as relatively low by certain observers. The conservative perspective was based on the comparison with previous attempts by Fatah and Hamas to reconcile their differences, and from this perspective it is probably justified. On short term, it is also difficult to envision a sustainable solution to the extremely complicated regional situation. However, two aspects require attention. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh probably disincentivizes Hamas and potentially other factions from continuing to reach a detailed and comprehensive agreement with Fatah. Assuming, however, that work among the Beijing Declaration signatories will continue towards a Palestinian unitary state, with the already-identified hardships, the latter action can amount to a test of commitment. Secondly, the broader context of the conflict has to be considered as well. While the Palestinian Question took a more visible corner on the global stage, significant developments are taking place in other parts of the world and in different fields of international collaboration. It is important to consider, besides the Israeli – Palestinian direct confrontation, that neither party is fully independent from other global developments or power centers.
On short term, the party that possesses more resources has a theoretical higher chance to win in a conflict. But in a globalized world, the long-term international consensus can also be decisive. While the negotiation principles and concessions based on interests and resources remain important, each decision of any party has more consequences due to the complexity and dynamics of international relations.
China’s reconciliation initiative was in line with its international policy, President Xi Jinping proposals for addressing the Palestinian Question and Chinese wisdom. Its importance was recognized by many Middle East (and other) countries through their presence at the Beijing Declaration closing ceremony. The initiative appears to ultimately pursue broader peace, reminding once again of the United Nations peace pursuit established in the aftermath of Second World War. It is certainly not the final resolution of Palestinian division, or the definitive solution to the Palestinian Question, but a step and a declaration of intent towards peace as a goal. The text analyzed appears to be essentially Palestinian, not a suggested agreement, hence a genuine outcome. And the speed with which the agreement was reached appears to bear the hallmark of China’s way of doing business, mediation in this case.
Bibliography
AGENCIES AND TOI STAFF. (2024, July 23). Hamas, Fatah sign declaration on plans to seek joint government; Israel slams Fatah. Retrieved from The Times of Israel: https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-fatah-sign-latest-declaration-on-ending-years-long-rift-seek-joint-government/
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Prof. Ecaterina MATOI
Prof. Ecaterina MATOI is Program Director at MEPEI.
