by Ms. Lu Dong•Published on July 5, 2025

Photo’s source: http://www.china.com.cn/node_9016203.html

 

Introduction

Amid ongoing regional uncertainty and shifting power dynamics, the Second China–Central Asia Summit was held in Astana, Kazakhstan, from 16 to 18 June 2025. President Xi Jinping met with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This summit marked an important step in China’s efforts to institutionalize regional cooperation (Sirvydytė, 2024). Building on the first summit in Xi’an in 2023, the meeting produced the Astana Declaration and the Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, along with several cooperation agreements and newly created joint institutions.

Notably, the consensus reached on regional connectivity and security not only reaffirmed China’s growing influence across Eurasia but also affected how Middle Eastern countries approach their engagement with Central Asia (Mazanik & Romanova, 2024). As a result, the summit signals a wider reconfiguration of continental trade routes, energy corridors, and geopolitical alignments.

China’s Expanding Role in Central Asia

China is increasingly incorporating Central Asia into its broader development and strategic frameworks (Chang, 2023). Economic integration, in particular, has become a central priority. For example, China announced increased investment in the East–West Trans-Caspian Corridor, aiming to ease infrastructure bottlenecks in Kazakhstan (Skalamera, 2023). It also supported the expansion of Turkmenistan’s port facilities. These steps, therefore, directly challenge alternative transit initiatives promoted by other regional powers (Chen & Fazilov, 2018).

In the area of security, the summit clearly placed the stabilization of Afghanistan at the center of regional concerns (Ong, 2005). This focus stands in contrast to the declining effectiveness of other multilateral security platforms. Moreover, in the energy sector, recent agreements on green hydrogen development and uranium processing (Shadrina, 2019) have further elevated China’s position as a key partner in Central Asia’s energy transition. Consequently, this may reduce the strategic relevance of other energy technology suppliers in the region.

Strategic Adjustments by Middle Eastern States

For Middle Eastern countries, the shift of trade and energy corridors toward the east—reflected in the Astana consensus—presents both challenges and opportunities. Gulf states, in particular, view the enhanced Trans-Caspian Corridor as a viable alternative route for accessing Eurasian markets (Timakova, 2020). As a result, sovereign wealth funds from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are expected to increase their investments in Central Asian logistics infrastructure and energy assets. These investments, framed within China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aim to exchange financial capital for market access and logistical influence—thereby supporting industrial relocation and diversification (Dave & Kobayash, 2018).

However, China’s control over the corridor’s standards and operations may limit Gulf actors to the role of capital providers, without gaining significant influence over the corridor’s governance (Almujeem, 2021). This, in turn, could constrain their ability to shape strategic outcomes in the region.

Türkiye, meanwhile, faces a dual challenge. Although Ankara has long supported the development of the Trans-Caspian route, China’s growing dominance over the Central Asian segment has reduced the strategic value of Türkiye’s “Eurasian gateway” position (Şenol & Erbilen, 2022). Furthermore, the limited mention of Türkiye in summit documents reflects Beijing’s preference for bilateral cooperation with Central Asian states (Eldem, 2024). Therefore, Türkiye is likely to strengthen its ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia to reinforce its position along the western corridor (Pepe, 2021), while also seeking European backing to balance China’s influence in the region.

Iran, by contrast, may find itself strategically constrained. China’s growing support for the Caspian corridor undermines Tehran’s promotion of the North–South Transport Corridor (Peimani, 2022). Moreover, delays in Iran’s domestic infrastructure projects (Chan et al., 2023) may further weaken its regional position. As a result, Iran is likely to deepen its reliance on Russia and explore eastward alternatives for maintaining connectivity (Keliwaal & Mubariz, 2024).

In addition, the summit’s outcomes are likely to widen the scope for security cooperation between the Middle East and Central Asia. Since Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2023, there has been a notable increase in joint activities with Central Asian countries on counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics operations. China’s push to formalize regional security frameworks now offers Gulf countries a new platform to engage in discussions on Afghan reconstruction, border control, and ideological extremism. This may lead to the formation of a cross-regional dialogue mechanism involving China, Russia, Iran, and Gulf states—thus operating beyond the traditional influence of the United States and Russia.

New Regional Competition and Cooperation

The summit also exposed underlying regional tensions. Although China and Russia present a united front, the development of new transit routes and security frameworks reflects a trend toward regional multipolarity (Timakova, 2020). China’s growing interest in mediating regional conflicts demonstrates increasing diplomatic confidence. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains a significant source of instability, and Central Asian leaders used the summit to express their concerns to China (Chang, 2023).

