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1. Introduction
Considering the long-term tensions and associated conflicts between India and Pakistan as rooted only in the bilateral relations between the two countries may represent an oversimplification of history and modern international relations. Both contemporary countries inherited the British Raj, and previous political structures like the Mughal Empire, European colonies, and historical cultural milieux like the Indus Valley Civilization.
The classical decolonization process that became mainstream in the first part of 20th century resulted in the dissolution of British formal rule over the “Indian Continent”, but settled only one of the conflicts specific to this geographical area. Long term tensions and rivalries throughout the region reemerged in new forms, influenced, among others, by interactions with more modern and technologically advanced states and militaries.
The April 2025 crisis that emerged between India and Pakistan represents both a predictable continuation of a historical multidimensional conflict and the outcome of a peculiar international relations context, marked by polarization, inconsistencies, growing confrontational rhetoric, a generalized contestation of the state of affairs, and global rearmament.
Present study aims to identify core underlying elements of the April 2025 acute crisis between India and Pakistan, analyze the latest developments of the water and trans-border terrorism challenges that the two neighbors face and determine potential frameworks and conditions for de-escalation.
2. India and Pakistan: An Intertwined Destiny and a Long Rivalry
Modern states of India and Pakistan emerged officially in 1947, when the British Raj was abolished. However, as in the case of Ottoman Empire’s dissolution, the pathway to independence for new countries had begun earlier, and the emergence of a nationalist movement throughout the Raj was paralleled by the rise of United States of America (US) among global leaders. Richard Aldrich’s article on US intelligence efforts in the British Raj for the period 1942 – 1947 reveals sinuous agendas of the English and Americans, and a competition-cooperation relationship that ended up closer to the American vision rather than the English one (Aldrich, 1998). The article determines that US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an intelligence secret organization, was instrumentalizing on one hand the anti-colonialism speech, that was recommended as policy to Washington, and was balancing common interests with the British. Although the allies pursued the common goal of World War II, the British regarded India as an internal matter while President Roosevelt reportedly aimed independence for colonies and improvement of economic prospects for its own companies. The research frames the competition and American political stance on the matter as “empire questions,” and underlines that while President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to disagree, the US was penetrating Indian subcontinent at intelligence level, and the support for nationalists like Gandhi was offered either publicly, though, for example, US Congress campaign called “Quit India”, or covertly through secret services. The US reportedly began to implement a new policy in the region after mid-1942, with the help of OSS and the Office of War Information (OWI – responsible with propaganda) and other actors, colluding or competing oftentimes with British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). At political level, there were common British and American interests to join forces, and the legitimacy of American presence on British overseas territory was partially legitimized by the confrontation with Japan, and subsequently with the Soviet Union. This leads to multiple attempts to split Asia into regions of influence/dominance, and, for example, allow the leadership of British intelligence structures over the American ones in India, while the opposite would apply for China. However, by 1945, the American plan called “The Development of a Program of a Political and Economic Intelligence for India and Burma” confirms a political and ideological split with the British, that had been promoted for many years by the Americans to increase the legitimacy of their presence and actions in the region (Aldrich, 1998). Consequently, before an India – Pakistan rivalry, there had been an intense British – American rivalry on the territory of British Raj that resulted among others in the dissolution of the latter. The study mentioned above refers to a religious split as well, and connections between the Middle East and other Muslim regions with the Indian Muslim regions. This will represent an important factor in the post-1947 events from India and Pakistan.
