by Ms. Lu Dong•Published on August 3, 2025

Photo’s source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202507/t20250716_11671280.shtml

On 15 July 2025, the annual Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization convened in Tianjin under the chairmanship of China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi. The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of nine Member States—Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—as well as the Secretary‑General of the SCO and the Executive Director of the Regional Anti‑Terrorist Structure, among nearly twenty senior officials. Participants engaged in an in‑depth exchange on current international and regional developments and agreed that, as the most influential multilateral cooperation mechanism in the region, the SCO’s cohesion and appeal continue to strengthen, providing a reliable platform for Member States to safeguard peace, maintain stability, and promote common development (Alimov, 2018).

In his opening remarks, Minister Wang observed that the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, with the resurgence of protectionism and unilateralism profoundly testing the international governance system. Against the backdrop of persistent threats from terrorism, separatism, and extremism, the SCO Member States must further enhance strategic mutual trust and bolster security cooperation (Islam, 2019). Delegates exchanged views on concrete measures such as joint border patrols and exercises, and unanimously agreed to complete a “Regional Counter‑Terrorism Capacity Assessment Report” by year‑end to furnish scientific data and analysis in support of future joint operations (Buckley, 2020).

The humanitarian and security situation in Afghanistan also featured prominently on the agenda. Delegates concurred that Afghanistan represents both a critical security concern and an urgent humanitarian challenge (Ali et.al., 2019). They resolved, via the SCO’s Regional Anti‑Terrorist Structure (RATS), to coordinate with the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international organizations to deliver, in staged shipments over the next three months, medical supplies and food assistance worth nearly USD 10 million. This support is intended to alleviate immediate needs and prevent further deterioration of security and humanitarian conditions (Belousov & Vlasov, 2010).

Turning to economic and development cooperation, Minister Wang reviewed the SCO’s achievements over the past 24 years in connectivity, trade and investment, and technological innovation, emphasizing that the Organization’s international reputation and strategic value are rising, and that cooperation must be extended into new fields. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Sadykov expressed his country’s readiness to deepen cooperation with China in logistics, mineral resources, artificial intelligence, green transition, and desertification control, and to maintain close coordination with China on regional and international affairs in support of the forthcoming Tianjin Summit. These initiatives signal the SCO’s gradual evolution from a focus on security to a comprehensive engagement in economic and social governance (Nurimbetov, 2024). Delegates examined and provisionally approved the “Draft SCO Development Strategy for the Next Decade,” which offers a macro‑level blueprint for deepening collaboration in connectivity, low‑carbon green transition, digital economy empowerment, industrial chain coordination, and financial cooperation (Pomfret, 2020).

Participants agreed to leverage major projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Eurasian Land Bridge to build a multi‑layered transport network of highways, railways, and pipelines (Rizvi, 2014); to promote green, low‑carbon development through environmental technologies and new‑energy projects; and to enhance cross‑border e‑commerce and digital trade by jointly constructing 5G base stations and data centers.

Cultural and scientific cooperation also generated lively discussion. Ministers reached consensus on rotating the “SCO Youth Cultural Festival” and the “SCO Summit Forum” among Member States from 2025 to 2027, and plan to sign a “Memorandum of Understanding on Joint University Training and Scholarship Programs” at the Tianjin Summit, establishing at least 5,000 scholarship opportunities annually for students from Member States. In public health, delegates proposed creating a regional public health emergency network to strengthen infectious disease surveillance and prevention (Wrobel, 2014). In scientific innovation, they recommended establishing a joint laboratory on artificial intelligence and quantum communications, open to research institutions across Member States to accelerate the translation of research outcomes and promote talent exchange.

