THE expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on 5 February 2026, ended the bilateral arms control agreement between Russia and the United States and set the stage for an unconstrained nuclear arms race between them.

Moreover, termination of the Treaty increases the likelihood of both vertical and horizontal proliferation in the rapidly evolving international strategic environment. A new risky nuclear arms race is in the offing, which the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, called a “grave moment for international peace and security.” Is nuclear order changing? The strategic arms reduction process between Moscow and Washington began with the signing of START-I on July 31, 1991. It required both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. Russia and the US signed the New START on April 8, 2010, which entered into force on February 5, 2011. Its duration was initially for ten years from entry into force. It was extended for five years in February 2021. The United States accused Russia of violating the New START treaty on January 31, 2023. Rather than addressing the former’s concerns, the latter suspended the Treaty on February 21, 2023.

The bilateral strategic arms control was advantageous for both parties. It introduced mutual restraint in developing dangerous, expensive and unnecessary nuclear weapons. For instance, the New START limited Russia and the US to 1550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems, i.e., intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launchers and 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers). Notably, the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs were counted as the number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) on each missile. Heavy bombers were counted as one warhead against the total regardless of how many warheads they carry. Moreover, these agreements provided each country with unprecedented insights into the other’s arsenal, enabling them to make decisions based on empirical evidence rather than speculation. New START’s verification arrangements included data exchanges, site visits and up-close inspections of missiles to confirm they do not carry multiple warheads. The transparency about each other’s nuclear capabilities mitigated the risks of an inadvertent catastrophic nuclear crisis between Russia and the United States.

Instead of responding positively to President Vladimir Putin’s last year’s offer to stick to the New START’s limits for another year, President Donald Trump expressed his desire to include China in a new arms control pact. Last month, he said of New START, “If it expires, it expires. We’ll do a better agreement.” The signalling of a new pact germinates an optimism that the termination of New START does not signal the end of nuclear arms control. Could the termination of a New START lead to the trilateral arms control agreement between China, Russia and the United States?

The US intelligence community proclaimed that China’s nuclear build-up has been the world’s fastest since the height of the Cold War. It opined that China would have an arsenal of 1500 warheads by 2035. On February 4, 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio opined, “The President’s been clear in the past that in order to have true arms control in the 21st century, it’s impossible to do something that doesn’t include China, because of their vast and rapidly growing stockpile.” Therefore, they desire to cap China’s nuclear arsenal by engaging it in nuclear arms control. Similarly, President Putin has demanded the inclusion of Britain and France in a new arms control agreement.

The prospects for bilateral, trilateral or multilateral nuclear arms control at present seem remote because the disparity between the US and China or China’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, is enormous. China seems to be catching up to strategic competitors in the nuclear arena. Russia replaced the Soviet-era R-36M2 (SS-18 Satan), which could carry up to ten MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles), with the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30/SS-X-29), capable of carrying fifteen MIRVs. It also tested the nuclear-powered Poseidon torpedo and the Burevestnik cruise missile. The US has expressed willingness to advance its nuclear arsenal. The US Sentinel program is scheduled to build more than 650 new missiles and more than 400 new silos, costing more than $140 billion. The costly military modernization programs have bipartisan support in Congress because the American strategic pundits are convinced that the expansion of US strategic forces is imperative to address the two-peer (China-Russia) deterrence challenge.

The emergence of non-nuclear strategic weapons is negatively influencing nuclear arms control prospects. The US developed conventional prompt strike capabilities capable of engaging elements of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces that previously could only be targeted with nuclear weapons. The Trump Administration’s craze for the Gold Dome missile shield is a recipe for an international conventional and nuclear arms race. Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Yuri Borisov, noted that the RS-28 Sarmat was a response to US missile defence. The demise of New START substantiates that contemporary international politics is not conducive to nuclear arms control. The strategic competition at the international and regional levels is accelerating nuclear weapons modernization and necessitating the reform of nuclear thinking. Thus, the nuclear order is changing, with built-in risks and little room for arms control.

About the author

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
(jaspal_99@hotmail.com)