Syria Post-Assad: Benefiters, Un-benefiters and What’s Next

The Syrian tragedy once more captures the global spotlight. In addition to Bashar al-Assad’s departure, the rebels have now successfully driven the Baathist regime out of Damascus after a protracted civil war and humanitarian crises. This situation will inject a new dynamism to the geopolitical landscape. This paper intends to examine the primary beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the current situation, together with the critical future of Syria after the downfall of the Assad regime.

Benefiters

Hayat Tahrir al Syam (HTS)- led rebels

The fall of Aleppo clearly provides significant advantages to the non-state actor rebels regarding political strategy. Major cities like Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and now Damascus were taken by the Hayat Tahrir al Syam (HTS) group, which led the ‘Blitzkrieg’ campaign, codenamed ‘Rade Aleudwan’ (Deterrence of Aggression), which effectively overran the regime’s army. The rebels’ seizure of Damascus on 8 December 2024 unequivocally marks the conclusion of sixty years of Assad-Baathist governance. This represents a crucial advancement in strengthening and expanding their power in central Syria, while also facilitating the subsequent phase of Syrian politics. Following the overthrow of Assad, HTS, led by Emir Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, played a pivotal role in the political power shift; Mohammed al-Bashir has now assumed the position of interim Prime Minister.

Turkiye

Turkiye has long been an advocate of the Syrian democratic (anti-Assad) movement. A tight bond between Erdogan and Assad was fostered in the past by Bashar al-Assad’s first visit to Turkiye in 2004, which improved diplomatic ties between Syria and Turkiye. The connection resulted in an economic boom following the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), aligning with Turkiye’s regional strategic objectives of ‘zero problems with neighbors’ and the ‘Schengen quartet,’ pertaining to the borderless Schengen area of the EU. Nonetheless, the circumstances have worsened since the onset of the Syrian uprising in 2011. On 9 August 2011, Türkiye employed diplomatic initiatives (soft power) via FM Davutoglu in the intention of curtailing the Assad regime’s brutality against demonstrators. Since that time, ties between Turkiye and Syria have worsened, resulting in 3 million refugees entering the country and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. The Syrian interim government Prime Minister, Mohammed al Bashir, prioritized the repatriation of Syrian refugees abroad, thereby mitigating Türkiye’s enduring challenge by promoting their return home.

A notable advantage is the enhancement of Turkiye’s geopolitical goals, which now encompass championing the cause of Syrians. In the occurrence of a political vacuum, it is probable to emerge as the principal state player, especially in opposing Kurdish separatists like the PKK/PYD by backing rebels and the SNA. Historically, Hafez al-Assad offered bases and assistance to the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) in the 1980s and 1990s amid their fight with Turkey. MIT Director Ibrahim Kalin’s visit to the Umayyad Mosque and the opening of Turkiye embassy underscores Syria’s significance in Turkish foreign policy doctrine.

Israel

The collapse of the Assad regime and political vacuum is an opportunity for Israel to expand the occupation plan into the buffer zone inside Syrian territory and capture the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. This is the first time in 50 years that the IDF has stepped foot in this strategic location after the 1974 Agreement. Moreover, Israel unilaterally occupied the Golan Heights post-Yom Kippur War (1973). IDF carried out air strikes on Syria, where they claimed 80% of military assets were destroyed amid the weakened Syrian security structure and political vacuum. This occupation will not stop until stability is restored in the country. The United Nations accused Israel on Monday of having violated the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Syria. Despite the ongoing war in Gaza and the long-awaited ‘success’ to bring back Israeli hostages since October 2023, uncertainty and ‘no government’ in Syria give an advantage to Israel to move deeper, and its propaganda is a political victory for Netanyahu to divert domestic problems.

The chaotic Syria has been exploited by Israel for political diversion of its internal problem and mishandling the war on Gaza. However, the new Syria with stability and strength obviously makes Israel more insecure. This shift towards a more stable and powerful Syria could challenge Israel’s strategic positioning in the region, as it may embolden Syrian influence and resistance against Israeli actions. Consequently, Israel’s ability to manage its internal issues may become increasingly complicated in the face of a unified and resilient neighbor.

