Published on: July 19, 2025
Photo: Three flags: Ukraine, Russia, and US, by: Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell
Introduction
On July 10th, 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly asked President Trump to “stay with” Europeans related to Ukraine, which could raise the potential question why wouldn’t the United States (US), Europe’s security provider after 1948 consider that (The Hindu, 2025). On July 12th, 2025, media reports claiming that the US had been asking Australia and Japan to clarify their position in the case of a war against China, “over Taiwan”, were published (Sevastopulo, 2025). Both instances represent calls for war or support for future wars, that appear to plague the “end of history”, i.e., the fragile vision of a US total, final and definitive victory that, when considering world’s known history, was as utopian as many others in this propaganda class.
In the information quagmire related to the war from Ukraine, dominated by opposing narratives and situation reports, it is relatively difficult to distinguish between fundamental and contextual assessments, in the broader context of media weaponization and competing interests. Europe did not experience any major war in the period 1950 – 1990, but the situation changed after Perestroika and capitalizing on this Western victory implied, among others, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The exceptional peace period on a continent marked by wars for centuries, either within the Old Continent or projected in other regions can be associated to a series of factors, including the American undisputed dominance, the acceptance of both the US and European leading economies of a cooperation mechanism in which military and economic roles were considered complementary, but also Europe’s inability to meaningfully contest superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union.
Assuming that the UK is still aiming at global hegemony due to its past achievements but with no major consequences, as other former European colonial powers, the involvement of democratic countries in larger wars is likely representative through US dynamics, since the latter was both a superpower and a democracy after 1950. In this context, the outcomes of Vietnam war may be interpreted in various ways, depending on the analysis framework: a lost battle in a war won by the US against communism, or a defeat that would later enable a non-Soviet type of communism to flourish and challenge fundamental societal and economic paradigms. For the purpose of this study, the outcomes of Vietnam War may have represented a lesson learned for the dominating Western power, that translated later into rallying broader coalitions and securing local support in large-scale wars before proceeding. However, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the changing nature of warfare and of victory’s definition might have revealed a pattern that was not as obvious in Vietnam: taking into consideration that wars presumably aim to solve a dispute, conflict or settle a rivalry by force in a competition, and that American power included also non-traditional attributes such as capital domination, it must be analyzed whether American wars in general aim for military victory in battles or different, more profound, transformations in global competition landscape. Otherwise, the US would have become dominated by the winners of the wars they fought.
The war from Ukraine is purportedly a war for expanding democracy, but overlooking the Cold War outcomes and Western expansionist tendencies cannot be overlooked, irrespective of the expansion’s nature. If this is an American-led war, or a Democrat American-led war, as a next step in reasserting hegemony against China or as a Cold War continuation, or whether it is a European war with American support, depends on the perception angle and transformation observed. The world changed significantly in 2001, when the US made use of its hegemonic power to skip United Nations (UN) framework when starting to infringe national territory sovereignty, either based on national security excuses in the case of Afghanistan and on false allegations in the case of Iraq, changed again in 2008 when state intervention in the US debt crisis began to raise questions about the real freedom degree of markets and countries like Argentina, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Ukraine faced either debt crises or default.
In 2014, the Russian Federation signaled both a relatively surprising comeback and a reiteration of its post-1990 red line related to proximity between NATO and its borders, and 2016 might represent, through Brexit and an American administration that initiated tariffs against allied countries from Europe, the beginning of a new escalation model. Whether the Ukrainian war is a pathway to weakening China’s potential allies or a continuation of the Western Cold War objectives may be less relevant than triggering a large-scale call to militarization and conflict, meant to preserve US hegemony and an exceptional European peace that led to sustained prosperity. Likewise, described as Thucydides trap or as a simple hegemony pursuit, the threat of a major war along the fact that the US demands increasingly more support from competitors and allies alike rise the question whether the American domination model is still capable to lead the 21st century on a stable path, or its limits have been reached and a reset will restabilize the international system.
