by Prof. Ecaterina MAȚOI•Published on May 11, 2025

 

On May 6^th, 2025, President Donald Trump promised a “really, really positive”, “as big as it gets” announcement related to the Middle East, for Thursday (May 8^th), Friday (May 9^th) or Monday (May 12^th) (Cameron, 2025). In anticipation of his upcoming visit to the Persian Gulf, various agendas, plans, and prognoses are hinting at a few scenarios, in line with recent global and regional developments.

This article aims to identify and analyze potential implications of President Trump’s visit to major regional developments like the ones in Occupied Palestinian Territories and Iran, which are of utmost importance for Persian Gulf countries, the region, and wider international relations.

Notwithstanding the importance of international institutions and cooperation, the research design will employ a power-centered analysis, specific to realism, as national states and confrontation patterns appear to deleverage multilateral decision-making at the expense of unilateral measures or bilateral negotiations, like the renewed US – Iran nuclear negotiations.

1.    State and private American interests in the Persian Gulf region: a brief update

In his second term, President Trump asserted the will to work for a historic legacy and the dynamics hinting at structural changes to global order are unfolding with increased speed. Whether the new American administration has other interests other than state-related has been answered by White House press secretary recently, quoted in a media outlet: “I think it’s frankly ridiculous that anyone in this room would even suggest that President Trump is doing anything for his own benefit. He left a life of luxury and a life of running a very successful real estate empire for public service, not just once, but twice” (Gangitano, 2025).

The split between private/personal interests and state interests is a major topic in political debates, but in case of American and other liberal states, connections between the two spheres have always been underlined, hence these cannot be fully excluded. The best example in this context, is probably the cooperation between American establishment and oil companies after the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf region, or previous American administration’s business links with Ukraine.

Whether the same people that defined policies benefited directly from them, or whether policies have favored certain circles, that might have or have not responded in kind to policy-makers, hence benefiting indirectly policy-makers and cannot be utilized directly as a measure of any administration’s tenure. However, the activity related to President Trump business circle appears to have increased in the Middle East region. After the proposal to turn Gaza into a “resort” failed so far, President Trump’s acquaintances and businesses are ever more present in the Middle East. Following developments related to President Trump’s business circle have been mentioned recently in mass media: a Trump International golf course in Dubai, an apartment block in Jeddah, a $ 4 billion golf and real estate project in Oman, and the crypto conference from April 2025 – in which Eric Trump and Zach Witkoff (the son of President Trump’s Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff) convinced the Emirati fund MGX to use USD1 crypto-currency and invest $ 2 bln. in Binance (Iskandarani, 2025), a Malta-based crypto exchange platform (Binance, 2025). Likewise, investments in Qatar gulf and resort projects are in the range of billions USD. The values may appear relatively large for small or less financialized economies, but in comparison to US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the value of assets from funds like Vanguard and Black Rock, they become relatively small.

Consequently, the level of business expansion by Trump business circle in the Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, is important, but probably in line with the size of Trump business level rather than political and economic stakes in the region. Furthermore, other business ventures emerge either as part of region’s decarbonization and diversification strive, or as part of economic and defense cooperation. However, the question is whether these particular ventures will impact US foreign policy in the region and other state-level agreements, and if yes, in which direction.

As in his first mandate, President Trump’s first official business visit will be to Saudi Arabia, which is expected to host a GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) meeting as well, and subsequently to other Gulf monarchies. Multi-billion dollars arms deals, Saudi peaceful nuclear program, the expansion of Abraham Accords, negotiations with Iran (MEE Staff, 2025), and probably oil output volumes will be main discussion topics. Likewise, the Saudi, Emirati and potentially other investments in US economy, either conditioned by allowing increased access to key technologies like nuclear or AI processing, or fueled by still significant returns on capital from US economy, are expected to be in the range of hundreds of billions or even exceed the trillion marks. Like pointed out in the media, President Trump aims to replace instability and extremism with investment, trade and exchanges, in a region that remains very important on the financial map and is responsive to his cooperation initiatives (AFP in RFI, 2025). Hence, if there was a new influence of President Trump’s business environment on this region, this could potentially be assessed as positive from a security perspectives: if Saudis were the main proponents of regional peace, in order to increase the success rates of Saudi 2030 Vision and not only, new American investments will add important decision-making at state level, be it Republican, Democrat or any other, to the Saudi-driven peace direction, as to better secure American assets abroad. Similarly, significant Gulf investment in the US, would allow financing large projects and a continued pursuit of hegemony by the US, in the face of rising competition.