Indian National Congress (INC) under Jawaharlal Nehru had pressed for complete independence since the 1930s and the All-India Muslim League (AIML) under Mohammed Ali Jinnah had aimed to maintain a future independent state as a single entity. There was also an initial Wavell Plan in 1945, which envisioned the transfer of power to local subjects of the Raj, but this has not materialized in the initial form. Citing the determination of the Muslim League to obtain control of Pakistan, and the acceptance of leaders of the Mountbatten Plan (***, 1999), the UK Parliament passed the 1947 Indian Independence Act on July 18th, 1947 (UK Parliament, 2025). The split between India on one hand, and West and East Pakistan (the latter becoming Bangladesh in 1971) on the other, determined widespread violence, the displacement of 15 million people and the death of approximately 1 million (BBC, 2022). But the views of Chaudhry Rahmat Ali (a supporter of Pakistani separation) for a Pak Commonwealth of Nations had neither been shared by all Muslim political forces from the former British Raj, nor have they been implemented as envisioned. Therefore, both India and Pakistan are inheriting a larger (former British) political entity, whose former subjects did not fully agree to the partition and subsequent developments, a practically continuous state of tension being thus created.
The post-colonial settlement in South Asia represented a unique chapter in history, and the tensions appear to have developed mostly along religious lines. However, in the broader landscape of colonialism, segregation of societies along religious lines by colonizers has been a practice in other regions as well, like for example the Middle East, and along other lines as well, like for example in Rwanda. The new distinctions introduced in societies may have been scientifically correct, but in certain cases, these infringed upon a fragile state of peace and contributed, among others, to violent conflicts. In the case of India and Pakistan, a space in which millenia-old cultures developed, the pre-existing rivalries and conflicts were related to both cultural and religious aspects, as well as wars for political dominance over territories. From a constructive perspective, a cultural space can be assessed as multicultural or cosmopolite, i.e. diverse and relatively stable, while the same space can be presented as divided and prone to conflict.
At the time of the partition, princely state Jammu and Kashmir was under the rule of (Sir) Maharaja (Prince) Hari Singh, heir of the ruling Singh dynasty that was reportedly instated with British help, and the initial choice was to remain independent from the two new countries/dominions, Pakistan and India. However, due to pressure and attacks from Pakistani territories, Jammu and Kashmir reportedly sent a request, i.e. the Instrument of Accession (for Jammu and Kashmir), to join India, that was accepted in October 1947 by Lord Mountbatten as a precondition for dispatching troops for defense. The accession has been described as controversial and even fraud (Ijaz, 1995) especially by the Pakistani side, since the principle of self-determination has reportedly not been applied in 1947 or afterwards (Schonfield, Strategic Studies Volume 42, Issue No 1, 2022).
The legal status of Jammu and Kashmir as part of India has been a source of tensions and conflict since 1947. Besides the lack of a referendum, two additional aspects are part of the discussion: the majority of population was in 1947 and remains Muslim, and the initial option to join India, whose existence or validity are sometimes questioned (Kashmir Law and Justice Project, 2024), would have relied on an a unitary India as successor of the Raj, not the partition based essentially on religious lines, in which case the Jammu and Kashmir region would have joined the Muslim part. Furthermore, the accession should have been subjected to popular vote, as Maharaja Hari Singh suggested and Lord Mountbatten stated.
The status quo led to multiple violent events, including military confrontations between India and Pakistan. After the third Indian – Pakistani war of 1971 (first one in 1947 – 1948 and second one in 1965), the 1972 Simla Agreement was signed. The document basically acknowledges India’s success in splitting Bangladesh from Pakistan, as it paved the way for the latter to recognize the independence of Bangladesh and, among others, addresses Jammu and Kashmir’s situation through two major provisions: the Line of Control is recognized by both parties, i.e. the militarily enforced demarcation line for this region, and a mutual agreement to pursue further negotiations only bilaterally, without international or third party coordination. However, unilateral actions followed, and the confrontations were scaled up through India’s 1974 first nuclear weapon test, followed by Pakistan’s nuclear arming (CFR, 2025).
Through constitutional article 35A (delegated regional government to enact requirements for permanent residency in the region) and 370 (special status of the region), the special autonomy status of Jammu and Kashmir were guaranteed until 2019, when they were abrogated by the Indian establishment (Khan, Zubair Khan, & Abbas, 2021). The move led to further militarization of the region and increased tensions between India and Pakistan, but the international community did not apparently react significantly to the change in status (Khan & Sultana, 2023).
