Foreign Confrontation in the Sahel Region between Propaganda & Policies

As of 2024, the Sahel region appears to undergo geopolitical transformations and the Russian propaganda is often mentioned as a major factor in the disruption. While the Russian Federation appears to (re)assert itself as a global superpower, the societal and technological transformations in first quarter of the 21^st century require a contextual assessment of propaganda-related developments.

This article will briefly analyze the challenges in identifying potential limits between policies and propaganda by employing a positivist approach from an international relations perspective. Since propaganda theory and especially its application are subject to interpretations in confrontation, and the scope and shape of confrontations also evolve, the positivist approach is expected to deliver meaningful findings on propaganda and potential connections with policies.

Hence, first section will compare recent postures of China, the United States (US), Russian Federation in the Sahel region, and France’s apparently decreasing role. The next section will identify elements that are typically presented as propaganda throughout Sahel in the context of established postures, and finally, these will be analyzed from the perspective of a wider confrontational scene in which the role of propaganda may be either underestimated or overstated on a case-by-case basis.

Introduction

At present, the term “propaganda” is extensively utilized, although not exclusively, in the context of geopolitical rivalry between superpowers like the US, Russian Federation and China. From a mass media perspective, nowadays propaganda would be generally associated with hidden, illegitimate, or negative aims, since mainstream or social media rarely provide instances of positive or constructive propaganda as such.

In the particular case of American – Russian confrontation, which appears to survive the end of the Cold War, pro – Western voices tend to outline Russian propaganda (Michałowska-Kubś & Kubś, 2023), whereas anti-Western voices tend to emphasize on Western propaganda (Vltchek, 2015).

The propaganda itself is just the instrument meant to carry out a message and achieve the defined goals. In brief, propagandistic aspects of the message may include design and language or other content elements, facts or alleged facts, principles, and links to individual or social conscience, among others. From this perspective, a message may contain various levels of propagandistic elements, and anti-propaganda would sometimes be assessed as propaganda and therefore countered. These distinctions reveal a thin line between policies and their associated propaganda, while the amount of bias in the propaganda or anti-propaganda materials creates challenges for researchers in determining this line and assessing the impact of propaganda as part of the larger framework. In all cases, the propaganda claims to be grounded in facts and processes, and this demands a brief assessment of geopolitical changes in the Sahel region, or related to it, for the purpose of this article.

Significant foreign postures in the Sahel region

Sahel stretches from Mauritania and Senegal to Sudan and Eritrea. The European Union (EU) considers the G5 Sahel countries to include Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (EU External Action, 2021). For the purpose of this article, the Sahel region will be considered the G5 Sahel countries and their neighbors.

The Franc Zone encompasses 14 African countries that utilize since 1945 the replacement of French Franc called Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc. The CFA Franc is managed within two major (central) banking systems: BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) which encompasses Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and BEAC (Banc of Central African States) which encompasses Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad (BCEAO, 2024). This currency was pegged to the EURO after the latter replaced the French Franc and Mauritania left the CFA Franc in 1973. According to World Bank, Mauritania’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in current USD, per year, was $ 2’149.4 in 2023, followed by Mali with $ 897.4, Burkina Faso with $ 874.1, Chad with $ 719.4 and Niger with $ 618.3 (World Bank, 2024).

French domination over this territory has been challenged almost continuously, and the idea of renouncing CFA Franc has repeatedly surfaced. While negotiations to replace the CFA Franc may be complex, Côte d’Ivoire announced in 2019 to reform the currency and rename it “Eco”, and more recently Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger reportedly announced that the intend to stop using the CFA Franc (Bougrine & Arnould, 2024).

French posture in this region appears to have been basically unchallenged seriously in the second part of 20^th century at international level, but recent evolutions can be interpreted from various angles. The American and broader international community stance towards decolonization after WWII had major formal implications. States like Indonesia, Philippines, Jordan, India, Morocco, Mali, Somalia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, to name just a few, became independent and more recently, Hong Kong was returned to China after a long British occupation. The historical decolonization process is not a new trend, and although relatively slow, it led to increasing autonomy within former colonial territories. Whether this trend has been accelerated by competitors or not is a subsequent matter, but the baseline for increased local autonomy is an ongoing development.