Furthermore, the absence of Western institutions from the summit (Chen & Fazilov, 2018) reinforces Central Asia’s shift away from traditional international structures. This evolution may force Middle Eastern countries—especially Gulf monarchies that depend on Western security guarantees—to carefully navigate the balance between their long-standing military alliances and emerging economic partnerships in Eurasia (Fulton, 2020).

Conclusion: A New Eurasian Landscape

The Astana summit reflects both the deepening of China–Central Asia relations and the growing importance of Central Asia as a strategic pivot for Middle Eastern countries (Zhou et al., 2020). The regional connectivity network that China is building offers Middle Eastern and North African states new opportunities for energy diversification and trade. At the same time, however, it increases their reliance on Chinese infrastructure systems and technical standards (Chen & Fazilov, 2018).

As Türkiye works to maintain its hub status along the corridor (Şenol & Erbilen, 2022), Gulf capital flows north in search of new investments (Dave & Kobayash, 2018), and Iran explores alternate routes to offset its marginalization (Peimani, 2022), the long-term impact of the summit will continue to shape the region’s energy flows, security engagement, and diplomatic alignments.

In conclusion, Central Asia—once seen as peripheral—is now emerging as the core of a China-centered Eurasian connectivity system. Middle Eastern states, in turn, are becoming key stakeholders in this evolving regional order.

 

Bibliographies:

Almujeem, N. S. (2021). GCC countries’ geoeconomic significance to China’s geopolitical ends. Review of Economics and Political Science, 6(4), 348-363.

Chan, D. W., Sarvari, H., Husein, A. A. J. A., Awadh, K. M., Golestanizadeh, M., & Cristofaro, M. (2023). Barriers to attracting private sector investment in public road infrastructure projects in the developing country of Iran. Sustainability, 15(2), 1452.

Chang, F. K. (2023). The middle corridor through central Asia: trade and influence ambitions.

Chen, X., & Fazilov, F. (2018). Re-centering Central Asia: China’s “new great game” in the old Eurasian heartland. Palgrave Communications, 4(1).

Dave, B., & Kobayashi, Y. (2018). China’s silk road economic belt initiative in Central Asia: economic and security implications. Asia Europe Journal, 16, 267-281.

Eldem, T. (2024). The Global Rivalry over Strategic Connectivity and the Emerging World Order: A View from Türkiye. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, 29(2), 102-119.

Fulton, J. (2020). China in the Persian Gulf: Hedging under the US umbrella. In Routledge Handbook of Persian Gulf Politics (pp. 492-505). Routledge.

Keliwaal, A. N., & Mubariz, A. S. (2024). International North-South Transport Corridor Opportunities, Challenges, and the Role of Afghanistan. Educational Administration: Theory and Practice, 30(11), 01-09.

Mazanik, S. V., & Romanova, T. A. (2024). Geopolitics of Connectivity: The EU in Central Asia. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 24(4), 563-575.

Peimani, H. (2022). Strategic alliance or cooperation of convenience: Iran’s linking the Chinese and Russian transit routes to connect Asia to Europe. In The China-led Belt and Road Initiative and its Reflections (pp. 209-243). Routledge.

Pepe, J. M. (2021). Value chains transformation and transport reconnection in Eurasia: Geo-economic and geopolitical implications. Routledge.

Şenol, C., & Erbilen, S. Ü. (2022). Analysis of the Impact of the Middle Corridor on Turkiye in Terms of Geopolitics and Economy in the OBOR Initiative. Coğrafya Dergisi, (45), 161-180.

Shadrina, E. (2019). Renewable energy in Central Asian economies: role in reducing regional energy insecurity (No. 993). ADBI Working Paper Series.

Sirvydytė, S. (2024). Navigating great power dynamics: ukraine–china relations in the aftermath of russia‘s invasion in 2022 (Doctoral dissertation, Vilniaus universitetas.).

Skalamera, M. (2023). Russia’s lasting influence in Central Asia. In Survival 59.6 (pp. 123-142). Routledge

Timakova, O. (2020). Strategy of the gulf countries: Special aspects of policy towards central asian countries. URL: https://www. ca-c. org/online/2020/journal_eng/cac-01/03. shtml (дата обращения: 08.07. 2020).

Zhou, Q., He, Z., & Yang, Y. (2020). Energy geopolitics in Central Asia: China’s involvement and responses. Journal of Geographical Sciences, 30, 1871-1895.

 

Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of MEPEI. Any content provided by our author is of her opinion and is not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual, or anyone or anything.