The Jammu and Kashmir dispute represents a central and enduring issue between India and Pakistan. A significant factor fueling the dispute is the colonial heritage, along borders established by the colonizers either based on an exogenous, theoretical logic that did not account for realities on the ground, or anchored in owned interests. Traditions and legal factors became instruments of confrontation between India and Pakistan, besides the inherited religious segregation that the Raj accentuated. India appears to advance its interests in recent history faster than Pakistan throughout the region, by having deployed successfully its influence to achieve the separation of Bangladesh, and by gradually advancing its political interests in the Jammu and Kashmir region.
India’s constitution proclaimed a secular state, and this principle is promoted at official level. However, Hindu population has been by far the largest majority in India since its independence (83.4 % in 1961 and 80.5 % in 2001), despite a relative increase of Muslim population from 10.7 % in 1961 to 13.4 % in 2001 (Sharma, 2009). Pakistan’s state religion is Islam, and in Bangladesh’s Constitution Islam is designated as state religion while the principle of secularism is also mentioned. At ideological level, India is basically a democratic country, often called world’s largest democracy, and it ranked # 61 in a religious freedom index, whereas Bangladesh ranked # 77 and Pakistan was not listed among top 89 countries in terms of religious freedom (U.S. News & World Report L.P., 2025). In all three countries, religion appears to emerge as an important social and political factor, irrespective of the legal and official narrative. In the context of a renewed nationalist wave on the international scene, revisiting identities in Pakistan and India becomes a renewed challenge for populations and political representatives, especially due to the heritage and historical conflicts that have not been settled in a sustainable manner.
3. Geopolitical developments in South Asia: a brief overview
In 2025, the term “emerging economy” can be considered a relative one, due to the classical understanding of emergence, but also the geopolitical and international economic transformations. Therefore, the economies of India and Pakistan can be considered also emerging, but due to different factors and in different contexts.
India’s population reached 1.44 billion in 2023, whereas Pakistan’s stood at 247.5 million. Since 1960, India’s population increased to 330.28 % from the considered initial value, whereas Pakistan’s to 541.47% from that in the reference year 1960 (WB POP, 2025).
In terms of GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity – PPP), India overtook Pakistan in 2009. A steep increase in India’s per capita GDP PPP in current international USD was noticed in the period 2020 ($ 6,715) to 2023 ($ 10,166.2). Pakistan also experienced a rise in GDP PPP per capita during this period, but from $ 5,048 in 2020 to $ 6,036.7 in 2023. A rate of rise in GDP PPP comparable to the one of India was also registered by Bangladesh, who reached $ 9,147.8 in 2023 from 6,640.6 in 2020 (WB GDP PPP, 2025). These general indicators suggest a stronger economic position than that of Nepal or Afghanistan, but not comparable with the ones of regional countries like Iran or China.
The conflict between Pakistan and India, essentially due to the Jammu and Kashmir region and in April 2025 apparently also due to water, has turned the region into an arms destination, potentially the second largest arms destination in the world after West Asia/Middle East. In the period 2020 – 2024, India (ranked second largest arms importer) and Pakistan (ranked fifth largest arms importer) amounted for 12.9 % of total global arms imports registered by SIPRI. Among the top 10 importers, Qatar (6.8 %), Saudi Arabia (6.8 %), Egypt (3.3 %) and Kuwait (2.9 %) made up 19.8 % of total arms imports, followed by the United Arab Emirates with an additional 2.6 % from total on the 11th position (SIPRI, 2025). These transfers do not include deployments or technology transfers, like for example the ones between the US and Israel, but it is considered a relatively representative indication of the armament transfer landscape across the globe.