Un-benefiters

Iran

Since the Iranian Revolution (1979), Iran has been Assad’s close ally, largely due to the threat posed by regional rivals such as the Arab monarchy states, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq, despite their shared political ideology, Baathism. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Syria developed a strategic alliance known as ‘the Syria-Iran Nexus,’ providing both military and economic support, including Syria’s military presence in the Iranian military HQ. Another significant aspect of this event was that Hafez al-Assad attempted to weaken Saddam economically by cutting off the Iraqi oil pipelines, which cost Baghdad an estimated 17 million dollars per day. This earned Damascus the appreciation of the Iranian clergy. The bilateral relationship developed from time to time until the Syrian Uprising 2011 breakout. In defending the Assad regime, Iran sent IRGC officials to create, recruit, and train local minority Shias, i.e., the National Defense Forces (NDF), Local Defense Forces (LDF), and Syrian Shia militias.

The collapse of the Assad regime (Alawite minority rule) has weakened Iran’s sphere of influence, thereby counterbalancing the status quo ante bellum, which is the Arab monarchy, the GCC, and their allies. This latest development will also impact the process of “Iranianization” of Lebanon. Obviously, Iran is not only losing its important allies but also most crucial economic grips amid sanctions. It has been reported that Iran allocated an estimated $50 billion to aid the Syrian regime amidst the country’s civil war. Tehran plans to invest $947 million across eight projects over the next 50 years. Iran and Syria also signed a zero-tariff trade deal in July 2023 and are in the process of establishing a joint bank.

Russia

Syria has been a longstanding ally of Russia since the initiation of diplomatic relations in 1944 during the Soviet Union era. In 1971, an accord let the Soviet navy to utilize ports of Latakia and Tartous; in exchange, Syria acquired armaments and improved its military. Subsequently, both states actors finalized the Peace and Security Pact. Following the Cold War, the alliance under President Putin remained robust both economically and strategically, despite some Arab states, especially Egypt, transitioning towards the West, having previously been pro-USSR. In 2005, Russia forgave Syria’s $13 billion debt to enhance economic collaboration and restore its dominance, which had primarily been established during the Soviet era. In the 2011 uprising, Russian intervention assisted Assad in combating opposition factions supported by the United States and Turkiye.

As power dynamics in Syria change, Russia is forfeiting a vital strategic ally in the region, especially as it cedes its exclusive Mediterranean naval base, the port of Tartous, where it had maintained basing rights until 2066. They possess a vital logistical support system that allows them to function in the region for prolonged durations, so contesting the US’s power. The Russian military’s investment in the Hmeimim airbase (Latakia) and Tartous is at risk. Furthermore, Putin is seeing strategic political challenges not only from the United States but also from China’s increasing influence in the Middle East, which poses difficulties for Russia as it is viewed as providing options.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria will undoubtedly lead to a complex and uncertain future, with a range of potential outcomes shaped by the dynamics of the region and the interests of global powers. The immediate aftermath will likely see a significant political vacuum, where competing factions vie for control and influence. This vacuum could intensify Syria’s already fractured landscape, as the country remains deeply divided with a variety of factions, each backed by different external actors. The transition process will be pivotal in determining the country’s trajectory, but it will face immense challenges due to the entrenched power struggles and sectarian divisions within Syria.

Achieving stability in the post-Assad era will require a delicate balancing act, with a need for both political and military reconciliation. The roles of the US, Turkey, and regional bodies like the Arab League and the United Nations will be crucial in shaping the transition, with each actor seeking to protect its interests while contributing to or complicating the path to peace. The US, with its military presence and strategic goals in the region, will likely play a significant role in influencing the transition process, but may face challenges in managing relations with regional powers such as Turkey, whose interests often conflict with those of the US in Syria.

Meanwhile, Turkiye’s role, particularly regarding its involvement in northern Syria and its stance toward Kurdish forces, will be vital in shaping the regional balance and any future settlement. Regional bodies like the Arab League, while working toward Syria’s reintegration, may struggle to overcome internal disagreements and the geopolitical realities of the Middle East. Ultimately, Syria’s future will hinge on the ability of local actors and international powers to navigate these complexities and build a foundation for long-term peace and governance.

 

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