This article aims to identify and correlate developments related to Ukrainian war, from a system perspective, employing an international relations type of analysis. While the peaceful world hopes for the least destructive outcome to systemic wars, like the ones from Ukraine, and potentially Iran and Taiwan, it must be acknowledged that the use of force and rearmament are being scaled up. The war from Ukraine emerged amid a deteriorating political, social and economic situation in the West, reflected in contested issues like migration, the rise of far right politics, widening gap between poor and rich, or the opportunistic approach towards technological progress for particular interests. Despite the technological and logistics progress, certain democratic countries go to war without consulting the UN Security Council or even own population, eroding thus pillars of the system that dominated 20th century. And despite claiming victories, the American-led international order appears to be contested by its own founder, growing increasingly vulnerable to initiatives like BRICS. The main goals of this study are to identify whether Europe’s stance are independent from those of the US, and whether it signaled a comprehensive plan to step into the future, irrespective whether this is a green one, or a restaged oil and gas era in which war is likely to become far more destructive than in the 20th century.
A (global) system theory brief reassessment of the Ukrainian war
From a systems theory perspective, the world is considered rather connected than disconnected, with relations, synergies and interactions between various actors. Adopting this analysis direction does not impact on connectivity and relations themselves, but determines the terminology employed.
The United Nations was created to enable dialogue and exchange, among others, and thus avoid conflicts like the two world wars. While communication at international level improved significantly, the rise in conflict potential cannot be ignored as of 2025. There are more reasons to consider broader conflict as a probable outcome in the future, and these include, besides BRICS contestation, the US withdrawal from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, the failure to end the Ukrainian conflict and relentless preparations to continue it on both sides, rising unpredictability related to international conflict resolution principles and actions and the increasing dependence of certain actors on inventing excuses to deploy hard power unilaterally as a tool to maintain influence.
Since this study concerns an ongoing war, the conflict perspectives employed by Levy and Thompson will be considered as a starting point in defining a framework for current analysis. In their book “Causes of War,” the two authors associate the use of military force with “a strategy for advancing group interests” (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p. 2). The formal definition of war adopted in this book is “sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations” (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p. 5), the authors mentioning that actors are generally organizations and, citing Clausewitz, that the war is a political instrument, continuing political activity “by other means”.
Ukraine became an independent state in 1991 and whether primarily Ukraine’s efforts positioned it ever closer to Western affairs or the efforts of American and European counterparts led to this outcome, can be considered a debatable topic although it was not Ukraine that fundamentally destabilized the Soviet Union and determined its demise. The contested gentlemen agreement for NATO to maintain distance from Russian borders after 1991 represents a good instance of effective diplomacy, which served both American-European interests, and the Russian ones, at that time. But in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin was already criticizing the unipolar model, hinting at future resistance to Western expansion towards its borders and emphasizing that NATO and EU should not aim to replace the UN. In 2008, the Russian Federation invaded Georgia, capitalizing on its continuous warning related to Western expansion. Despite warnings, Washington continued pushing eastward and the major dispute arose in 2014, when the Euromaidan Revolution removed the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych. While Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria joined NATO without major problems, as they were not part of the Soviet Union, Western intervention in Ukraine from 2014 triggered the occupation of Crimean Peninsula by the Russians in what they considered a defensive move.
After various coups and secret operations, the sole dominant power was advancing its interests in Ukraine based at least on two arguments: previous victories against the Soviet Union and its unique capacity to project overwhelming power around the world. Furthermore, the relatively recent Cold War empowered American administrations to sell relatively easy any operation against Russian Federation. The nowadays regular pilgrimages to Kyiv, carried out by American and European state representatives, might have debuted in December 2013, when John McCain met Oleh Tyahnybok, the leader of Svoboda right wing nationalist party Svoboda, reportedly accused back then of being an “antisemitic neo-Nazi” (Taylor, 2013). McCain also attended an anti-government rally, contributing actively to the soon-coming government overthrow. However, more than a decade later, the prospects of Ukrainian file have not improved.
There is no clear cut between the Cold War confrontation between the US and the Russians, and the renewed conflict that became obvious again in 2014. This implies that the dissolution of Soviet Union apparently solved certain issues, but not the fundamental conflict, prompting a reassessment of the fundamental conflict.