Certainly, the indicators analyzed in the above paragraphs are economic in nature, but especially the trade with weapons impacts regional security and societies overall as well. During the Cold War, all countries were subject to pressures of the confrontation between the US and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the superpower race, the latter decided to provide support for the development of nuclear sectors in China, India, and Pakistan. These strategic decisions changed the security landscape in Asia on short term (during the second half of 20th century), and potentially the course of history, but did not prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and did not help win confrontations like the Russian War in Afghanistan.
The confrontation between the US and Soviet Union impacted relations of the former with Pakistan, a country that was, alongside India, a Russian partner, and an American partner as well. In an article that fact-checks Hillary Clinton’s statements interpreted as “We Created Al-Qaeda”, that was assessed as false, journalist Nick Hardinges quotes statements from Clinton’s video: “…We also have a history of, kind of, moving in and out of Pakistan. I mean, let us remember here, the people we are fighting today, we funded 20 years ago. And we did it because we were locked in this struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan and we did not want to see them control Central Asia. And we went to work… And it was President Reagan in partnership with the Congress led by Democrats who said: “You know what? Sounds like a pretty good idea. Let’s deal with the ISI and the Pakistani military and let’s go recruit these mujahedeen. And that’s great. Let’s get some to come from Saudi Arabia and other places importing their Wahhabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union” (Hardinges, 2024). News outlets, particularly the Indian ones, presented the April 2025 statements of Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif in a Sky News interview, according to which his country did “dirty work” for the West and the Minister “…has admitted the country’s history of supporting, training and funding terrorist organisations” (The Hindu, 2025). Consequently, a concurrence of declarations appears to confirm special agreements and operations involving the US and Pakistan, with impact at least at regional level and dating back to at least the 1970s.
As of 2025, regional stakes appear to become higher than ever. The former superpower in South Asia, i.e. the United Kingdom, appears to look for a renewed global influence in the wake of Brexit, and the US is looking for solutions to maintain dominance in the post-Kissinger relations with Asia and particularly China. In this context, it must considered that the idea of replacing China with India as a major economic partner is not new: as early as 1945, the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) “…had already begun to identify independent India as a possible commercial rival to China” (Aldrich, 1998, p. 157).
Acknowledging that the hypothesis presented above remains an open topic, it must be emphasized that the US might be the second country looking with one eye into the past and one into the future regarding this region, after the UK: a potential switch from economic cooperation with China to India is one of the premises vehiculated in various scenarios, and secondly, past American economic success relied on trade and exchanges with Asia. In terms of changes in superpower presence, the Russian Federation appears to have minimized its role, or rather resources invested to shape regional outcomes, and China became world’s top economy in terms of total GDP PPP, while India also emerged as the third country from this perspective. An evaluation based on absolute GDP in USD might reveal additional aspects of the comparison, but given the fluid and increasingly unpredictable nature of global trade and future of the US dollar in the context of emerging alternatives, these parameters will not be assessed in detail for the purpose of this study.
As the first modern trade and economic superpower that did not win its position by major wars, China recalibrates gradually Asian and global trade and consequently geopolitical landscape. However, alliances like BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are not directly comparable with Western/Western-led ones, like for example NATO, European Union or G7. Asian and China-driven organizations are younger and more flexible in terms of cooperation and competition rules, and the autonomy of participants is inherently predominant. In this context, India’s autonomy on the international scene is a relatively complex factor, with a high potential to determine historic outcomes.
Unlike China, India did not receive a seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) after World War II, although its population was relatively large and it joined the Bretton Woods agreement as a major market upon its foundation. Consequently, India advocated in recent decades, alongside other countries like Türkiye, for a reform of the Security Council system, to reflect its economic and security role throughout the globe, although unlike China, it runs a trade deficit and the volume of exports does qualify for the top 10 globally. Therefore, China did not exercise enough leverage to improve its international stance decisively based on handling with Western powers and while continuing cooperation, it also became a member of BRICS and SCO. In terms of BRI participation, India appeared to entertain the idea of a competing project, should the Western partners and, for example Middle Eastern partners, would have contributed significantly.
