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What happens when war and peace are priced, negotiated, and traded like deals?
During Donald Trump’s second term, peacemaking has shifted toward a series of high-profile, large-scale deals. Wars are seen as “problems” to be resolved. Peace agreements serve as channels for corridors, essential minerals, and long-term concessions. It appears efficient and impressive on television. From afar, it might even seem like progress.
But when we closely examine three main areas – Ukraine, Armenia–Azerbaijan, and Gaza/Palestine – one pattern keeps coming back: these are not pathways to positive peace. They are forms of negative peace – fragile, elite deals that keep conflicts frozen and add new layers of dependency.
By “sustainable peace,” I mean ending violence in a way that also discourages its return—through credible security, political agency, and some form of accountability.
Peace is made to look like a business success story. In reality, it often feels more like an illusion.
Ukraine: Weapons as Equity and Trump’s 28 point-plan
On April 30, 2025, the Ukraine–United States Mineral Resources Agreement was signed, and following this, the United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (USURIF) was established. On paper, it is a joint reconstruction fund. In practice, it ties Ukraine’s future to the attractiveness of its subsoil to foreign investors.
The agreement allows U.S. partners to secure market-based offtake rights for critical minerals like lithium, titanium, rare earths, graphite, and manganese. Ukraine keeps legal ownership of its resources, but commits 50% of future revenues from new state-owned resource projects to the Fund. Existing state giants such as Naftogaz and Ukrnafta are exempt.
This fund’s link to military aid shows what it’s really about:
- The deal comes right after a tense period during which U.S. military deliveries were suspended, and then resumed once the agreement was in place.
- Any new U.S. military assistance—such as ammunition, weapons systems, or training—is considered a capital contribution to the Fund, classified as a preferred class of shares for the U.S. partner.
In simple words: weapons become equity. Security help is booked as an investment claim on Ukraine’s future.
This happens against a backdrop of deep political mistrust. Since 2019, the relationship between Trump and Zelenskyy has been shaped by domestic U.S. scandals, impeachment, and public humiliation. On February 28, 2025, Zelenskyy arrives in Washington seeking security guarantees and a credible path to end the war, which ended up with a well-known diplomatic embarrassment— a moment widely remembered as one in which diplomacy itself seemed absent from the Oval Office. Instead, he faces strong pressure to accept a mineral deal and a ceasefire on terms that reduce Ukraine’s leverage.
So, what kind of peace does this create?
- It can keep ammunition flowing.
- It gives Ukraine access to reconstruction capital.
- It gives the U.S. a long-term economic stake and supply security.
But it does not offer clear security guarantees. It does not resolve core issues with Russia. And it risks leaving many Ukrainians feeling that their country is paying for protection with the resources of future generations.
Is that a sustainable peace – or just a better-managed dependency?
Let’s discuss the now-famous Trump’s 28-point plan. In November 2025, the United States revealed all 28 points of its proposal to end the Russia-Ukraine war. The most revealing part is not just what it proposes, but how it reads: a deal document that treats sovereignty as a clause and territory as a write-down.
On the territory, the plan proposes recognition of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as de facto Russian—including by the United States—while Kherson and Zaporizhia are “frozen” along current contact lines. This isn’t conflict resolution; it’s conflict management by cartography—locking in gains first, then calling the outcome stability.
While the USURIF approved its investment policies in late 2025, the January 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos served as the primary marketplace for pitching Ukraine’s critical minerals—lithium, titanium, and rare earths—to global private equity firms. This confirms the shift where security aid is effectively considered an investment claim on future resources.
Regarding security, the guarantee is clearly transactional: the United States “will receive compensation for the guarantee,” and it can be invalidated under certain conditions. Ukraine must also constitutionally renounce NATO membership, while NATO would formalize Ukraine’s exclusion; troop basing is not permitted, and Ukraine’s armed forces are limited to 600,000.
Finally, the economic “peace dividend” is defined as reintegration and joint ventures: staged sanctions relief, long-term U.S.–Russia economic cooperation, and investment mechanisms tied to reconstruction and resource extraction. Include the requirement for elections within 100 days and broad amnesty for actions during the war, and the logic becomes clear: peace is treated less as a political settlement than as a contract designed to close the case, reopen markets, and move forward without addressing the underlying causes of the war.
Armenia–Azerbaijan: A Corridor with a 99-Year Clock
In the South Caucasus, Trump’s team has promoted what it calls the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), presented as part of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace package which was signed on August 8, 2025, by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, with the mediation of U.S. President Donald Trump. When Trump claims the conflict “resolved,” he gains some economic benefits, plus another victory for his reputation. Whether it will work or not is less important now; even the countries themselves aren’t that important, as he repeatedly confuses Armenia with Albania and even calls Azerbaijan “Aberbian.”
TRIPP is a strategic transit corridor that crosses Armenia’s Syunik region and links Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. In reported drafts and briefings, the United States would secure exclusive development rights for 99 years. It will sublease the land to a consortium to build rail lines, oil and gas pipelines, fiber-optic cables, and possibly electricity transmission along the route.
The project serves several U.S. goals at once:
- It bypasses Russia and Iran, allowing trade, energy and minerals to move between Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Central Asia without crossing their territory.
- It strengthens U.S. economic and political influence in the South Caucasus and sidelines older formats, such as the OSCE Minsk Group.
For Azerbaijan, the corridor finally connects its mainland to Nakhchivan. For Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan describes it as a way to “unblock” the country from the long-standing blockade and reconnect it by rail to the broader world.
On the surface, this appears to be a textbook win–win scenario.
The question is not whether connectivity is useful—it is who controls the corridor’s rules, security, and revenues.