The underlying paradigm of US interventionism before 2001 was the spread of democracy, which remains a theme in the case of Ukraine and other Asian countries like Georgia. While this slogan has traditionally been successful in mobilizing resources, two aspects are important in this context. On one the Russian Federation appeared to enter this game, and at the beginning, and the rotation of positions among Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev mimiqued a democratic process. But at the same time, the US itself had been catalogued a flawed democracy in 2024, and it does not actually impose the sanctity of democratic processes among its allies. For example, despite the formal organization of Israel, various analysts question whether Israel is a democracy (Beck, 2020), and at the same time, current Prime Minister of Israel served in this role between 2009 – 2025 (ongoing) with minor interruption, being longest-serving prime minister of Israel. Likewise, the US is not waging wars against Persian Gulf monarchies, hence conditionally pursuing the spread of democracy everywhere and anyhow.
As a central actor in the Ukrainian war, the US deployed its security, military, and financial-economic instruments, presumably with the aim of integrating Ukrainian natural and agricultural resources in its global dominance system. From an economic perspective, BlackRock stepped in during the Democrat administration and set up a fund for Ukraine’s reconstruction, but reportedly abandoned the initiative after President Trump’s electoral win, and agricultural business giants like Monsanto, Dupont, Cargill, Bunge or Archer Daniels Midland also became active in Ukraine, some of them reportedly gaining control over farmland along the Saudis (Bonte, 2024). Although disputed, the form of control over farmland or the overall involvement in Ukrainian agricultural affairs is less contested in mainstream media. The terms “central” and “American” in conjunction with the American presence in Ukraine would normally imply the identification of a monolithic actor with predictable behavior. However, the increasing competition between the Democrats and Republicans has reached new heights, with political violence reflected in events like the January 6th, 2021, US Capitol attack, or the assassination attempt against President Trump in July 2024 during a Pennsylvania campaign rally.
In matters related to Ukraine, but also other global issues like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, the Democratic and Republican camps had different approaches. It was the Democrats who strived to gain control in Ukraine before 2016, and again after 2020. The presumed hypothesis that the democrats envisioned a weakened Russian Federation as a precondition to begin confronting Chinese economic domination, along involvement of Europeans in this new “Cold War”, is questioned by President Trump’s reluctance to unconditionally support Ukraine’s war efforts, amid alleged Russian occupation of lithium-rich areas from Donetsk in June 2025 (one month before BlackRock’s announced retreat), that reportedly endanger the Minerals Deal (Méheut, 2025). Similarly, President Trump questions the necessity to weaken the Russian Federation, while resetting economic relations not only with China, but the entire world.
The heterogenous nature of the US as a global actor, consisted historically of a separation between the state and private actors, as a guarantee for the rule of law and fair political process. However, in recent years, a galvanized relation between these two sectors can be noticed in various forms. For example, President Biden’s family was involved in Ukraine business, and President Trump’s extended family (e.g., Jared Kushner) became involved in the political process. The raw of political donations, especially from defense but also other type of contractors, the involvement of billionaire Elon Musk in government work, and similar developments, hint at a narrowing gap and prompt observers to question whether the US could become an oligarchy (Oxfam America, 2025).
As of 2025, the US strives to preserve a global order from which it benefited, despite questioning pillars like the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967 through sanctions. Likewise, the withdrawal from or stopping funds for UNHRC, UNESCO and UNRWA (President Donald Trump / The White House, 2025), along with at least partial disregard to certain World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions, amount to a contestation of the old-world order it dominated.
In the new paradigm, that can be associated with the year 2016 and President Trump’s tenures, the US is a more dynamic competitor against emerging “South” economies, and against Europe. On one hand, the American administration does not contemplate to somehow compensate the world for the massive consumption of hydrocarbons during past century and instead used the opportunity to begin delivering fossil fuels to Europe, reportedly at higher costs than the ones from the Russian Federation after the sabotage of Nord Stream gas pipeline, while raising shale oil and gas production to unprecedented levels due to economic but also national security reasons. On the other hand, the accumulation of capital in Europe led to gradual imposition of sanctions for key European industrial products. Besides increasing energy throughout, reshoring industrial production back to the US impacts competitors like China, but also Europe.