In the early 2020s, the idea of competing China was a mainstream topic in the West, but as of 2025, major international developments like the War from Ukraine and associated sanctioning programs, as well as confiscation of funds, tariffs and similar measures, confirm a trend of financial contraction for the traditional poles, irrespective of causes. Hence, India does not appear to have the resources to compete China on BRI even along its partners, and while still doing business with the West and refining Russian oil, it also plays an important in BRICS, SCO developments. From this perspective, if political negotiations between India and China will progress significantly, India may even become a more active BRI partner due to economic reasons, in the context of major geopolitical constraints: while regionalization is presented as a safety net for all-out globalization, it must be acknowledged that the majority Hindu India, although a large market, is surrounded by major Muslim countries like Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh and potentially the future uncontested global economic leader, China, the latter having a global customer base and special cooperation agreements with neighbors like ASEAN. From this perspective, should modern regionalization yield results on long term, this might place Asia’s India in the future somewhere between 20th century US and Canada in terms of regional influence, unless disruptive events will reshape current trends.
Regional geopolitics and the relations between India and Pakistan are being shaped by the countries themselves and traditional exogenous actors like the UK and the US, but China’s regional interests, for example, in ports like Gwadar, otherwise similar to India’s interest in the Iranian port Chabahar although not part of a similarly systematic endeavor, represents both a new regional alignment vector, and an example replicated globally through projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) or Iraq Development Road. Consequently, the two main development vectors for geopolitics in South Asia are the increase of international relevant actors’ number and the rearrangement of strategies due to Chinese fundamentally new initiatives at global level (BRI) or at regional level (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – CPEC).
4. Contemporary Tensions between India and Pakistan and the April 2025 escalation
Since the pursuit of nuclear programs around 1970s, security situation in the region deteriorated significantly. Likewise, the series of wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan added pressure to this region either directly or indirectly. The categorization can include tensions due to past historical regional confrontations, past confrontations driven or facilitated by former superpowers, and contemporary tensions due to objective challenges or projections of exogenous superpower interests in Pakistan and India.
Especially in Pakistan, the security situation has been very unstable, with implications at internal and regional level. On one hand, the inherited Jammu and Kashmir tensions, and multiple confrontations with India represent an important security challenge which is probably likely to continue at slow speed, with acute episodes from time to time. But two other factors are relevant in this context: internal political divisions and a broader, regional, landscape of instability.
The internal political struggle is reflected by the all-out competition between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. In the 2024 elections, 12 parties or coalition won parliamentary seats, the highest number of seats won by a single party or coalition being 75, while 101 seats were won by independent candidates from a total of 265 elected members (one constituency delayed elections) (IPU Parline, 2025). Political confrontations may lead to ban of political parties, like the cases of Communist Party of Pakistan in 1954, Awami League in 1971, National Awami Party in 1971 and 1975, Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz-Arisar in 2020, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan in 2021 and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Mustafa, 2024). On one of the major instability sources, i.e. the porous border with Afghanistan, the media cites Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which claims that after Taliban Afghanistan’s takeover in August 2021, 2,386 terrorist attacks took place in Pakistan, resulting in 3,399 deaths from which 924 were civilians (Zia, 2024). The article suggests that organizations like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be responsible for the security incidents.
The Baloch Liberation Front represents a separatist movement in Pakistan, but since Baluchistan is also a region from Iran, multiple and potentially cross-border movements and actions destabilize the region. In 2019, Abdul Hameed Khan and Sher Nadir Shahi surrendered to Pakistani authorities after engaging in various destabilizing actions. Khan, the leader of separatist movement Balwaristan National Front (Hameed Group) was reportedly recruited by Indian intelligence services through India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the latter fueling unrest and subversion in regions relevant to CPEC project, opposed by India. Khan had been allegedly recruited during a visit in Nepal, after which he received an apartment and funds in New Delhi for 11 years. India then deployed Khan toi Bruxelles on different occasions to promote anti-Pakistan speech and provided INR 1 billion for disruptive activities in Pakistan (The Express Tribune, 2019).
