Photo’s source: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250626A033UK00

From June 25 to 26, 2025, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers’ Meeting was held in Qingdao, Shandong Province, China. As the rotating chair this year, China hosted the meeting chaired by General Dong Jun, Chinese Minister of National Defense. The meeting focused on international and regional security cooperation, consolidated multilateral consensus, reaffirmed conflict resolution through dialogue, and offered new strategic perspectives for Middle Eastern security within a multipolar framework.

Against the backdrop of profound global realignments and ongoing turbulence in the Middle East, the SCO delivered a clear collective security signal, presenting the international community with a “non-Western” paradigm for security governance.

China’s Leadership: From the “Shanghai Spirit” to Collective Security Consensus 

The Chinese military consistently prioritizes SCO defense and security cooperation as a cornerstone for regional peace and stability. As stated by Defense Ministry spokesperson Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang at a press briefing, China has deepened cooperation with member states across multiple dimensions—institutional building, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, and professional engagement (Aris & Snetkov, 2013). This includes participation in the “Peace Mission” series of military exercises, hosting senior officer training programs, and mid-career officer exchange initiatives, effectively advancing “practical cooperation to greater depth and substance.”

During the meeting, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun emphasized: “Amid intertwined global transformations and instabilities, the SCO must serve as a stabilizing anchor. China stands ready to work with all member states to promote the Shanghai Spirit, resolutely uphold international fairness and justice, and jointly address security challenges.”

The core values of the “Shanghai Spirit”- mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and consultation – offer the Middle East and other volatile regions a new cooperative security concept that transcends ideology (Yang, 2018).

Iran’s Support & Multilateral Stance: Collective Rejection of Sovereignty Violations 

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh expressed gratitude for China and Russia’s firm support for Iran’s sovereignty, highlighting the SCO’s critical role in regional peace. During the meeting, multiple nations – including China, Russia, and Iran – jointly condemned military strikes against Iran as grave violations of the UN Charter that undermine regional stability (Lo, B., 2015).

However, foreign media outlets reported India’s abstention from signing the statement, citing “inconsistencies in defining terrorism” and reservations about certain phrasing. In response, China’s Defense Ministry noted the meeting’s “complete success achieved through collective efforts,” demonstrating the SCO’s adherence to the pragmatic principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” in multilateral cooperation.

Despite not being unanimously adopted, this statement reflects the SCO’s security consensus on the Middle East: a willingness to speak, a commitment to dialogue, and a dedication to peace.

Institutional Appeal to Middle Eastern States: The Rise of Non-Western Security Platforms 

Middle Eastern nations have increasingly gravitated toward the SCO: Iran became a full member in 2023, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt actively participate as observers. Iran’s assertive stance at this meeting underscores that the SCO is evolving from a “political alternative” to a “security institutional option” for Middle Eastern states (Aris, 2009).

Unlike the U.S.-dominated NATO – which emphasizes military intervention and alliance obligations – SCO security governance prioritizes equal dialogue, national sovereignty, and non-interference principles (Loke, 2021). This offers a more flexible security dialogue platform for the Middle East’s complex political structures.

For nations like Iran, Türkiye, and Qatar, the SCO provides cooperation instead of sanctions, unity instead of intervention. Its institutional nature aligns with the dual demands of “major-power balancing” and “strategic autonomy” in today’s Middle East.

Cooperation Mechanisms & Real Divides: The SCO’s “Multilateral Challenges”

Despite substantive outcomes, underlying divergences remain. India’s refusal to sign the joint statement reveals policy and stance differences among members on specific security issues (Zhao, S., 2010). Consensus still needs to be built through dialogue on counterterrorism definitions, border security, and military transparency.

Moreover, unlike NATO’s “collective defense clause,” SCO cooperation relies on consensus-driven mechanisms lacking binding military mutual assistance (Herd et.al., 2013). While preserving sovereign flexibility, this structure limits rapid crisis-response coordination.

Yet this defines the SCO’s uniqueness: replacing coercion with inclusiveness, and pressure with consultation. Such institutional elasticity proves more adaptable to the Middle East’s diverse political and religious landscape.

Strategic Outlook: Forging a New Middle East Security Paradigm?

The Qingdao Meeting sent a clear signal: future Middle East security architectures will no longer be dominated by a single bloc or external power (Bilgin, 2015). The SCO is becoming a testing ground for the region’s transition toward a “multipolar” security system.

By steadfastly upholding the “Shanghai Spirit,” strengthening military communication, border coordination, and professional trust-building, the SCO could evolve beyond wielding influence to becoming a platform for “shared security governance” in the Middle East (Walton, 2007).

This signals the gradual emergence of a more open and pluralistic international security framework. In this process, the Chinese military—as an active contributor—will continue striving for “a shared home of peace, prosperity, good-neighborliness, and justice.”

References

Aris, S. (2009). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:‘Tackling the three evils’. A regional response to non-traditional security challenges or an anti-Western bloc?. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(3), 457-482.

Aris, S., & Snetkov, A. (2013). “Global alternatives, regional stability and common causes”: the international politics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its relationship to the West. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 54(2), 202-226.

Bilgin, P. (2015). Region, Security, Regional Security:“Whose Middle East?” Revisited. In Regional Insecurity After the Arab Uprisings: Narratives of Security and Threat (pp. 19-39). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Herd, G. P., & Kriendler, J. (Eds.). (2013). Understanding NATO in the 21st century: Alliance strategies, security and global governance. Routledge.

Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Brookings Institution Press.

Loke, B. (2021). The United States, China, and the politics of hegemonic ordering in East Asia. International Studies Review, 23(4), 1208-1229.

Walton, C. D. (2007). Geopolitics and the great powers in the 21st century: multipolarity and the revolution in strategic perspective. Routledge.

Yang, H. (2018). Time to up the game? Middle Eastern security and Chinese strategic involvement. Asia Europe Journal, 16(3), 283-296.

Zhao, S. (2010). The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?. Journal of contemporary China, 19(65), 419-436.

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