The so-called trade unbalance is not a new term in US foreign policy: for instance, tariffs imposed to Japan in the 1980s on grounds of alleged unfair trade practices related to semiconductor/electronic sector reached 100 % (Redburn & Walters, 1987). This is an important aspect that reconfirms the previously cited “group interests,” be they supported through military or non-military means.
Considering pragmatic economic imperatives, the sustained war from Ukraine emerged after an American-European apparent understanding during the Democratic administration, as in the case of JCPOA, and crumbles under the Republican administration of President Donald Trump due reprioritization of economic directions. The inconsistent American policy on priorities and cooperation with traditional partners may be associated to the economic situation and competitiveness the US faces, but also to the vision on how to maintain dominance, Ukraine being an important project. In all cases, the US as a major international actor and the leader of a unipolar world throughout the 1990s, appears to become increasingly concerned with voices contesting its leadership role, and while it considers all options, the Democrat administration identified no role for the Russian Federation in its endeavors, while the Republican administration appears to bet on economic leverage and confrontation with basically all relevant economies on the globe. So did the US with initiatives like Tesla and subsidies. Before 2015, the race to pioneer electrification appeared to still follow the pattern of free market competition, but as China became the largest market in this year, guarantees of a competitive advantage in this market began to fade. Hence, the back-to-basics American exercise resulted in returning to its oil and related dominance, and confused the Europe that had hoped to become a leader in renewables into scaling down efforts to transit rapidly, maintain fossil fuels as a major energy source and reassess its economic and security development priorities. Indeed, neither Europe nor the US have sufficient lithium reserves, nor the past political or military leverage to secure it conveniently in Afghanistan and Ukraine. So far. But slowing down the transition to renewables, reflected by Chinese market’s fast expansion in comparison to its competitors (11.3 million plug-in electric vehicles sold in China in 2024, compared to 3.2 million in Europe and 1.5 million in the US) (STATISTA EV, 2025) may pose risks to long term competitiveness to economies based on oil.
In the 1960s, the US reportedly imposed tariffs on German vehicles as a response to German tariffs on American poultry. This was not a significant dispute in the trans-Atlantic relation, but despite the victorious NATO alliance, a broad security cooperation and extensive trade, the EU and the US have not manage to reach a free trade agreement. In the contemporary era, the US did not manage to convince Europe to buy its agricultural products, and Europe did not manage to convince the US to transition relatively fast to a renewable energy-based industry, resulting in a lose – lose situation for both Europe and the US from this perspective, as China rapidly scaling up capacity and market share. In the triangle EU – US – China, the EU and China appear more determined in renewables goals amid President Trump’s pushback, whereas in Ukraine, the EU and the Democrat US administration had potentially agreed on the economic importance of Ukraine, including its lithium reserves.
The Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) revolution might have represented a contextual exaggeration, to facilitate Europe’s transition from cheap Russian pipeline gas to more expensive and less environment-friendly shale gas from the US or shipments from the Persian Gulf. The continued acceptance of gas and oil consumption increase empowers large suppliers like the Russian Federation to export to markets other than Europe without pressure to decrease production. Likewise, OPEC and its partners also contemplate increasing production, a measure with complex impact on industries and international trade.
Aside from economic competition, in which the EU and the US are both partners and competitors, the military and security levels of implication in Ukraine are largely disproportionate. If at the beginning of the conflict British and American support appeared to successfully counter Russian advances, continental Europe was taken by surprise by the prospective of a conventional war at its borders. Even if the EU engaged in massive military spending and committed to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” the Old Continent does not have significant oil and gas resources, did not manage to establish itself as a detached leader in production of renewable energy or technology exporter, and is still lagging in technologies related to digital transformation and sovereignty. The US managed to sell significant volumes of F-35 fighter jets and munition, Patriot missile systems and related equipment to European countries, securing not only military dominance but also additional long-term sources of income. For example, the US additional costs for $ 1 invested in F-35 fighter jets is expected to determine another $ 3.575 in sustainment costs over lifetime, whereas European allies may face various levels of cost (Szakacs & Badohal, 2024). The defense imperative for Europe may result in a potential increase in military technology independence, but in realistic terms, this is relatively unlikely to happen in the next decades as long as major purchases of key weapons maintain dependence on the US on long term, and the EU does not manage to articulate a credible energy and economic sustainment policy. As Europe’s population is decreasing naturally, and migration has become a major issue amid an American-led push against open borders, rearming the continent may imply heavy burdens on EU citizens and economic development of non-military sectors.
