Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been accompanied by many difficulties since the beginning of Pakistan’s independence. In addition to cultural relations, the two countries have a difference of opinion over the Durand Line, a 2640-kilometer border. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made Islamabad establish close relations with the Muslim parties in Afghanistan.
In the late nineties, Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, recognized the Taliban regime in 1996 and provided good support to it.
The Taliban fell in late 2001 and some members found refuge and support inside Pakistan. The Pakistani base was crucial for survival and a possible return to power in August 2021. However, Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban has long been more complicated.
It seemed that with the Taliban taking over Afghanistan in August 2021, it would be in the interest of Pakistan to establish a friendly government in Kabul. However, these relations have gone from interaction to confrontation or challenge in the past two years.
Challenges and variables involved
Terrorism and bilateral disputes
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) officially entered the scene in Pakistan in late 2007. The TTP has had strong ties with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network in the past. TTP considers itself a “branch of the Islamic Emirate”.[1]
TTP has helped to strengthen the Taliban and pledged allegiance[2] to Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Afghan Taliban. The Pashtun ethnic link and previous relationships have also helped maintain relations.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also pursues the implementation of Sharia law and assistance in the liberation of Free Balochistan, Free Pashtunistan and Free Sindh[3] from the army on a national scale. They sometimes have also claimed to form an independent country in the tribal areas of Pakistan and to control the border areas.[4][5]
The reorganizing of the Pakistani Taliban and strengthening the central structure, as well as expanding the movement to other ethnicities, are all against the security and geopolitical interests of Pakistan.
The United Nations reports in 2023[6] also indicate the connection between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the TTP, the coexistence of terrorist groups, and their freedom to maneuver in Afghanistan.
The Taliban either cannot confront some of its allied groups or does not want to provoke strong reactions or change previous commitments.
The strengthening of the TTP is beneficial to the Afghan Taliban in the international, security, and military spheres. Pakistan considers the TTP as a threat to its existence. However, Pakistan still believes that India supports[7] the Pakistani Taliban.
Pakistan claims that the Afghan Taliban have provided safe havens to the TTP and that they carry out attacks in Pakistan like suicide bombings against the Chinese.
In March 2024, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations requested the Security Council of this organization to ask the Afghan Taliban to cut ties with the TTP. He asked[8] the Afghan Taliban not to threaten the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries. However, the Taliban have always denied the claim[9] and consider the problem of the TTP to be a Pakistani issue.
Yet, the widespread pressures of Islamabad have caused the Taliban to sometimes think about mediation and peace talks between the TTP and Islamabad or form a special commission.
The pressure or privilege of Islamabad to the Afghan Taliban has not been able to have a large effect on the friendly behavior of the Afghan Taliban with the Pakistani Taliban.
In fact, the Taliban is not willing to cooperate more with Pakistan regarding the TTP. Alternatively, they want to use the TTP as a bargaining tool in interaction with the government of Pakistan.
While terrorism is the biggest obstacle in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan increased to 79% in 2023.[10] Most of these attacks were carried out by TTP. This continues to cause disagreements, tensions, and periodic border conflicts between the Taliban and Pakistan. Despite the agreement of a temporary ceasefire in May 2024,[11] the border tension between Pakistan and the Taliban on the Durand line raised serious concerns.
In addition, the more recent issue in Pakistan-Taliban relations is Pakistan’s claim of training ISIS-K terrorists and sending ISIS militants to Afghanistan.
The Taliban hoped that Pakistan would be the flag bearer and play an important role in consolidating its power, expanding relations with various foreign actors, getting them out of isolation, and recognizing the Taliban. However, this did not happen.
Pashtunistan and Durand Line
Pashtuns make up 15% of Pakistan’s population[12] and the vast majority of Pashtuns live in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a significant number of Pashtuns have settled in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan.
The Durand Line between the Pakistan-Afghanistan border covers an area of and2,560 km from north to south of Afghanistan. Since the establishment of Pakistan (1947), the Afghan-Pakistani conflict over the Durand Line has been a major historical challenge.
Pashtun nationalist circles in Afghanistan are calling for the unification of the Pashtuns of the two countries and the great Pashtunistan, an issue that Pakistan considers to be against its national interests. Some believe that even seven tribal areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, should be returned to Afghanistan, and the 100-year validity period of the Durand Line expired in 1993.
Economic interests
Worsening of the economic crisis,[13] poverty and famine, food crisis and its consequences can become the basis for more terrorism.
Afghanistan could be a potential corridor by participating in projects such as the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline, and railways (the Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway network), and the CASA-1000 transmission lines (move electricity at high voltage between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan) for easier access to trade and transit of Pakistani goods to Central Asian countries.[14]
Despite efforts to comprehensively develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the timely completion of Islamabad’s CPEC[15] has considerations regarding Afghanistan’s presence in the above project.
Pakistan is trying to preserve its interests in Afghanistan through transit routes, apart from a wider economic presence in the Afghan market. Pakistan even considers the Taliban’s view on the Chabahar port project in Iran as a weakening of its interests.
Pakistan is one of Afghanistan’s largest trading partners, with almost 2 billion dollars of bilateral trade. Pakistan’s share in imports was 13.1 percent, making it Afghanistan’s third largest import partner after Iran and the United Arab Emirates in 2022.
In addition, the Taliban had[16] previously announced “important” trade agreements with Pakistan and the development of banking relations between the two countries. But there are challenges such as sanctions, the banking system, and an attempt to create trade restrictions[17] against Afghanistan by Islamabad.
