On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement was put into effect between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel, marking a complex beginning of a new post-conflict phase. Before delving into examining the ceasefire agreement, its outcomes, and possible prospects, it is important to understand the circumstances that encountered this agreement.
Lebanon, with all its factions and groups including Hezbollah, approved the ceasefire agreement, and so did the Israeli cabinet. This led to a cessation of hostilities starting at 4 a.m. on November 27. Mediated by the United States and France, the ceasefire agreement ended one of the most intensive conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel that began on October 8, 2023, just one day after the Tufan al-Aqsa operation. During this period, the Israeli attacks displaced 1.2 million people in Lebanon and killed 3,768 individuals, most of them in the past two months (Nashed, 2024). The Israeli air strikes have targeted Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure, causing huge devastation in southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburb, known as Dahiyeh (Salhani, 2024). On the other side, Hezbollah’s responses have caused damage within Israel and put tens of thousands into displacement. However, the international pressure exerted by powerful actors, the overwhelming costs of the conflict, and the wide-ranging resulting destruction are all factors that pushed both parties to accept the ceasefire agreement.
The full text of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon consists of thirteen points, outlining actions that must be done within 60 days. Under this agreement, the Israeli troops have to withdraw from southern Lebanon behind the Blue Line and Hezbollah forces have to pull back north of the Litani River, ending their presence in the south (check figure no.1).
A key provision of the ceasefire agreement prohibits Hezbollah and all other armed groups in Lebanon from conducting offensive actions against Israel. In return, Israel is committed to not launching any military operations against targets in Lebanon, whether on land, in the air, or at sea (Rabih, 2024). Additionally, both parties reaffirmed in the agreement their recognition of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701[1] and the importance of its full implementation. Clause 7 of the agreement, specifically paragraphs a, b, and c, specifies that only Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese Army will be authorized to carry weapons or deploy troops in southern Lebanon. In this context, the Lebanese government must exercise oversight of the sale, provision, and production of firearms within Lebanese territory to confiscate and dismantle unauthorized weapons and their related facilities. To ensure the execution of this agreement, a US-French committee will be mentoring the implementation of these commitments. As part of the agreement, Lebanon will deploy its official security forces and army south of the Litani River. At the same time, Israel will gradually withdraw from the southern Blue Line zone within a maximum of 60 days. Furthermore, the agreement’s Clause 8 outlines that the United States and France will work through the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L) in coordination with UNIFIL to facilitate the deployment of 10,000 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel to southern Lebanon as soon as possible.
However, to objectively assess the viability and prospects of this agreement, our analysis must surpass the examination of its content to consider the on-ground realities on both sides. These realities include not only the political and military landscapes but also the larger regional and even international dynamics. Looking at the situation from a realistic lens and an objective perspective reveals several concerns that may challenge the agreement’s sustainability. These concerns can be summarized into three key questions.
First, how will the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deal with Hezbollah in the south of the Litani River? On the technical level, questions arise about the procedures of disarmament and the best practical approaches to execute the agreement commitments. Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Naim Qassem, stated in his first speech following the ceasefire that Hezbollah would ensure smooth coordination with the LAF, but to what extent will Hezbollah be ready to cooperate? this question is really pressing, as Hezbollah’s influence is still rooted in the social fabric of the southern population.
Second, what exactly will be the role and authority of the US-French monitoring committee? At this stage, its mandate remains somewhat unclear. Will it operate alongside the LAF on the ground? What criteria and standards will it rely on to assess the implementation of the agreement? Furthermore, will the committee provide recommendations and address technical issues with the LAF and the Lebanese government, or will it primarily serve as a reporting mechanism for Israeli interests?
Third, although hostilities have ceased, the Israeli forces are still present in certain southern Lebanese villages. What if these forces failed to withdraw within the timeframe of 60 days specified in the agreement? What will happen at this point? Also, the continued presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory not only violates Lebanese sovereignty but also poses a significant risk of escalation, especially as many displaced Lebanese families begin returning to villages located near these positions.
Despite these concerns, several factors and strong indicators contribute to the viability of this agreement. First, the serious intentions and efforts undertaken by both France and the United States to reach and oversee the agreement. These efforts have demonstrated a genuine international will to end the ongoing conflict. Second, the agreement has separated the southern Lebanon front from the Gaza front. This separation was clearly acknowledged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his cabinet speech on November 26[2], as well as by Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem, who stated, “We won’t stop supporting Gaza in other ways”[3], which implicitly means that military means are no longer an option. This development reduces the agreement’s vulnerability to regional dynamics. Moreover, the populations on both sides have suffered significant losses. Most Lebanese political powers opposed the initiation of this war from the beginning. These political actors, combined with the struggles of displaced communities on both sides, exert considerable pressure to prevent any further escalation.
As of now, around ten days have passed since the agreement’s implementation, and it is still holding despite minor violations (Salhani, 2024). This sustainability reflects a common interest among all parties in protecting and maintaining the ceasefire agreement. Finally, despite the complexity of the regional landscape with recent military developments in Syria and the international changes that are coming with the election of US President Trump, the ceasefire agreement seems to be holding from collapse. Based on the agreement’s terms, along with the political, economic, and military realities on both sides, we can suggest but never affirm nor guarantee that the agreement has a promising chance of survival.
Bibliography: (Magazine References cited in APA style)
Nashed, M. (2024, November 26). A ceasefire between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel: What to know. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/26/ceasefire-between-lebanons-hezbollah-and-israel-what-to-know
Salhani, J. (2024, November 30). Analysis: Can the Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire hold? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/30/analysis-can-the-hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-hold
Rabih, M. (2024, November 26). Full text of the cease-fire agreement between Lebanon and Israel. L’Orient-Le Jour. Retrieved from https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1437074/full-text-of-the-cease-fire-agreement-between-lebanon-and-israel.html
Figures:
[1] A Security Council Resolution issued on August 11, 2006, intended to end the hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel after the 2006 conflict. Check the resolution draft: https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf
[2] Check Netanyahu’s speech on: https://youtu.be/aWkvmdlH6VU?si=y5355hUIJjJdbnK6
[3] Check Kassem’s speech on: https://youtu.be/–G8cofKWdI?si=pcdrZmvNePgrGHcg
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About the author:
Mr. Alaa Abou Chakra holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy and International Affairs from the American University of Beirut, as well as Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science and Military Science. His research centres on security-related topics, particularly within the context of the Middle East. Through his practical experience in this field, he seeks to bridge the gap between theoretical frameworks and practical security applications. Additionally, his research encompasses policy analysis, development studies, and international politics.