Recent sessions at the 2026 Peace Forums highlighted increasing tension, as the 99-year exclusive development rights granted to the U.S. began to clash with local sovereignty concerns in Armenia’s Syunik region. This reinforces fears that the province could become a corridor primarily serving external interests rather than supporting local stability.
But there is another side to consider. The idea of the Zangezur corridor has a long, painful history. It is connected to pan-Turkic visions, threats of using force, and fears that Armenia’s southern province could be hollowed out and turned into a passage that mainly serves others. Critics warn that creating a corridor through Syunik without full Armenian control risks reviving the old concept of “corridors” that once helped trigger war in Europe.
Again, the agreement says little about:
- long-term minority protection,
- mechanisms for truth-telling or justice,
- or ways to rebuild trust between ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Instead, peace is tied to the successful operation of a highly strategic, highly profitable strip of land leased out for almost a century.
What happens if this corridor is attacked? What if a future U.S. administration changes course? And whose anger will be louder – the villagers living along the route, or the investors holding the contracts?
Gaza and Palestine: From Riviera Dreams to Technocratic Control
Nowhere is the “businessman’s peace” more visible than in Gaza. Two layers come together here: Tony Blair’s technocratic plan and Trump’s controversial “Riviera Plan.”
Through his Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, Blair helped design the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA), which became the governing foundation of Trump’s 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan in 2025. The plan was revealed by Trump himself on September 29th alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House.
In that proposal, GITA is imagined as the supreme political and legal authority in Gaza during a transition period, potentially established through a UN Security Council resolution. It would be led by an international board of 7–10 notable figures, including a senior UN official and strong representation from Muslim and Arab states, with Tony Blair often discussed as chair.
Day-to-day services—such as health, education, infrastructure, and finance—would be managed by a Palestinian Executive Authority composed of selected technocrats, while the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority would initially serve only a limited liaison role. Security would be handled by a multinational stabilization force and local police, along with a DDR process designed to “neutralize” Hamas.
Economically, the plan relies on a market-driven model through a Gaza Investment Promotion and Economic Development Authority (GIPEDA), emphasizing public–private partnerships and “commercially viable returns” for reconstruction.
The 2026 discussions in Davos further highlighted the role of GIPEDA, viewing the territory’s reconstruction as a ‘Riviera-style’ real estate opportunity rather than a political settlement. This approach emphasizes ‘commercially viable returns’ over the political aspirations of a society striving for full power.
On paper, it seems organized and professional. In terms of peacebuilding, this is the common trade-off between governability and legitimacy. But we can ask some basic questions:
- Who really holds power in this structure – elected Palestinians, or an unelected international board?
- When reconstruction is tied to “commercial returns”, whose needs come first – investors, or displaced families?
- And what happens to political aspirations when governance becomes just a technical issue?
Layered on top of this is the earlier “Trump Riviera Plan” – the most shocking version of the vision for Gaza. On February 4, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intent for the U.S. to take over the Gaza Strip and expel Palestinians from the territory, clear the land, and develop it. The proposal was made during a ceasefire in the Gaza war, fought between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militants. Trump shared his vision of transforming the territory into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” or “Trump Gaza,” with luxury tourism, ports, and high-tech mega-projects.
In its original version, the plan proposal openly called for:
- forced displacement of around two million Palestinians from Gaza, with no guaranteed right of return;
- re-inhabiting the strip with “the world’s people” – investors, settlers, tourists;
- and a form of U.S. “ownership” or trusteeship over Gaza for at least ten years.
Unsurprisingly, this triggered massive international condemnation as an ethnic cleansing and a violation of international law.
Later, the official 20-Point Peace Plan dropped the explicit reference to displacement and permanent U.S. control and adopted the language “Gaza is for Gazans,” including property-rights guarantees for those who are temporarily forced to leave. However, the core economic vision of a “Riviera-style” development remained as the long-term objective in its final phase.
So, we are left with a difficult truth: even when the most extreme elements are removed, Gaza is still being envisioned and treated mainly as a space to be made investable, not as a society that warrants full political power.
Illusions – The Problem with Peace Made by Businessmen
Across these three cases, the pattern is clear:
- In Ukraine, security aid is turned into a financial stake in critical minerals.
- In Armenia–Azerbaijan, peace is tied to a 99-year corridor agreement that redraws the map of the South Caucasus.
- In Gaza, governance is outsourced to international technocrats, while the long-term dream is still a polished coastal “Riviera” built on the ruins of a traumatized society.
This style of peacemaking can produce quick headlines and visible projects. It can unlock funds and infrastructure. It can even temporarily stop open fighting.
But it leaves core questions unanswered:
- Who defines what peace looks like – the people living under bombs and blockades, or the people signing contracts in boardrooms?
- What happens when the interests of investors and ordinary citizens diverge?
- And how stable is any peace that depends on one leader’s brand and a few mega-projects?
Trump’s business diplomacy is effective at closing deals. However, the more important work of peace – rebuilding trust, addressing injustice, creating fair institutions – cannot be outsourced, leased for 99 years, or tied to the next investment round.
That is why these agreements, despite their ambition, still appear more like carefully crafted illusions that silence conflicts rather than truly resolve them, rather than foundations for a just future.
As seen in the boardrooms of Davos this year, peace is increasingly viewed as a contract meant to close a case and reopen markets. The shift from 2025’s signed agreements to 2026’s investment roadshows indicates that ‘businessman’s peace’ is no longer just an experiment, but the new global standard for managing conflicts.
And if peace is being reshaped as a transaction, is Trump really the only exception—or just the most evident example of a broader trend?
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