Other variables
According to United Nations statistics, there are one million and three hundred thousand Afghan citizens in Pakistan.[18] To put pressure on the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan has expelled Afghan refugees in Afghanistan. As of October 2023, Pakistan has repatriated more than 500,000[19] illegal Afghan immigrants. Pakistan began the second phase of deportations on April 15 and plans to deport another million refugees.[20]
Despite the Taliban’s expectation of the new Pakistani government’s “flexibility”[21] in the issue of the forced deportation of Afghan migrants, Pakistan has started new measures to impose restrictions, to deport migrants and closing border crossings.
Pakistan does not want the management of the relationship with the Taliban to lead to the abuse of India, strengthening the militia, and proxy forces against Islamabad. Pakistan will be more focused on preventing India’s presence in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s approach regarding the Kabul River, which originates from the Hindu Kush and goes to Pakistan, is subject to concessions and playing cards with Islamabad. Pakistan also fears diverting the water of the Kabul River with the help of India.
Vision
In March 2024, Amir Khan Motaghi, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Taliban, asked the new government of Pakistan to take constructive steps to strengthen relations with the Taliban.[22] The Taliban’s spokesman also said that Afghanistan (Taliban)[23] wants good relations with Pakistan both in the economic and diplomatic fields.
Nevertheless, the recent political tensions as well as the statements of officials from both sides indicate the growing tension between the Taliban and Pakistan. After the general elections on February 8 and the formation of a new coalition government, it seems that the policy of Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif towards the Afghan Taliban is to maintain international restrictions, establish some kind of control over this group, and maintain government leaning in the strategic depth of Pakistan.
According to some opinions,[24] Pakistan has unofficially reduced or even severed its diplomatic relations with the Taliban. On the other hand, the meeting with the opposition figures of the Taliban the officials of the previous government of Afghanistan,[25] the opposition, and the ethnic parties of Afghanistan can be considered as a pressure tool on the Taliban to change their behavior in the interests of Pakistan.
In addition, Pakistan’s good relations with other Afghan political groups and emphasis on inclusive government in Afghanistan can be a measure to control the Taliban.
Islamabad probably wants to put pressure on the Taliban to recognize Durand and not give too many concessions to the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas and Pakistan.
Still, the visits of political-religious figures of Pakistan to Afghanistan have not been able to improve relations with Islamabad. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan with 50,000 fighters is still the main problem of relations. Islamabad wants the Taliban to fight the Pakistani Taliban.
Therefore, Islamabad will try to force the Taliban leaders to cooperate more widely by leveraging Kabul’s confrontation with the Pakistani Taliban and using it as a test for official recognition.
Apart from making it more difficult to issue visas for Afghans, intensifying the tone and literature against the Taliban,[26] Pakistan’s decisive decision against the anti-government militias, the recent airstrikes by Pakistani forces in parts of Afghanistan, and the response of Afghan forces[27], it seems unlikely that relations will improve in the short term.
While economic stability and expansion are essential for Pakistan’s international relations attracting international investment and fostering economic relations, maintaining stable relations with Afghanistan has become more difficult in line with Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-26. There is also the possibility of re-evaluating the government’s policy regarding Afghanistan. Islamabad has also shown that, like in 2001, it can cooperate with a supporter to weaken the Taliban.
Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of MEPEI. Any content provided by our authors is of their opinion and is not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual, or anyone or anything.
References:
[1].https://www.rfi.fr/fa/%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86/20211209-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85
[2] https://da.azadiradio.com/a/31619327.html
[3] https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/ttp-resurgence-achilles-heel-pakistan-taliban-1844450-2021-08-24
[4] https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-ttp-has-redefined-its-goals-should-pakistan-be-worried/
[5] https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/the-rise-of-the-new-pakistani-taliban/31261608.html
[6] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2303891.pdf
[7] https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-afghan-taliban-abehuria-160921
[8] https://8am.media/fa/security-council-meeting-pakistan-once-again-demanded-to-cut-ties-between-afghan-taliban-and-ttp/
[9] https://8am.media/fa/security-council-meeting-pakistan-once-again-demanded-to-cut-ties-between-afghan-taliban-and-ttp/
[10] https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/pub/insight/2024/Pakistan-Afghanistan-Relations-in-the-New-World-Order-Way-Forward/Pakistan-Afghanistan-Relations-in-the-New-World-Order-Way-Forward.html
[11] https://chekad.tv/49364
[12] https://study.com/academy/lesson/pakistani-ethnic-groups.html
[13] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/02/world/afghanistan-economic-humanitarian-crisis/
[14] https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-afghanistan-uzbekistan-sign-strategic-plan-for-railway-project-1.76961644
[15] https://isdp.se/assessing-pakistans-foreign-policy-under-shehbaz-sharif/
[16] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cndjp53j4e7o
[17] https://www.iess.ir/fa/analysis/3699/
[18] https://amu.tv/fa/?s=%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7+%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86+%D9%88+%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86
[19] https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/taliban-push-back-against-pakistani-accusations-of-involvement-in-recent-attacks/
[20] https://zantimes.com/2024/05/10/pakistans-strategic-morass-in-afghanistan/
[21] https://amu.tv/fa/86605/
[22]https://8am.media/fa/?s=%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7+%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86+%D9%88+%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86
[23] https://amu.tv/fa/86605/
[24] https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/287666/%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA
[25] https://iswnews.com/114262/%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA/
[26] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/02/17/3080445/%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA
[27] https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/344468/why-did-the-afghan-taliban-sour-on-pakistan
About the author:
Farzad Ramezani Bonesh is a writer, senior researcher, and analyst focusing on the Middle East and South Asia. He has written research articles, short analyses, and journalistic pieces in both Persian and English. He has also appeared on international outlets such as Al-Jazeera, RT, and Al-Araby among many others.