The competitors of French influence in Africa and particularly the Sahel can theoretically be both allies and opponents. For example, while the 2’500 jobs cut at Airbus Defense and Space division announced in October 2024 is determined by multiple factors, a traditionally French ally, Morocco, decided to buy a $ 1 billion satellite from Israel that will replace Airbus and Thales satellites (Reuters 1, 2024).

There are very few countries around the world in which the US is not considered a competitor for influence, if any. In the Sahel region, American posture is not highly visible in trade relations, but rather in the field of mineral resources exploitation and military presence. For example, Maher Hajbi claims that the takeover of Marathon Oil by ConocoPhillips for $ 22 billion has the potential to impact the sub-Saharan oil industry (Hajbi, 2024). Other large American corporations like Anglo American, AngloGold Ashanti, BHP Billinton, Rio Tinto are reportedly holding mining assets and are active in this region(Gaya, 2023). They are not alone, with China’s CNCP and France’s Orano and TotalEnergies, among 200 French companies or subsidiaries in the region (Cessac, 2023), also being active, but the American corporate presence in the Sahel is very significant.

USAID reports, for example, the improvement of water services for over 1.2 million people in Burkina Faso and Niger, treating hundreds of thousands of children from pneumonia and other diseases in Burkina Faso, management, and rehabilitation of more 255’000 hectares of land in Burkina Faso, food assistance for over 170’000 in Mauritania and 1.8 million in Chad as of 2022 (USAID, 2024).

After 9/11, American military presence in the Sahel has reportedly increased, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) aiming to improve counterterrorism capacity of countries like Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania (ECFR, 2024). In 2019, the US was reportedly opening its largest drone base in Agadez, Niger. Olayinka Ajala claims that while France and China have economic interests in the Sahel, the US “the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence” as a consequence of French military presence contraction (Ajala, 2024). However, Kamissa Camara, senior advisor at US Institute of Peace, concluded in 2021 that Washington’s strategy for the Sahel relied too much on counterterrorism and diplomacy should be improved in order to play a more effective role.

In this sense, four policy recommendations were identified: the recognition of politics – security connection, the unification of US aid programs, development of economic opportunities in the region, and the assertion of US diplomatic leadership in the Sahel (Camara, 2021).

From the perspective of relations between policies and propaganda, three policy recommendations above address exclusively policy issues, while the assertion of US diplomatic leadership may leave more space for propaganda deployment. Besides the connection between policies and propaganda, the so-called unipolar American approach to international relations after the fall of Berlin’s Wall represents another factor that contributes to explaining Russia’s increasing presence in the Sahel region.

Beginning with the 1990s, the Russian Federation began to adopt a rather defensive and reactive posture, while collaborating with the US and NATO in various matters. The agreement that ended the Soviet Union was theoretically supposed to guarantee Russian Federation’s buffer regions according to Russian accounts. Despite American politeness, the number of neutral countries between NATO and the Russian Federation decreased subsequently, and President Putin’s 2007 speech at Munich Security Conference signaled opposition not only to NATO’s expansion eastwards but American unilateralism in general.

In the context of War on Terror (WoT) and Western advancement towards Russian borders, which have been probably perceived as expansionist, the Russian Federation began to actively oppose American initiatives in less than two decades after attempting to cooperate. Russia did not appear initially to have economic interests in the Sahel region similar to those of France and China, and neither military interests similar to those of the US, but from the perspective of a generally reactive posture, it probably began to develop responses to American expansion in the region. And this is well reflected by the Russian military and security forces presence, as well as support for friendly leaders.