The US military economy does not encompass only the military-industrial complex, but an entire range of entities including military sustainment and logistics supply, private military contractors and large infrastructure developers. The American war machine is by far the largest and most expensive in the world, and the hundreds of billions in annual budget caught the attention of contributors and investors alike. Financial interests related to US military sector have become more apparent after 2001, when large amounts of US Senate-appropriated funds, i.e. taxpayer contributions, were distributed to a certain clientele in an obvious manner: it appears to have become a recurring habit for American administrations to invest or distribute public funds to private actors, invoking the liberal principle of contracting/subcontracting. The war from Ukraine is apparently citing democracy and an almost NATO-like commitment for a non-NATO country, but the hypothesis that this war may also well serve to redistribute public funds to certain economic actors is supported by at least three arguments: the US Congress and government have generally channeled public funds towards private contractors especially after 2001, there is a very creative and sustained ongoing effort to whitewash the expenditure of Russian frozen assets, i.e. public funds, on (American) weapons for Ukraine, and further European public funds, that are largely spent on expensive American weaponry, were, are and will be raised through state budget increase for military spending across Europe. From an economic perspective, Europe is beginning to step up contributions (Novikov, 2015) for the further development of an already disproportionately large American military-industrial complex.
So far, economic and military policies of the European alliance in the Ukrainian war is either too sophisticated or not convincing when compared to the American one(s). In terms of political process at international level, the EU still maintains an inclusivity discourse. Whether it stands by it or not becomes secondary when considering Brexit, the imperative to buy weapons from the US with long term implications for Ukraine or own defense, expensive energy imports, American tariffs and the rise of a past-oriented nationalism throughout Europe as a reaction to American political development. The inclusivity argument and its constant reaffirmation is certainly appealing for Ukraine, but as long as it is only at declarative level and heavily reliant on exogenous economic, military and even political leadership, it might not be as decisive as expected.
The political competition in Europe reflects partially American political developments, although there are not only two major political groups that run for seats. But the rise of nationalism, sometimes associated with far-right, and the struggle to oppose this development resemble the similar situation from the US. Additionally, the rise in confrontational political rhetoric, polarization, and instances of political violence, are present in both the US and Europe. There are systematic differences between aspects like political parties funding, and the role European institutions play in comparison to the American ones, but at national level, political clashes between nationalist themes (migration, economic isolation) and the neo-liberal ones (LGBT, “own nothing, be happy”), are often encountered. While the Republicans and Democrats do and undo other’s policies when winning mandates, many European leaders have been increasingly challenged by decreasing political support, as in the case of former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, the German former Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The outcomes of French snap elections from 2024, the way German and Romanian elections were carried out in 2024 and 2025, hint at either political difficulties or the beginning of a new era that requires new political considerations, in Europe and the US alike.
In the wider system of international relations, the suggested transfer from an American unipolar world to a multipolar one, determines tectonic shifts. However, in the effort to defend its leading position, and preserve a certain type of global dominance system, the US increasingly requires its allies to step up contributions in various direct and indirect forms. At the same time, suggestions of occupying territories like Greenland or Canada, to maintain a growth paradigm that will anyway end unless adapted to modern realities, along abrupt financial correction measures in either economic, political, or military form, appear to hint at a systemic change anyway. In all cases, Europe appears to continue adopting American stances in the Ukrainian war, including the redirection of public funds towards private entities, and as of July 2025, these are mainly American.
