by Wenjia Luo•Published on April 22, 2026

I. Introduction

On 8 April 2026, the Strait of Hormuz was closed once again. According to data from maritime traffic tracking systems, the oil tanker ‘AUROURA’ performed a 180-degree turn off the coast of the Musandam Peninsula in Oman and returned to the depths of the Persian Gulf. This marks the second time Iran has halted oil tanker traffic through the Strait following Israel’s attack on Lebanon.

However, the impact of this round of conflict on the global energy market extends far beyond short-term shipping disruptions. Key oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf region has come under intense attack: approximately 17% of LNG export capacity at Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City has been paralyzed, with repairs expected to take 3-5 years; Bahrain’s Sitra Refinery has declared force majeure; the Riyadh refinery in Saudi Arabia and the Habshan gas complex in the UAE have both been targeted. This conflict is reshaping the global energy supply landscape.

For North Africa, the impact of the conflict is not a one-way ‘shock’, but rather follows a distinct pattern of divergence: on the one hand, Algeria and Libya, leveraging the security of their geographical corridors and proximity to European markets, have emerged as core alternative suppliers of Gulf oil and gas, entering a period of explosive growth; on the other hand, dual importers of food and energy such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have plunged into a deep crisis due to soaring global prices and dwindling foreign exchange reserves; Sudan, meanwhile, is on the brink of humanitarian collapse due to the combined effects of civil war and the disruption of Red Sea shipping routes.

II. Divergence in the Energy Dimension: Beneficiaries and Hardest-Hit Countries

(1) The Counter-Trend Rise of North African Oil and Gas Nations

The collapse of the Gulf supply chain has opened up an unprecedented market gap for North African oil and gas exporters. The core advantages of Algeria and Libya lie in the fact that they do not rely on the Strait of Hormuz for transport, meaning their export routes remain entirely unaffected by the conflict; they are adjacent to the European market, resulting in transport costs far lower than those of Gulf alternatives; and high international oil prices directly boost government revenue.

Algeria has seen the finalization of investments worth tens of billions of dollars. On 8 March 2026, the President formally issued a decree approving a US$5.4 billion oil and gas development agreement for the southern El Ilic block, signed between the Algerian National Oil Company and Saudi Midat Energy North Africa, with the entire investment funded by Midat Energy. On the gas supply side, Italy and Spain are stepping up negotiations to increase LNG imports, whilst Asian nations such as Vietnam have also expressed procurement requirements. Although the majority of Algeria’s production capacity is already locked in through long-term contracts, the high market prices give the country significant pricing power in new contracts.

Furthermore, Libya is likewise accelerating its expansion. The Libyan National Oil Corporation is pushing ahead with a new round of block tenders, planning to offer exploration blocks that were not awarded in the 2025 tender. US firm KBR has secured a contract to provide project management and technical services for a refinery project in the southern city of Ubari. With efforts underway across both upstream and downstream sectors, the country is striving to capture market share.

(2) The Critical Vulnerability of North African Energy Importers

In stark contrast to Algeria and Libya are Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

Egypt’s situation is the direst. As the world’s largest wheat importer, Egypt is facing a triple blow: revenue from Suez Canal tolls has plummeted due to a sharp decline in Red Sea shipping; energy import costs have skyrocketed as global oil prices soar; foreign exchange reserves are being rapidly depleted due to falling tourism revenues and capital outflows. According to risk assessment data for Africa’s 54 nations, Egypt’s risk of a food crisis is classified as ‘extremely high’, whilst the risk of a fuel crisis is ‘high’, rendering the country extremely vulnerable to the impact of the Middle East situation.

Although Morocco is a fertilizer exporter, it relies on imported natural gas as a raw material. Concurrently, successive droughts have driven up demand for wheat imports, whilst soaring energy costs are placing immense pressure on the national budget, resulting in “high” risks for both food and fuel. Tunisia, meanwhile, faces a fragile economic structure and a severe reliance on wheat and energy imports, with its national subsidy system being pushed to the brink of default.

 III. Profound Impacts on Food Security and Livelihoods

(1) The Ripple Effects of Disrupted Global Supply Chains

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea have directly driven up the costs of food and fertilizer imports across the African continent. For North African nations, this crisis has compounded on three fronts: international food prices have risen due to supply chain disruptions; soaring marine insurance premiums have increased logistics costs; and high fertiliser prices have stifled local agricultural output.

Egypt’s vulnerability is particularly acute. The country imports approximately 12 million tonnes of wheat annually and is heavily reliant on the Black Sea and EU markets. For every 10% rise in global food prices, Egypt must spend an additional US$1.5 billion on food import subsidies. Against a backdrop of already strained foreign exchange reserves due to declining Suez Canal revenues, this burden is almost unbearable. Domestic power rationing has become frequent, and social discontent continues to mount.

(2) The Extreme Crisis in Sudan

Sudan’s risk assessment indicates “extremely high risk of food crisis and extremely high risk of fuel crisis”, making it the most vulnerable country in North Africa. The nation is mired in civil war, with its domestic agricultural system devastated by the conflict; disruptions to Red Sea shipping have directly cut off international food aid and fuel imports required to sustain the war. In stark contrast to the “low risk” ratings of Algeria and Libya, Sudan’s humanitarian crisis has reached catastrophic proportions.

(3) The Compounding Pressure of Refugees and Return Migrants

According to UNHCR data, the escalation along the Lebanon-Lebanon border has led to approximately 30,000 people being accommodated in government-designated shelters in Lebanon, with a large number more sleeping rough by the roadside. Recently, an average of around 11,000 people per day have been entering Syria from Lebanon. Although this refugee flow is currently directed primarily towards Syria, should it continue to spread, Egypt will become the North African country most directly affected.

Meanwhile, since October 2023, approximately 5.4 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan, with over 232,000 returning so far in 2026. This large-scale, hasty wave of returns has increased regional protection needs and may trigger further population movements. The UN Refugee Agency requires US$454.2 million in funding for 2026 across Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia; however, as of the end of February, only 15% of this amount had been secured, severely limiting its capacity for humanitarian response.

 IV. Conclusions and Implications

The impact of the 2026 US-Israel-Iran conflict on North African nations is not a uniform ‘shock’, but rather presents a distinctly divergent pattern.

Beneficiaries: Algeria and Libya, leveraging the triple advantages of secure geopolitical corridors, proximity to European markets and high oil price dividends, have emerged as key alternative players in the restructuring of the global energy supply landscape. The implementation of investments worth tens of billions, multiple countries actively seeking gas supplies and enhanced pricing power signal that the North African oil and gas industry is entering a period of explosive growth.

Hardest-Hit Nations: Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, due to their dual reliance on food and energy imports, have plunged into crisis under the twin pressures of soaring global prices and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Egypt faces the most acute risks, with a sharp decline in Suez Canal revenues and a surge in wheat import costs creating a “double whammy”.

On the Brink of Collapse: Sudan, facing the combined impact of civil war and the suspension of Red Sea shipping, has seen its food aid channels completely cut off and is in the midst of a humanitarian disaster.

This conflict offers profound lessons for North African nations: Firstly, energy self-sufficiency and food security reserves are the lifelines for coping with external shocks; Algeria’s gains serve as a stark counterpoint to the root causes of Egypt’s vulnerability; Second, the internal divisions within North African nations indicate that regional cooperation mechanisms must be urgently strengthened to enable resource allocation and risk-sharing during crises; Third, the international community must swiftly bridge the humanitarian funding gap to prevent the crises in countries such as Sudan from spreading further across North Africa.

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