Two major elements could eventually be associated to increasing Russian presence in the Sahel region: the reactive nature and a certain degree of symmetry to American presence. From this perspective, should the strategic competition between the US and Russian Federation have survived Perestroika, this became relatively more limited to military and security aspects: the Russian Federation is rich in mineral resources and it did not appear to compete traditional players in large industries like China does.

Consequently, the posture of the Russian Federation in the Sahel could be assessed as in line with its wider global posture, reacting almost symmetrically to American geostrategic initiatives in what it describes as defensive moves. The approach is mostly security-based, but the scope and reach of security nowadays spans from hard power to payment systems and ideologic mobilization.

China’s posture in the Sahel region is also in line with its wider global stance, since it emerged as a key economic partner for all regional countries. No element of China’s posture suggests that it would aim replace or adopt a Cold War approach like the US or Russian Federation to the competition for presence and influence in the region. As it will be detailed in subsequent paragraphs, China declares continuously its policy of non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful cooperation, and at propaganda level it instrumentalizes this foreign policy in order to win “hearts and minds”. Unlike the Russian Federation, the superpower China competes with Western industrial giants and secures besides hydrocarbon resources and projects, all minerals possible irrespective of their strategic importance.

China’s posture in the region could represent a challenge for French and American companies, but from a strategic and security perspective, it creates more demand for regional assets and present the representatives of Sahel with more negotiation power. This is relevant not only for the region, but for large economies as well, since availability and price point of strategic minerals impacts directly companies and markets.

On one hand, the competition landscape in the Sahel region has diversified through the increasing presence and role of China, whereas the renewed confrontation between the US and Russian Federation appears to have inherited elements from the Cold War period. While policy elements may help to identify key aspects of foreign presence in the Sahel region, the propaganda tools meant to support this presence could be either in line with postures or capitalize on the assumed weaknesses of opponents.

Propaganda and anti-propaganda in the Sahel region

In a Washington-based Middle East Institute article, Prof. Gain was asking an important question in May 2023: are the shifting sentiments in the Sahel anti-France or pro-Russian (Gain, 2023)? Besides the policy – propaganda separation, it is important to distinguish between shifting away from one framework and choosing one or more new frameworks. The article cited mentions terms like “French lip-service diplomacy” and (French) “support for corrupt regimes” (Gain, 2023). Unlike the US in Iraq, France had had a relatively long and significant presence in Sahel countries, and the so-called anti-French sentiment may have developed across decades and the so-called Africa’s coup belt was allegedly created also by “French mistakes” (Aina, 2023). At any rate the narratives promoted by various parties in the Sahel region are at least a basis if not part of propaganda.

The main France-related development and associated narrative that emerged in the Sahel was the initiation and conduct of counterterrorism operations. Literature notes that French Operation Barkhane accounted for 5’100 out of 7’000 French troops deployed in 2021, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had the largest annual budget of any UN mission ($ 1.26 bln. in 2022) and despite these efforts, Sahel remained a deadly region in the fight against terrorism (Gain, 2023).

Le Monde is a French news outlet that carefully watches and reports on developments in Africa and the Sahel. A 2023 Le Monde article explains that the (Russian) Wagner group “has conquered” the African continent and, besides mercenaries, it employed “fake news outlets and influencers” (Le Cam, 2023). The article claims that the first Russia-Africa summit from Sochi, 2019, has been the starting point of a cooperation accompanied by a sophisticated propaganda machine aiming to promote Russian support for African countries in their quest for Independence and allegedly “formation of negative attitudes towards European powers and the United States” (Le Cam, 2023).

The alleged propaganda themes appear to be in line with Russia’s policy to regain power after the dissolution of USSR. Apart from Russian policy, the propagandistic aspects appear to build and capitalize on a genuine anti-colonial sentiment that is both in line with similar phenomena across the world and developed throughout decades. An alleged need for (more) independence can be expanded within a propaganda framework by repeatedly referencing financial domination, (French) military presence and a so-called failure in the fight against terrorism. The Russian propaganda for the Sahel region is not much different from the one it generally employs to underline its position and role in the wider global anti-unilateralism and (American) hegemony.