Should these economic perspectives be materialized and yield results, the situation will become a win-win for all parties involved, at least in the classical sense. For example, Arab investments in the US might allow President Trump to receive back Asian dollars paid for Gulf oil and gas, instead of issuing the equivalent amount in bonds in order to finance large projects. However, the challenges that stand between the plans and potential agreements on one hand, and successful realization of these plans on the other hand, are significant, and the situation in Occupied Palestinian Territories is one of the long and difficult files.

2.    President Trump’s May 2025 visit to the Middle East and the Palestinian situation

Since the inception of Abraham Accords, it has been clear for all parties involved that in order to become an effective framework, Saudi Arabia’s agreement represented a decisive factor. The Saudi readiness to join has been expressed in various forms, like for example opening the air space for Israeli carriers in 2022, the expressed readiness to contribute to the intermodal trade corridor that would bypass the Suez Canal, and receiving Israeli Tourism Minister Haim Katz in 2023. However, this has not progressed further afar October 7^th, 2023, and the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman had reportedly stated that Israel was committing “genocide” in Gaza, as of November 2024 (Gardner & Khalil, 2024), shortly before the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Amid a rising death toll and systematic destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure, the pro-Palestinian protests appear to have been suppressed across the US during President Trump’s second mandate, as they were also during previous administration’s tenure. Likewise, despite a relatively recent appearance of President Trump’s distancing from Netanyahu’s policies on Occupied Palestinian Territories, did not appear to produce consequences in terms of military and diplomatic support for Israel’s war in Gaza, or the actions from the West Bank.

The Israeli proposal to relocate Gazans in Egypt, Jordan or somewhere else, has been a topic supported at least at declarative level by President Trump’s team, through the “riviera” concept. The subsequent idea of an American administration in Gaza appears to build on this argument, although there is no United Nations or Security Council discussion or approval to support such concepts: power politics is doubled in present politics by a sophisticated management of and balance between propaganda on one hand, and sticks and carrots on the other hand.

The assumptions that President Trump might recognize the Palestinian State, were reportedly rejected by the American Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, as “nonsense,” and quoted as such by the Times of Israel (The Times of Israel, 2025). The UK and France were also reportedly in talks to recognize Palestine as of April 2025 (Wintour, 2025), but the assessment of such potential moves must take into account historical and actual background. After 1948, various American stances, the longest and strongest superpower in global affairs, did not prevent October 7^th, or the more than 50’000 subsequent Palestinian deaths. Neither the Oslo Accords, nor the Abraham Accords, floated by the US and its allies, managed to bring a meaningful resolution to the conflict. Hence, a potential recognition of the Palestinian State by the US can represent the next important political declaration, but not a direct resolution to the conflict, as the enforcement of any exiting framework would. Such a hypothetical recognition might allow the US to pursue its economic policies with the Persian Gulf countries, but it does not directly imply a recognition of a Palestinian State by Israel, let alone a border demarcation or agreed security guarantees for Israelis and the Palestinians. From this perspective, there are more potential outcomes that can result from a potential American recognition of Palestine: a continued conflict, an instable peace, with or without continued Israeli settler colonialism or the theoretical concept of a peace in Palestine. However, there is no evidence to support the possibility of latter possibility. The flow of resources towards Israel from the US and Europe is consistent, multidimensional, and well-established (Jones, 2025), and the broader consensus has been that Israel’s security is paramount. Should the US have been prepared to sell a potential recognition of the Palestinian state, Egypt would have probably had to buy more American weaponry rather than Chinese, and an American mediation of the conflict with Ethiopia should have placed the US in a more advantageous position.

Saudi leadership in negotiating regional pacification and American support is reflected by reports hinting that Mahmoud Abbas was seeking to disarm Palestinian factions from Lebanon at the request of Saudi Arabia. While this would represent an overall positive development, should the US, in a first, guarantee regional peace rather than Israel’s security, the media report cites a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) representative claiming that the 1980s disarmament under American guarantees resulted among others in Sabra and Shatila massacre (El Ashkar, 2025). From this perspective, the question is whether Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies are in the position to agree on an enforceable recognition of Palestine, rather than a yet hypothetical and simple recognition, the latter potentially meaning the next American show of goodwill without impact in solving the conflict.

Consequently, irrespective of any potential American announcement related to Middle East’s most enduring conflict, any potential resolution would require a much clearer framework and enforcing mechanisms, that have not been presented or agreed upon. The only real imperative, related to this conflict and in general, is the preservation of US hegemony in the face of a potentially systematic paradigm shift promoted by China and its allies, in which peace is central and not imposed by military means so far. The American-Saudi cooperation has a long and rich history, and transformed history, but the conflict between Israel and Palestine surpassed this cooperation and threatens to maintain the region, despite immense hydrocarbon wealth, in a slower development cycle and instable state. Therefore, due to previous multiple steps towards peace, a new one, in the form of Palestine’s recognition or similar, might not be consequential for conflict resolution, as the elements of such a hypothetical scenario are missing, and details make the difference.

