by Prof. Zafar Nawaz JASPAL•Published on October 21, 2026

THE character of war is rapidly evolving as emerging technologies destabilize security. The pace of technological change is encouraging weaker combatants to adopt asymmetrical war strategies to bleed and frustrate a stronger enemy while defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear-armed states are equally exposed to this new character of war and are adjusting their nuclear doctrines and postures accordingly.

A review of strategic literature shows that war’s nature remains constant: it is violent, involves interaction between opposing wills and is driven by politics. However, because war’s character, i.e., its conduct, constantly evolves under the influence of technology, moral forces (law or ethics), culture and military culture, all of which change over time and across places, strategic analysts agree that contemporary wars are transforming. Therefore, states’ military doctrines and strategies are constantly being revamped and the technical, tactical, operational, theater and strategic levels or plans are changing.

The makers of nuclear strategy are equally sensitive to the changing characteristics of war in the contemporary strategic environment. The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—have continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals.

Strategic nuclear weapons (city busters) seem less applicable in asymmetrical war; however, tactical nuclear weapons could be more relevant in new wars. They are portable and often integrated into conventional force structures. The nuclear-armed states use tactical nuclear weapons (small, low-yield nuclear weapons) to attack underground hideouts of leaders or weapons manufacturing facilities of the resisting state or non-state forces in asymmetrical war.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine in October 2022 prompted President Vladimir Putin and his cohorts to consider using tactical nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear adversary; subsequently, the Kremlin deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in mid-2023. On September 16, 2025, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that his country’s forces had practiced launching tactical nuclear weapons with Russian counterparts as part of military exercise Zapad, held on September 12-16, 2025. These considerations of the use and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons have underscored their relevance in a protracted asymmetrical war between Russia and Ukraine.

The US frequently reassured South Korea that its security commitments are steadfast and its extended deterrence commitments remain ironclad. However, Washington’s rhetorical assurances seem insufficient. South Korean security observers opine that to deter North Korean aggressive designs, the US should redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea at the 38th parallel line (in the vicinity of Seoul), which it withdrew in 1991.

The chances of US redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea are remote because it has 200 tactical nuclear weapons in its active inventory; 100 are located in Europe and the other 100 are stored as a strategic reserve in the US. Second, the US cannot pull out a few weapons from Europe and deploy them in the Korean peninsula due to the war in Ukraine. Third, the US military also opposes the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons due to their vulnerability to a North Korean attack.

The US reluctance to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons because of limited numbers fuels the already-strong South Korean public sentiment for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2026, a Gallup Korea Poll found that 65% of South Koreans support domestic nuclear armament.

Presently, the American strategic pundits have been reviewing the US nuclear forces to devise additional options for nuclear warfighting below the strategic level. Both the 2018 and 2022 nuclear posture reviews declared that the US might use nuclear weapons first in extreme circumstances in response to non-nuclear strategic attacks against itself or allies and partners. In such an event, tactical weapons seem a better choice in asymmetrical warfare or theaters like Iran to terrorize the adversary.

US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby, said on August 5, 2026 that the review will examine “rationally employable, limited options that advantage us and stand the chance of favorably managing escalation and not getting us into an inexorable spiral.” What do limited options mean? The limited options imply acquisition of more types of tactical nuclear weapons—weapons with a shorter range and smaller yield as well as intended for tactical missions on the battlefield. To conclude, the relevance of tactical nuclear weapons is increasing because global politics is changing rapidly and the character of war is evolving.

Prof. Zafar Nawaz JASPAL

Prof. Zafar Nawaz JASPAL, Nonresident Fellow at MEPEI, is an Islamabad-based analyst and meritorious professor of International Relations at SPIR, Vice Chancellor of the Quaid-i-Azam University and an advisory Board Member of the Institute for East-West Strategic Studies (RIESS), affiliated with Oxford University, U.K. E-mail: jaspal_99@hotmail.com, X: @zafar_jaspal.