European costs, risks, and potential benefits
The definition of war adopted clearly opposes two main political organizations in the Ukrainian war. In theory, these are Ukraine and the Russian Federation, but the numbers suggest that it is rather a NATO-countries war against the Russian Federation, on Ukrainian soil and with Ukrainian troops, but with technological and financial support from the West. Within NATO, collective security may be considered the main goal, but the economic aspect is again intertwined. While the US has the largest military budget, its effective contributions to NATO’s budget represented only 15.8 %, i.e., $ 3.5 billion in a 2024 breakdown, a large contribution along that of Germany (Reuters Fact Check NATO, 2024). The propaganda thread that summed up national defense budgets and positioned the US as a major and dominant contributor to “NATO” budget reportedly began to meet resistance in the US and were rejected. Indeed, national defense budgets may play a role in NATO’s posture, but at least two conditions must be met in order to unite NATO countries defense spending for one goal: Article 5 must be triggered and all countries, especially the ones with large militaries, have to agree to work together for that very purpose. Consequently, strengthening NATO, as its current Secretary General Mark Rutte implies, through military spending, assumes automatically that in case of need, the two conditions would be met without further arrangements. However, from an economic perspective in which the largest arms suppliers are American, both Secretary General Rutte and President of the European Commission may employ discourses comparable to those of weapons salesmen, when calling for rearming on short term a continent that is neither at the head of global economy, capitalization on research and development or at least expanding its influence at the pace of other economies similar in size.
The COVID pandemic incurred a series of costs on the European Union members, reflected in medical expenses and vaccines, sharp current account deficits for the first time since 2012 (Emter, Fidora, Pastoris, & Schmitz, 2023), budget deficits that are projected to remain above pre-pandemic levels through 2027 (Angelini, Bańkowski, Checherita-Westphal, Muggenthaler-Gerathewohl, & Zimic, 2025), and slowing transportation industries. From a political perspective, Russian trucks landed in Italy at the beginning of the pandemic depicted a relatively difficult to explain development.
In 2022, the energy shock began to undermine major industries like automotive sector from Germany, which integrated large supply chains from entire Europe, including countries like Poland, Hungary and Romania. Subsequently, increased defense spending is on course to align EU’s debt to GDP ratio, which averaged 87.4 % at the end of 2024 (EU News Redazione, 2025), with that of the US. However, unlike the US, Europe does not own world’s currency reserve and while the Euro is gaining momentum, instrumentalizing it to balance between inflation and deflation might be more expensive on short term.
Unless it utilizes the window provided by President Trump’s intention to mediate in the Ukrainian war to reposition itself, Europe risks entering a hot conflict that consumes important resources. The numbers on the war from Ukraine are significant: in the three years since the beginning of the conflict, EUR 267 billion in aid was provided to Ukraine, half representing weapons and military assistance and EUR 118 billion representing financial assistance. European contribution was overall higher with EUR 62 billion in arms and EUR 70 billion in other types of aid, whereas the US contributed with EUR 64 billion in arms and EUR 50 billion in other types of aid (Pianta, 2025). Russian costs from this article are according to American sources $ 211 billion and 315’000 deaths.
The escalation of the war and increased European involvement might increase the potential to achieve political goals, whatever these are, but at the same time risks joining more countries around the Russian Federation, Iran and potentially China, which have become front lines in a systematic confrontation. The conflict for resources becomes ever more apparent for emerging economies, that while beginning to form various forms of alliances (BRICS, SCO, BRI), are also willing to reshape the old global order to their benefit. Hence, the war from Ukraine is likely turn into an economic North – South, or West – East wide scale confrontation, following traditional confrontation patterns for power and wealth.
Should Europe and the US remain allies, although during President Trump’s first term first fundamental questions appeared in the trans-Atlantic relation, Europe is neither capitalizing on cheap hydrocarbon energy nor does it champion alternatives. From this energy perspective, it is difficult to envision a victory for Europe, unless it surrenders all its finances and continues to rely on expensive American energy for demanding endeavors like wars and industrial development to sustain it.
Overall, Europe is leaving slowly from the scenario of potentially winning wars without firing a shot, and take enemy’s fortress intact. After a tragic outcome of World War II and almost 80 years of relative peace, Europe appears determined to reenter a war state without clear political and economic goals, opening the possibility for other non-involved parties to win a potentially devastating war without fighting it consistently and directly. However, assuming that the US will still continue its involvement, to support Ukraine or to defend its stance against BRICS rising contestation, in which the Russian Federation plays a major role, Europe as a partner may continue the tradition of supporting the US in global confrontations.
Ukraine’s NATO neighbors: a front line?