Further destabilizing factors across the region stem from certain former Soviet republics that now form Central Asia, and either host violent groups or serve as recruitment bases for regional or global promoters of violence.
Consequently, the tense security situation from Pakistan and India does not necessarily emerge from confrontation at state level only, but regional conflicts or separatist movements as well. In India for example, the number of communal riots increased by 84 % to reach a number of 59 in 2024 (The New Indian Express, 2025). Likewise, terrorist attacks as the Mandai Massacre (1980), Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (1991), Bagber Massacre (2000) suggest that while the relation with Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir or pro-Muslim violent actors represent a challenge for New Delhi, India’s security incidents have other sources as well, emphasizing the growing complexity of modern security. Furthermore, in the case of 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the extradition of Pakistani-born Chicago businessman and Canadian citizen Tahawwur Hussain Rana to India for investigation as key suspected conspirator appears to have become a political settlement after 17 years from the tragic event (Saaliq, 2025).
Tuesday, April 22, 2025, gunmen killed 26 people in the Pahalgam region from Jammu and Kashmir. The incident, blamed on Pakistan despite latter’s rejection of accusations, led to a series of measures that hint both at security concerns and long-term political and economic interests of the two countries. New Delhi announced the suspension of Indus Water Treaty (1960), a move that aims to reduce the quota of water Pakistan receives, expelled military advisors from Pakistan’s diplomatic mission in India, reduced the number of diplomatic staff on its territory (ul Khaliq, 2025), suspended the issuance of visas for Pakistani citizens and later asked Pakistani citizens to leave India. The article cited above presents a picture from a protest that reads: “Stop water terrorism” (ul Khaliq, 2025). Pakistan retaliated with symmetrical measures including, a reciprocal border closure, stop of visa issuance except, banned trade with India and its airspace for Indian carriers, and decided to “put in abeyance”, i.e. to pause the implementation of the 1972 Simla Agreement.
The Indus Water Treaty (INDIA, PAKISTAN and INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1960) stipulates that all the waters of the “Eastern Rivers”, i.e. the Sutlej, The Beas and The Ravi, are available for unrestricted use of India, while the affluents of this river from Pakistan are available for Pakistan’s use. Westerns rivers, i.e. the Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab, are provided for Pakistan’s unrestricted use. India’s use of water from the Western Rivers is detailed in Annexure C and hydro-electric power generation by India from the Western Rivers in Annexure D. According to Indian sources, the Kishanganga dam project (on the Kishanganga river, tributary to Chenab) was initiated in 2007 and was due to be completed in 2016, while the Ratle dam project was initiated in 2013. Both Indian projects were contested by Pakistan at the Court of Arbitration (in the Hague) and through the mechanism called Neutral Expert. In recent years, India took the position to reject the Court of Arbitration and supported only the Neutral Expert mechanism, but the World Bank, a signatory to the treaty, reportedly initiated both settlement processes in 2022 (Drishtiias, 2025). Neither project has been finalized so far and the dispute is ongoing.
Hydro-power capacity in India installed in 2023 was 51,897 MW and Pakistan’s 10,649 MW for the same year (hydropwer.org, 2025). In the water stress index for 2023, India ranks 24 and Pakistan ranks 31 (World Population Review, 2025), a top in which Persian Gulf countries Kuwait, (Cyprus ranks 2nd), Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, (Lebanon ranks 6th), UAE and Saudi Arabia have the highest water stress index.
Undoubtably, India and Pakistan have had long disputes on security and water issues, but at the same time, it must be acknowledged that, according to literature, 25 countries and one quarter of world’s population are exposed to extremely high water stress and 4 billion people, i.e. approx. 50 % of world’s population to water stress, the latter percentage expected to increase to 60 % by 2050 (Kuzma, Bierkens, Lakshman, & et all, 2023). From this perspective, a similar dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt for the Renaissance Dam has polarized both the countries involved directly and supporters or superpowers with interests to obtain concessions from the dispute (The New Arab, 2025). Consequently, taking into consideration global trends, the India – Pakistan dispute is not necessarily a particular confrontation point between the two countries, but part of a global evolution of water and dams’ disputes.
