Introduction

The Syrian civil war has long transformed the region into a fragmented geopolitical chessboard, attracting the involvement of regional and global powers. With the recent collapse of effective centralized control by the Assad regime in late 2024, a new phase of strategic contestation has emerged. Previously, Iran had been the dominant external actor supporting the regime through militias and advisors, but Tehran’s growing economic struggles and domestic unrest have led to a partial retreat from its once expansive influence in Syria. This retrenchment has created a strategic vacuum in key areas of the country- particularly in the north- prompting new actors to step in.

Turkiye’s strategic

Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has seized this moment to expand its military and political footprint in northern Syria, with a primary objective of dismantling Kurdish separatist strongholds. Through a series of operations- Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Peace Spring (2019)- Ankara has established de facto zones of control across areas like Afrin, Jarabulus, and Tel Abyad. Beyond military occupation, Türkiye has introduced local governance structures, integrated Turkish language and currency, and reconstructed infrastructure- signaling a deeper strategic intention rather than a temporary military presence. The Turkish government frames these incursions as necessary for national security, especially to combat the Kurdish YPG forces it links to the PKK, which it designates as a terrorist organization. However, this deepening engagement reveals a broader aspiration: to re-establish regional influence and protect Türkiye’s southern border from both Kurdish autonomy and extremist spillover.

This expansion is not occurring in a vacuum. Israel, which has long conducted airstrikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria to prevent hostile entrenchment near its borders, is now increasingly observing Türkiye’s assertiveness with caution. While Israel and Türkiye have engaged in recent diplomatic thawing, particularly over trade and energy cooperation, the growing proximity of their military forces in Syria presents new risks. Israel’s air force has reportedly conducted strikes near Turkish zones of control, including the T4 airbase, believed to be repurposed by Ankara for logistics and surveillance operations. The overlapping military footprints of Israel and Türkiye are thus introducing potential friction zones, leading both states to quietly initiate deconfliction mechanisms to avoid unintended clashes.

At the core of this emerging confrontation lies a broader regional recalibration. Türkiye’s involvement is not only displacing Kurdish militias but also gradually replacing the space once held by Iranian-backed groups. In this context, it is accurate to assert that “Türkiye is attempting to fill the strategic vacuum left by Iran in post-Assad Syria, not merely as a security necessity but as a projection of regional influence and identity.” However, this growing influence presents Ankara with a strategic dilemma: the deeper it embeds itself in northern Syria, the more it risks military overreach, economic strain, and diplomatic isolation. As its interventions increasingly draw attention and concern from Israel, the Gulf states, and Egypt, Türkiye faces accusations of neo-Ottoman adventurism that complicate its relations across the region.

Israel’s reponse

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces growing domestic political pressure amid corruption allegations, judicial reform protests, and security challenges. In such a politically volatile environment, military assertiveness abroad becomes a tool of political survival. Analysts suggest that escalating tensions with Türkiye, Iran, or Hezbollah could help Netanyahu rally nationalist support at home and distract from internal discontent. This dynamic turns Israel’s Syria policy not only into a strategic necessity but also a form of domestic political signaling- where military action and regional confrontation serve a dual function as both deterrence and propaganda.

For Israel, Türkiye’s military entrenchment poses both direct and indirect challenges. Strategically, Israel must now recalibrate its intelligence and operational focus, considering not just Iran-backed threats, but also Ankara-aligned militias and infrastructure. Politically, the potential for Israeli support- covert or diplomatic- toward Kurdish groups could increase tensions with Türkiye. The rivalry is not rooted in open hostility but in competing visions of regional order, influence, and strategic dominance. In short, while Türkiye views northern Syria as a vital buffer zone for national and regional security, Israel perceives it as an evolving threat corridor that could reshape its northern defense strategy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the rivalry between Israel and Türkiye in Syria illustrates a deeper shift in Middle Eastern power dynamics. Türkiye’s expanding influence in northern Syria exemplifies its desire to achieve strategic depth in a post-Assad, post-Iranian-dominant Syria. However, this move simultaneously generates strategic dilemmas- overextension, regional blowback, and the potential for confrontation with Israel. What Ankara considers a geopolitical necessity, Israel increasingly views as a complication to its already complex security environment. The evolving dynamic between these two regional powers reflects a broader transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics, where old alliances are fading, new rivalries are emerging, and Syria remains the central stage for these transformations.

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About the author

Mr. Muhammad Shafiy bin Mazlan

Mr. Muhammad Shafiy bin Mazlan is an independence researcher in Turkiye Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Foreign Policy Analysis and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Foreign Policy. He earned International Master in Regional Integration from Asia-Europe Institute (AI), University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.