3.    President Trump’s May 2025 visit to the Middle East and negotiations with Iran

On May 11^th, 2025, the fourth round of negotiations between Iran and the US was concluded. As the two opposing “red lines” remained standing, i.e., the American “no enrichment” and the Iranian reassertion of the right to enrich, the talks were characterized by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson as “difficult but useful” (Hafezi, 2025). The renewed negotiations do not appear to express anything else but the willingness to achieve a relatively limited agreement, which concerns the Iranian nuclear program and sanctions. Unlike JCPOA, the negotiations are bilateral, in line with the recent trend to skip global standards like the United Nations and World Trade Organization, in what is presented as a deglobalization despite a renewed American push to increase an already overwhelming global dominance. Similar to the expected set of agreements between the US and Persian Gulf countries, the potential agreement with Iran is rather limited, and does not apparently address the fundamental Palestinian problem.

After the Chinese-brokered peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia back in 2023, diplomatic ties between these two countries were restored. While they remain regional strategic competitors, the two neighbors apparently continued the rapprochement and coordination, as exemplified by multiple reciprocal visits and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visit to Saudi Arabia before President Trump’s visit and consultations with the US (Al-Monitor SA-IR, 2025). Although the US exerted influence throughout the Middle East and the recent events from Syria demonstrate its resolve and coordination with regional and European allies, regional geopolitical settings remain challenging.

The UAE joined BRICS, and so did Egypt and Iran. Furthermore, Türkiye and Egypt are working with the Russian Federation on nuclear power plants, while Moscow appears to support Iranian nuclear endeavors by financing the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran (JP, 2025). Certainly, the US is not necessarily compelled to provide the Saudis with peaceful nuclear technology, but unless a deal is reached, traditional and emerging competition is on the rise. The so-called triangle of influence, i.e. the Russian Federation – Iran – China appears to define a new geopolitical delimitation line, that would present China with a comfortable defense buffer at its Western border, that would encompass the trade route to Europe as well.

In the upcoming visit to the Persian Gulf states, President Trump appears to adopt the path of peace and economic agreements, and potentially include Iran in the equation. Should an agreement be reached, and Iran would re-enter the dollar system, the US would be able to maintain at least a short and middle term leverage over Iranian economic development, at the expense of competitors. Amid an inconsistent European approach to renewed negotiations with Iran, the US maintains the theoretical chance of finding a working concept with Iran. However, if this pursuit represents an infinite loop of maintaining hope rather than solving fundamental issues in a comprehensive manner, as in the case of Palestinians, or it becomes an imperative due to the envisioned confrontation with China, will become more apparent as the events unfold.

In all cases, the underlying peace paradigm preceding President Trump’s visit in the Persian Gulf area, appears to entail the strive to reach an agreement with Iran, but without addressing core issues so far, i.e. broader regional security and the Palestinian problem. Consequently, a potential deal with Iran would be in line with the Saudi-led peace pursuit, but potentially in the sense of another step towards peace so far, rather than a long-term settlement, i.e. a temporary solution. Nevertheless, this would be complemented for the Arab countries from the Persian Gulf states by security and arms agreements, maintain their security relatively stable vis-à-vis Iran, should such reassurances be required in the future.

4.    American – Arab cooperation perspectives in the broader geopolitical landscape

Previous sections identified that a potential new round of American – Arab mutual reinforcement, as well as other associated actions, like the negotiations with Iran, may represent a reciprocally agreed solution that may not or cannot address core regional and more structural issues. The win-win in the classical sense term utilized previously in this article is essentially acknowledging President Trump’s efforts to rebalance American trade, maintain dollar’s dominance and influence throughout the world. While his first term was more antagonistic towards Iran, as in that period JCPOA was cancelled and the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani was assassinated, the renewed strive for peace is still marked by the same fundamental issues, i.e., the enrichment of uranium, Palestinian problem and regional security. However, several parameters changed: BRICS and SCO expanded, the war from Ukraine determined inflation and rising economic and security risks in Europe, while the Chinese economy consolidated. In the Middle East, i.e. Western-most part of West Asia and Eastern-most part of North Africa, Türkiye emerged as an important regional power, with active presence in Somalia, Libya, Syria, Qatar and partially Lebanon, restoring ties with Egypt, supporting Pakistan more actively and striving to become an important energy and trade hub by signing agreements with Iraq and Central Asian countries among others.