There are at least two factual pillars that Russian propaganda relies on in the attempt to rebalance a presumed unipolar world: the Soviet period, in which countries received support and military assistance when agreeing with Moscow on terms, and a new policy that Russian Federation adopted, together with BRICS countries and other partners, that aims to break away from Western financial and ideological dominance, and offer alternatives to third parties. The resonance of such topics has been historically significant, and aims like peace, freedom and independence have also been the basis for 20^th century major international relations breakthroughs. At the same time, the recent major wars from the Middle East, American occupation of parts from Syria among others, combined with the increasing number and scope of essentially American sanctions on various countries and entities, may legitimize the anti-Western discourse.

Russian discourse against Western practices does not entail fundamental opposition to all Western values. The propaganda against alleged Western colonial approach does not necessarily focus on formal independence of certain territories, but purported employment of financial and other type of constructs in order to control countries and economies, double standards in addressing situations of common interests and not delivering on promises. In the particular case of Sahel countries, Russian propaganda emphasizes on the failure of Western partners to help develop and stabilize this region while claiming to attempt this. This hypothesis is backed by deployment of Russian security assets like Wagner to demonstrate an interest in improving the security situation, cooperation and development conferences, relaxing visa regimes and similar friendly measures that can hardly be argued against as pure propaganda.

The question whether Russian propaganda is winning in the Sahel due to the fact that it is Russian, the facts that it emphasizes, associated Russian policies or due to failure of competitors to deliver – is difficult to address. It is Russian, it is intertwined with policies, but the bids for cooperation represent proposals that are competing with other bids at present, and this was the case also in the past, when Soviet Union and the US made various cooperation proposals to third parties.

Without aiming to establish the success level of Russian propaganda in the Sahel, or to precisely distinguish between policies and propaganda, it must acknowledged that the interaction between Russian Federation and this region, as well as its popularity in the region appear to have increased significantly. In addition to state visits from top diplomats like Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov or Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Russian officials saluted the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS or AES in French) (BaronG, 2024), Russian athletes were enrolled in the 2024 Mali Taekwondo Championships along ASS athletes (@cecild84, 2024), and a Russian military cargo plane delivered emergency aid in the wake of Faladie Gendarmerie School attack (@cecild84 2, 2024). Furthermore, the African Initiative – Russian news agency, considered a propaganda outlet in a Le Monde article (Le Cam & Eydoux, 2024) – reportedly celebrated with local partners the 72^nd birthday of President Putin (@cecild84 3, 2024).

The US generally expressed concerns about the expansion of Russian influence in Africa and the Sahel, and the term used to address this would often be “countering” (Hood, Borshchevskaya, Fishman, & Rumley, 2024). In the triangle France – Russian Federation – the US, the latter’s position is clearly closer to France, but how much closer is difficult to assess. Certainly, American interests to contain the expansion and success of Russian policy and propaganda around the globe are very clear, but the degree of coupling between its interests and French interests in the Sahel is not precisely identified in the media. American propaganda in the Sahel region does not necessarily look very much adapted to the region. With respect to WoT, and US global military posture, associated propaganda could focus on either the image of US a reliable security partner, or its corporations as capable economic actors.

Chinese presence in the Sahel appears to be the least confrontational: China seeks in general to gain recognition and domination through transformation rather than confrontation. Its competitive economic advantages and the declared principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries in general, including the Sahel region, allows it to focus its messages and their amplification on delivered projects, advantageous prices, credits, and conditions and the envisioned “shared future”, or a peaceful coexistence. In terms of infrastructure development, which is a core Chinese component of its internal and external policy, the projects from Sahel could also accommodate Chinese mineral resources projects and bilateral trade.