Pakistan’s response to the recent Indian action in the aftermath of April 2025 armed attack came in the form of Simla Agreement’s suspension. Simla Agreement from 1972 (Government of India and Pakistan, 1972) aimed to end confrontation by peaceful means through mutual agreement and refrain from using the threat of force “against territorial integrity or political independence of each other”. The Line of Control (with respect to Jammu and Kashmir) resulting from December 17, 1971 ceasefire was to be respected, and enshrined that “Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations”. “Seeking to alter” the Line is certainly not a perfect formulation, as any other general formulation, but interpreting the political fundamental changes from Jammu and Kashmir operated by India in recent years as alteration cannot be fully excluded, especially since the local population did not vote in a referendum, Pakistan’s choice to question its obligations under the agreement may result in legal action at global forums and rallying allies to support its position. As the two countries also exchanged fire as of April 28th, 2025, and Pakistan military warned of a potential Indian military strike amid reports that India prepares for such an action (Mashal, 2025), the crisis is further deepening.
5. Crisis evaluation, de-escalation, and cooperation
International crisis management as a problem-solving model can resort to static models, like the iceberg model, or to process analysis, the latter identifying following stages: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. Other models identify stages like stable peace, unstable peace, crisis and war (Notre Dame International Security Center, 2023), emphasizing on diplomacy and peacebuilding, as well as peacekeeping activities.
Assuming the latter process model and utilizing the Notre Dame International Security Center/George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies terminology to maintain consistency, although any other process model may lead to similar findings, the first question to address is whether the India-Pakistan relations after 1947 can amount to a stable or unstable peace. Irrespective of the positivism level of the assessment, it must be acknowledged that the security situation of/between these two countries is not comparable to that of Spain and France after WWII, or Norway and Finland. Hence, considering the four stages, the prevalence of peace was intertwined with periods of crisis and wars between India and Pakistan. Similarly, acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as regional wars, especially the ones from Afghanistan, as well as the projection of superpower interests did not necessarily tip the balance towards stable peace.
The only international initiatives that might amount to pre-crisis management, or the pursuit of a stable peace are frameworks like SCO or SAARC, doubled by efforts of regional/Asian governments to pacify the region in general. Vladimir Norov, SCO’s Secretary General in 2019, hinted that for India and Pakistan to participate in the SCO, “unconditional” fight against terror is a fundamental precondition (Business Today, 2019), in the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attacks. The same message is reiterated in 2025, when multiple reports hint at the possibility of undermining SCO unity, with blame attributed to various actors depending on the observation angle (TASS, 2025).
Hypothesizing that this crisis was predictable, as part of a sinuous escalation between India and Pakistan, is supported by arguments like the conflictual background, broader regional terrorist threat and a less prepared international community that hints at potential oscillations between the rule of law and the rule of the strongest on short term: it has not been common in recent decades to openly discuss annexing parts of land from other countries territories, like for example Greenland. In this framework, the temporal distance between stable peace and a potential war may be shorter, especially since regional power brokers like China do not easily intervene in third party disputes, and do not enforce international peace by military means. Likewise, global forums like the Security Council are in partial stalemate due conflicts like the ones from Ukraine and Occupied Palestinian Territory. In a negotiation scenario, while both sides will try to maximize their positions, the outcomes might be dictated by the power ratios and concessions to third parties at best, but addressing the fundamental crisis factors does not appear as a probable outcome. Hence, the crisis, irrespective how acute it becomes, does not resemble as an existential one, but rather an episode in the longer list of Indian – Pakistani fundamental crisis.