Especially during previous American administration, Russian presence in the Middle East and Africa was contested, and the post-Assad arrangements appear to have excluded the Russian Federation and Iran from Syrian affairs. However, the potential future role of these countries in future regional affairs is reassessed by President Trump’s olive branches to Moscow and Tehran, which might seek for a new American-led order through dialogue and negotiation. However, the British journalist Simon Tisdall asserts that President Trump would become reliant on rich monarchies, American regional policies “are failing across the board” and urges a “fundamental course correction” (Tisdall, 2025). While critique is generally useful and contributes to success, this particular example may also hint at the partial split between the US and the UK on Middle East matters, despite the relatively recent bilateral trade agreement. Likewise, the EU is not even present at the US – Persian Gulf upcoming summit, let alone aim for the hundreds of billions investments. In the broader competition landscape, the US is accelerating an envisioned recovery of its traditional power instruments in order to compete a new Chinese economic challenge at global level, while Europe tends to favor stability in favor of speed. This paradigm also raises the question whether acquiring concessions and access to new, strategic minerals worth the effort, considering that after initial efforts, one also needs to ensure economic competitiveness overall.

The strive to supply Europe with oil and gas opposes dynamics in Central Asia, Eastern Mediterranean, and potential new routes/pipelines from the Persian Gulf to Türkiye. However, OPEC and Saudi Arabia, who were previously asked by President Trump to increase production play a major role in global energy supply and have the capacity to challenge profitability of most third party oil and gas upstream companies. The OPEC production decisions impact not only European and global supply situation, but can also impact political decisions like the reinforcement of sanctions.

In terms of conflicts, the American – Houthi recent non-aggression deal emerged as probably the only argument supporting the thesis that the US could play a more important role in Middle East’s strive for peace. However, the ongoing hostilities from Sudan, especially the attacks on Port Sudan, a region in which the Russian Federation is reportedly aiming to build a military base (Rukanga, 2025), hint at projections of a structural power competition, as the case Sudan brought against the UAE at the International Court of Justice was rejected (Janevic, 2025). The escalation from Sudan started in 2023, and from particular observation angles, it might exhibit characteristics similar to the Syrian conflict, especially the alleged implication of Middle Eastern countries.

In the India – Pakistan recent confrontation, Middle Eastern influence is reportedly visible in the confrontation between Israeli drones utilized by India and Turkish drones utilized by Pakistan. However, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appear to have adopted a rather neutral and pacifying role (Naar, 2025), in line with their regional endeavors.

This section established that the peace pursuit of the Americans, Saudis, and their Persian Gulf allies, in anticipation of President Trumps May 2025 visit to the region, is simultaneous with conflicts in the relative proximity of the Middle East. Furthermore, a global rearmament race hints at higher conflict potential rather than a (US dominated) broader peace. Therefore, realigning regional geopolitics and a potential inclusion of Iran in a broader US-led security and development architecture might represent an endeavor atypical to contemporary developments, but with potential to write modern history.

5.    Conclusions

This article analyzed Middle East regional fundamentals and conditions in which the upcoming visit of President Trump in the Persian Gulf is expected to take place. It has identified that President Trumps’ close companies and business circles have a renewed and expanding interest in the oil-rich region, but these are not exceptional in the broader picture of American way of conducting foreign policy and international business. As in his first term, President Trump heads towards Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries on first official business visit abroad. The volume of agreements is expected to be very large, potentially surpassing one trillion dollars.

Due to missing actors like Egypt, the Palestinian representatives and Israel, the potential of a hypothetical recognition of Palestine by President Trump, assumed in recent media reports and rejected by the US Ambassador to Israel, does not appear to be very significant even if pursued. On one hand, in this format, it would not imply an Israeli recognition of the Palestinian State, and on the other hand, there is no clear framework that suggests an agreement related to details. Furthermore, the history of US support for solving this conflict is sinuous and limited to partial and sporadic mediation. However, the potential recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia through Abraham Accords, as suggested in various instances throughout recent years, as well as Saudi and other Arab investments in the US, represent incentives that can hardly overlooked by the American administration.

Similarly, the renewed attempt to reach a bilateral agreement with Iran, is consistent with American recent bid for peace in the Middle East, and in line with Saudi expectations to pacify the region. However, if reached, this is expected to address only the nuclear enrichment and sanctions against Iran, without addressing fundamental issues like the Palestinian problem and regional security. Nevertheless, the containment of Iran, as it used to be presented in the past, might have evolved in the question related to spheres of influence, hence a renewed incentive for the American counterpart in the competition with China.

In the latter section, this study reconfirmed that the US is apparently acting alone, and neither British nor other European are involved in the upcoming series of agreements. Furthermore, it identified that while Ukrainian war may appear as closer its end than the beginning, wars like the one from Sudan or the Indian – Pakistani war are reflecting a still rising global tension, amid a fast-rearming race that will inevitably increase the chances of conflict. Therefore, a Saudi – American framework aiming to pacify the Middle East region would represent a historic instance at an important time for international relations, should it uphold peace as a central prerequisite and achieve its goals.

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