The number of infrastructure projects completed by Chinese companies in the Sahel is increasing, hence only a few will be mentioned: the Agadem – Seme-Kpodj oil pipeline (Bhattacharya, 2024), the 5G network in Burkina Faso (@cecild84 4, 2024), while more are to be completed: a 1.2 GW wind farm in Mauritania (Sanderson, 2024) and further Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure in the aftermath of China and Mauritania signing a cooperation plan in 2023.

While a rather confrontational approach between France and Russian Federation, and the US and Russian Federation can be noticed vis-à-vis the changes from Sahel, Chinese reporting on the geopolitics of this region focuses almost exclusively on development and expansion of ties. This is in line with the general Chinese approach towards international relations, and another confirmation of its core aim to develop without employing force.

Discussion and conclusion

This article focused on identifying postures of four major countries in the affairs of Sahel region, i.e. the G5 Sahel countries or their neighbors. Subsequently, the article identified instances of expanding Russian influence in the Sahel region, which cannot be dissociated from actions, policies, and propaganda. However, the definition of propaganda, its use by other actors and the connections between propaganda and policies relativize the importance of Russian propaganda in the success achieved with expanding influence in the Sahel region.

In recent years, France lost influence in the Sahel region, and its military footprint also decreased. On one hand, there was no one-to-one transition from French influence to a Russian one, but rather a diversification away from French role. This transition entailed so far to a transfer of influence from France to China, Russian Federation, and the US. On the other hand, the significant increase of Russian presence, especially in the security sector of regional countries, changes the rules of the game and not the game itself.

Excluding the possibility of a global confrontation for the purpose of this analysis, international competition is and will remain a challenge for all actors, be they customers or suppliers. Furthermore, the role of propaganda is very important, but the policy that it aims to support and the link between the two determine outcomes, costs, and feasibility. From this perspective, it is important to emphasize that France, although accused of mistakes in dealing with Sahel countries, has certainly carried out a policy with an associated propaganda component. To catalogue this as a failure requires an assessment of what the ultimate policy was, whether it was suited for the region or the instruments used were appropriate. Furthermore, whether Russian claimed success is definitive or not, or its costs are acceptable on long term, remain open questions.

While propaganda can determine certain outcomes, it probably never won a confrontation by itself. At present, over-reliance on propaganda or anti-propaganda based on historical lessons learned or mathematical probabilities may win some battles but also endanger the war. At the crossroads between decolonization, war against terrorism and Russian reactive posture against Western push towards its borders, France appears to have lost a part of its influence in the Sahel region. Whether this was a Russian goal or French influence in the Sahel was a collateral victim of superpower confrontation remains an open question, as well.

Should Sahel developments be analyzed from the perspective of superpower confrontation at global level, it was difficult to establish which development impacted French influence in the considered region. The major topic related to BRICS development is a new payment (and financial) system aimed to end the exclusivity the US enjoys with SWIFT (and dollar). Such a new system would question not only the ability of certain countries to impose and enforce sanctions, but the very basic assumptions of the US-championed Bretton-Woods system. This system had been challenged by France when demanding gold against its dollars, a policy that is generally believed to have contributed to the 1971 decoupling of US dollar from gold.

The general scene of increased global tension includes a ramping-up of trade tariffs, not only between the rising superpower China and traditional players, but, as in the case of President Trump’s administration from 2017 to 2021, between the US and Europe. Finally, the conflicts from Ukraine and Gaza Strip present many actors on the international scene with examples of replacing negotiation and diplomacy with hard power and war. Considering that the so-called War on Terror disrupted the basic principle of solving threats to global security through UN tools, a Pandora’s box may have been opened, and the number of countries aiming to unilaterally project their understanding of justice outside their borders while claiming work in the interest of the entire global community may increase.

From this perspective, it is not only French relation with the Sahel that could fall victim to historical dynamics, but other sensible, yet still functional, frameworks as well.

This research also concludes that while strategic and tactical deployment of propaganda may yield results, the nature of modern influencing campaigns requires a more in-depth analysis of the relation between propaganda and policy, with the purpose of optimizing the effort, chances of success and long-term sustainability.

 

 

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