At the beginning of World War II, Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the invasion of Poland by both Germany and the Soviet Union confirm that Eastern Europe had been both a periphery and a border line between the major centers of influence at that time. In 2025, the border line between the EU and the Russian Federation appears to have formed in and around Ukraine, assuming that European efforts to gain influence in Central Asia might be challenged not only by the Russian Federation, but Türkiye and China as well, among others. While international relations have changed in essence, and emerging economic powers are contributing to a potential shift, the relative distribution of influence throughout Eastern Europe remains largely similar: important political and economic decision-making centers have not moved closer to the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. Despite NATO, EU and Schengen enlargement, major differences still persists among members of these alliances.
In April 2022, the EU inflation rate reportedly amounted 2.4 %. Ukraine’s neighbors consistently scored higher than the average. The inflation in Romania (4.9 %), Estonia (4.4 %), Hungary (4.2 %), Latvia (4 %), Poland (3.7 %), Lithuania (3.6 %) was much higher than in Germany (2.2 %), Italy (2 %) Czech Republic (1.7 %) or France (0.9 %) (STATISTA Inflation, 2025). Furthermore, Romanian inflation in June jumped to 5.66 %, and was expected to reach 7.9 % at the of 2025 (ING Infl, 2025). Likewise, current account deficit increased with 43 % in Romania year to year, as of May 2025, reaching 9.5 % of GDP (Ernst, 2025), whereas Poland’s current account deficit also increased to EUR $ 1.74 bln. in May 2025 from EUR 468 million in May 2024 (Trading Economics PL, 2025). Hungary’s trade surplus also narrowed from EUR 2.21 bln. in Q1 2024 to EUR 1.14 bln. in Q1 2025 (Trading Economics HU, 2025). The economic challenges faced by European economies relate to internal factors, energy prices, but also shifting paradigms in global competitiveness.
As previously discussed, “NATO spending” is not necessarily equivalent to purchases of weapons within the alliance, but among members. While the US consolidated its position as world’s major arms exporter, Germany’s arms sales dropped by 71 % in the first quarter of 2025 when compared to the same period in 2024, after record sales throughout the entire 2024 (Hasanova, 2025). Major US sales of weapons to Europe in recent period include large batches of Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets and RTX Patriot missile systems. Additionally, Poland is executing a major purchasing contract of tanks from the Republic of Korea ($ 6.7 bln.) (Lendon & Seo, 2025), and reportedly signed a $ 1.5 bln. deal with Sweden for Carl Gustaf M4 recoilless rifles and ammunition in March 2024 (Ptak, 2024). Besides Patriot systems and F-35 fighters, Romania has reportedly selected Rafael for an EUR 1.9 bln. contract to deliver very/short range air defense (V/SHORAD) systems (Defence Industry Europe, 2025) and has an approval from 2023 to purchase M1 Abraham tanks in amount of $ 2.5 bln., and reportedly received a $ 920 mln. loan from the US to advance the contract in September 2024 (Mehta, 2025).
All NATO neighbors of Ukraine appear to be in a clearly unsustainable military spending race, in the larger context of European purchase of mainly American weapons systems in recent years, except Hungary, which has recently ruled out any funding for US weapons to Ukraine (Vialko, 2025). Hungary has consistently questioned EU’s war and arming rhetoric and discussed purchasing a symbolic batch of 4 Gripen fighter jets from Sweden in early 2024 (Reuters HU, 2024).
The economic aspects of the war from Ukraine indicate the same consistent pattern of transferring significant public funds to a small group of military-industrial complex representatives, especially from the US. However, it is mostly European funds that are being transferred in relation to this war, and potentially interest on $ 200 bln. in frozen Russian financial assets held by Bruxelles (Barnes, 2025).
From a security perspective, Europe is investing its existing and borrowed funds to purchase weapons, to allegedly counter the Russian aggression from Ukraine, which is equated to a threat for Europe. While the Russian threat cannot be excluded, it must be emphasized that the same threat was invoked by Napoleon, and it was invoked again by Germans before World War II. What could be different this time is the fact that both Ukraine and NATO’s East-European neighbors are massively investing in weapons, amid a financial and economic ongoing meltdown, before a direct war even started beyond Ukraine.