The most significant outcome of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was the adoption, for submission to the Heads‑of‑State Summit, of the “Tianjin Declaration (Draft).” The Declaration reaffirms the United Nations’ central role in international affairs, opposes all forms of unilateral sanctions and hegemonism, and reiterates the SCO’s “Shanghai Spirit” of mutual respect, mutual trust, and mutual benefit (Saboor et.al., 2021). It also pledges no first use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and, for the first time, incorporates a “Regional Blue Economy Cooperation Plan” into the joint agenda, advocating practical cooperation in marine science research and maritime search-and-rescue. Once adopted, the Declaration is expected to offer a new multilateral cooperation paradigm for Global South countries and further enhance the SCO’s voice on the international stage.

Following the meeting, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting has laid a solid political and technical foundation for the Tianjin Summit, marking the SCO’s entry into a “fast track” of more comprehensive functionality and deeper cooperation (Pantucci & Yau, 2022). Igor Popov of the Russian International Affairs Council commented that the “Development Strategy for the Next Decade” reflects the SCO’s strategic shift from regional security cooperation to economic and social governance, signaling the Organization’s approach to the “second 25‑year cycle.” Meanwhile, Western think tanks have paid close attention to the SCO’s rise in the digital economy and green technology sectors, noting the significant implications for global supply chains (Obydenkova, 2024).

Looking ahead, Member States will proceed in phases to align domestic legislation and policies with the outcomes of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and ensure that the Summit’s decisions are effectively implemented (Yu, 2020). New mechanisms—such as the Regional Anti‑Terrorist Structure, joint laboratories, and the Youth Cultural Festival—will be launched in succession to create regular platforms for exchange. The SCO also plans to expand dialogue and cooperation with countries in the Middle East and Africa, explore a “UN–SCO” dialogue mechanism, and enhance global participation and inclusivity. Against the backdrop of intensifying great‑power competition and geopolitical rivalry, the SCO, adhering to principles of pragmatic cooperation and multilateral win‑win outcomes, is continually redefining regional governance models and is poised to inject fresh momentum into peace, security, and sustainable prosperity across the Eurasian continent.

References

Ali, R., Ali, I., & Ullah, S. (2019). SCO as a passage to regional security: Future developments and opportunities for Pakistan. Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 3(1), 19-29.

Alimov, R. (2018). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its role and place in the development of Eurasia. Journal of Eurasian studies, 9(2), 114-124.

Belousov, L., & Vlasov, A. (2010). The post-Soviet space: A transition period. Transition Studies Review, 17(1), 108-122.

Buckley, P. J. (2020). China’s belt and road initiative: Changing the rules of globalization: Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon and Christoph Lattemann (Editors) Palgrave, London, 2018, 358 pp. ISBN: 978-3319754352.

Islam, M. (2019). BRICS, MIKTA, SCO and IBSA: Emerging Global Organizations and Groups-A Paradigm Shift for New World Order. Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences, 9(2), 473-466.

Nurimbetov, R. I. (2024, July). THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: EXPLORING POTENTIAL SCENARIOS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. In INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION (Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 50-54).

Obydenkova, A. (2024). Sustainable development and actors of regional environmental governance: Eurasia at the crossroads. In Sustainable Development, Regional Governance, and International Organizations (pp. 144-151). Routledge.

Pantucci, R., & Yau, N. (2022). Paving the Digital Silk Road with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The RUSI Journal, 167(3), 28-41.

Pomfret, R. (2020). China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasian landbridge, and the new mega-regionalism.

Rizvi, H. A. (2014). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Strategic Studies, 34, 1-17.

Saboor, A., Ahmed, S., & Shabbir, T. (2021). Post Withdrawal Situation of us Troops from Afghanistan: Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Global International Relations Review, IV, 43-54.

Wrobel, R. (2014). China’s new energy geopolitics: the Shanghai cooperation organization and Central Asia. ASIEN, 133(Oktober), 24-51.

Yu, H. (2020). Motivation behind China’s ‘one belt, one road’initiatives and establishment of the Asian infrastructure investment bank. In China’s new global strategy (pp. 3-18). Routledge.

Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of MEPEI. Any content provided by our author is of her opinion and is not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual, or anyone or anything.