There are very few to none arguments to support the hypothesis of an unpredictable crisis. Likewise, India appears to count on successive victories like the ones from 1971 and 1999, and thus combine resolve with international commitment in order to impose a long-term expansion of its influence and, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, of its rule. Consequently, a return to peace, be it stable or unstable, would potentially appear feasible for India only if it improved its overall strategic and political situation. Consequently, with or without international participation in crisis management, a predictable outcome would be a minimal Indian advancement at the expense of Pakistan. Considering this premise, the question becomes whether Pakistan might reach or is close to a tipping point, and ready to deploy large-scale or nuclear deterrents in order to stop India’s advancement. While this crisis is at the moment comparable to previous ones and not yet at the stage of war, should Pakistan also share the view that the global rule of law is negotiable, then this would favor harsher pushbacks. However, the counterargument to this assumption is the leverage that China has over Pakistan, and its interest to advance regional and global peace, in order to continue its fast and generalized economic dominance.
Consequently, the characteristics of April 2025 India – Pakistan crisis appear to be predictability, the regional scale of impact and the well-trained willingness of both sides to reach partial agreements to the fundamental lack of stable peace between the two countries and within the broader region. However, given the larger global peace crisis and fast rearmament of basically all countries and particularly Europe, this crisis can represent a contribution towards a generalized state of conflict and polarization at global level, amid multiple water and environmental crises that will impact the entire global population.
6. Conclusion
The April 2025 India – Pakistan security crisis did not emerge as a surprise, and its resolution likely to result in a broader peace for the two countries and the region. These two neighbors inherited both the British Raj and the British power projection until the first part of 20th century, when American global influence and the Cold War became predominant factors in regional geopolitics. This study identifies the conflict between India and Pakistan as an ideological and political one, but also a part of the wider pattern of confronting Muslim countries by large western powers like the UK and the US throughout 20th century, especially after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and a reemerging regional conflict in the Middle East.
In the 21st century, the assertion of Chinese economic aspirations added a new complexity layer to regional politics, especially in the context of the narrative of India’s potential to compete China. The two major contemporary factors that fuel the differences between India and Pakistan, besides obvious competition, are the terrorist threat, which is a regional characteristic spanning from the Mediterranean Sea to India, and the tensions due to water and other associated environmental or demographic factors. The results of the global war on terror have been disputed, but irrespective of indexes, the political paradigms evolve at different speeds in various countries from Pakistan and India’s region, and the gaps produce periodical tragic events that reinforce the need to build and maintain confrontation capacity.
This study identified the April 2025 crisis between Indian and Pakistan as a predictable and still limited in comparison to previous wars, during the first week. It also identified that India appears to obtain geopolitical gains in the confrontation with Pakistan after 1947, but given the nuclear arsenal of both countries, the example of Russian reassertion of influence vis-à-vis NATO expansion eastwards, and India’s position between Muslim countries and China, its gains are still relatively small and not definitive.
If the fight against terrorism remains a clear and undisputed goal, the confrontation for water appears to exacerbate rather than attenuate the conflictual landscape not only for India and Pakistan, but at global scale. Unless sustainable desalination technologies emerge, along with distribution infrastructure, large-scale displacement and crises might become an ever more important driver of tensions and crises, with secondary, potentially catastrophic, effects.
Conflict and crisis resolution frameworks and institutions are likely to attenuate the April 2025 India – Pakistan crisis, and return the situation to a relative, stable or unstable peace. This may occur either within regional working groups like SAARC or SCO, or with intervention from regional countries like Iran, or other peace actors. However, the global conflictual background may increase both the cost and duration of crisis management.
Consequently, this study identifies that while the crisis is significant and tragic, the global security situation might favor similar disputes in this region and beyond, as certain global leaders are failing to advance disarmament, denuclearization, and a wider peace that the world is seeking after World War II.
7. References
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About the author:
Prof. Ecaterina MAȚOI is a Program Director at MEPEI.