The fact that the Russian Federation reacted to NATO’s push for Ukraine, and did not do so in the case of Estonia, for example, whose main city is much closer to Moscow than that of Ukraine’s main city, can be correlated with the response capacity of the Russian Federation in 2022. Hence, considering the multifaceted response capacity, among which Russian BRICS initiatives that include de-dollarization, the question is whether East-European NATO members are assembling or fighting the same war as the US does, along other major European economies. In the small landscape of European wars, the confrontation from Ukraine may appear as a peripheral war for Brussels and major countries supported or accompanied by the US, but at global level, it is part of a much more fundamental confrontation in which emerging economies are challenging US dominance. The war from Ukraine is just one of the front lines, which for Washington can signify both a military and financial opportunity, along other front lines like trade agreements or Golden Dome.
Comparing the contribution of East-European nations to the resolution of this conflict represents a challenge, since the war from Ukraine exists and exhibits clear metrics, but due to the wider confrontational landscape, tipping the balance on this particular front line depends on broader considerations. Whether the evolution of the war from Ukraine will tip the balance in other confrontations, or the other way around remains an open question: although it appears highly unlikely, a potential resolution of the US – China trade dispute may provide Washington with sufficient incentives to settle in Ukraine.
In the case of a major escalation, East-European NATO members may face even greater risks, like for example expansion of the conflict. Moldova has not entered a full military conflict yet, and as it is a non-NATO country, building the case for “defending” Moldova may prove as complex as the one for Ukraine. Furthermore, should the Russian Federation decide to push the conflict even further, the Balkans are still vulnerable to weaponization and instrumentalization, due to previous conflicts and the overall security situation.
By invoking the Russian threat, Western leaders undermine or underestimate NATO’s Article 5, which commits all members to defend NATO territory as if it was their own. Should this commitment have become a potential vulnerability for East-European members, the question whether investing in NATO members’ military industries and ultimately economies, much beyond their sustainability levels in order to temporarily fix one of the problems the world is confronted with, should be answered in the context of their internal and global contexts.
Final assessment and conclusions
This study employed an international system approach in order to characterize the war from Ukraine and its implications for European countries. From a historical perspective, it was identified that Europe appears to enter a renewed period of military confrontation after a period of US-dominated in the aftermath of World War II.
From an intra-NATO power balance perspective, there are little to no arguments that can support the hypothesis of a war proposed or led by Europe: it was still the (Democrat) US that set the stage for the Maidan Revolution, with the support of European allies, and it might be the (Republican) US which will continue to explore economic and financial benefits in the confrontation.
The role of Ukraine or Europe in this confrontation, and its potential outcomes, may depend on other economic, military or hybrid competition instances, in which the US strives to maintain dominance while emerging economies seek a more independent and consequential contribution to global affairs.
Europe experienced a series of shocks after 2016, when Brexit and the first American administration that began to impose tariffs emerged. COVID pandemic’s economic and financial hardships have not been compensated for as of 2025, and the energy crisis that emerged in 2022 was determined by a series of factors including the sabotage of Nord Stream, the failure to repair or replace it with a comparable source of energy, renewable or nor, and high prices of American energy which signalized that any alliance has its price. Furthermore, Europe remains in the shadow of US political scene, as the rise of nationalism that emerged in the US spread to Europe and not the other way around. Unprecedented political episodes like the elections from Germany and Romania hint a struggle to survive rather than to lead.
Except Hungary, East-European NATO countries have mobilized to invest massively on short-term in military equipment, and, as a major part of Europe, the suppliers are based in the US. Whether these investments will end up in Ukraine or not, maneuvered by NATO military forces, or whether they are sufficient to tip wider security and economic balance between the US and contesting emerging powers, is not clear. However, these countries appear to surpass their economic sustainability levels, that had been already stretched before the invasion of Ukraine. In the context of German economic stagnation, and its leading as well as overreaching role in the economies of certain East-European countries’ economies, the prospects of any sort of victory for Ukraine NATO’s neighbors remain very unclear.
In the unlikely scenario of a big power global politics, which was however suggested by US takeover proposals for Canada or Greenland, and should the East of Europe be divided again in spheres of influence, the countries that deteriorated their economic systems to make a difference in a confusing war situation may be graded at a lower bargaining value.
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About the author:
Prof. Ecaterina MAȚOI is a Program Director at MEPEI.
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