by Mr. Alaa Abou Chakra •Published on December 18, 2024

Photo: A woman waves the flag of the Syrian rebels as people gather on Sunday in Umayyad Square, located in the Syrian capital of Damascus, to celebrate the fall of the government. (Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images)

On December 8, 2024, the Syrian regime, under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, collapsed. It was a sudden event that no one expected to happen so quickly and easily. The collapse of Assad’s regime marked the end of an autocratic family dynasty that had held power in Syria for more than five decades (Picheta, R., 2024).

The seizure of power in Syria began with Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad. Hafez al-Assad was first appointed as the commander of the Syrian Air Force after participating in the 1963 Syrian coup d’état, which brought the Syrian regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party to power. Three years later, in 1966, Assad participated in a second coup d’état that brought a new government, which appointed him as the minister of defense. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad launched a third coup d’état, appointing himself as the new leader of Syria (Diyab, H. 2014). Hafez al-Assad broke the chain of military coups in Syria, and the country did not witness any military coups during his rule, which lasted for three decades. Assad was known as the architect of modern Syria, succeeding in bringing stability to his country and overcoming sectarian divisions. On the other hand, he ruled with an iron fist, turning Syria into a police state governed by totalitarian leadership and a one-party system (Diyab, H. 2014).  Hafez was preparing his eldest son, Bassel, to take power after him, but Bassel’s death in a car accident in 1994 brought his brother Bashar to the forefront (Quilliam, N, 2023). Bashar, a former ophthalmologist who studied in London, assumed the presidency in 2000 after an unopposed election following his father’s death. Bashar’s rule did not bring about any major or remarkable changes to the system; instead, it was almost a continuation of his father’s era of rule.

The situation in Syria remained stable under Bashar’s presidency until the Arab Spring revolution wave reached Syria. Tensions escalated when the first anti-regime protests broke out in Daraa in March 2011. The regime’s violent response fueled nationwide demonstrations, placing Assad under international criticism and sanctions from the U.S., EU, and Arab League. However, Syria’s allies, including Russia and Iran, continued to support Assad’s regime.

By the summer of 2012, the conflict in Syria transitioned from an insurgency to a civil war. Bashar al-Assad’s counterinsurgency approach failed to suppress the revolution, accelerating the descent into civil war (Zeidan, A., 2024). Efforts for peace, such as the Arab League mission and Kofi Annan’s UN-brokered ceasefire, have all failed. The militarized conflict continued with the emergence of the Free Syrian Army and many other fragmented and externally influenced rebel groups. By 2013, extremist groups such as the Nusra Front and ISIS rose to prominence urging the U.S. and its allies to launch airstrikes against them. In 2015, Russia intervened militarily, targeting anti-Assad rebels. With the support of Russia and Iran, the government regained significant territory, including Aleppo in 2016. By 2018, the government had regained control over much of the country, except for Idlib province. The conflict was further complicated by Turkish intervention, especially in Kurdish-held areas. A ceasefire negotiated between Türkiye and Russia in 2020 stabilized parts of the frontlines. By 2023, Syria was reinstated into the Arab League, signaling a degree of normalization (Zeidan, A., 2024).

In 2024, rebel activity resurged as international support for Assad weakened. Russia’s focus on its war in Ukraine and Iran’s setbacks due to the Israel-Hamas conflict diminished their aid to Syria. Hezbollah withdrew its fighters after Israeli bombardments in Lebanon, further straining Assad’s resources. The rebels, represented by several armed Syrian opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported by Turkish-backed factions, were able to advance. Starting on November 27, they quickly took Idlib and Aleppo, and within days, they announced control over Hama and Homs. On December 8, Damascus also slipped out of government control, leading to the unprecedented collapse of Assad’s regime which lasted almost 54 years (Al Jazeera Staff, 2024).

Today, the scene remains uncertain regarding what future the regime’s collapse will bring to this country. However, understanding the intricacies of the Syrian changes and anticipating their repercussions cannot be achieved without viewing the situation through three perspectives related to local, international, and historical lenses.

From the local perspective, the behavior of opposition groups must undergo a detailed examination, particularly regarding how they will deal with minorities, public servants, and international actors. It is still too early to assume or judge what ends the Syrian future is heading toward. Alongside this collapse, major and fundamental questions arise about what shape the new Syrian regime will take, what foreign and domestic policies it will adopt, and also what economic approaches and reform plans the future Syrian system will launch. These political and economic inquiries emerge during a critical phase, where, on the social level, Syrians are in great need of constructing a patriotic social identity that prioritizes national interests above all others. Although the overall picture is still unclear, the local efforts led by the new caretaker government appear to be on track to promote an image distant from radicalism, sectarianism, and extremism.

From an international perspective, as Syrians celebrated the fall of Assad’s regime, three foreign powers; Israel, Türkiye, and the United States, carried out airstrikes across the country, framing these attacks as measures to protect their interests. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran, the two primary foreign supporters of the Assad regime, withdrew their forces from Syria, marking a significant shift in power dynamics in the Middle East (Bazzi, M., 2024). Israel exploited the post-collapse chaos to invade the remainder of the Golan Heights, seizing the 1974 buffer zone and gaining strategic high points[1]. This invasion demonstrated a clear intent to expand its territory at the expense of Syrian land. Many Arab states, along with France, condemned Israel’s actions and called for its immediate withdrawal (Plotnick, M., 2024). In parallel with this, some Western powers and the United Nations are now considering lifting HTS from the list of terrorist organizations if it commits to forming an inclusive transitional government (Bazzi, M., 2024)[2]. On the other hand, Arab diplomats have advocated for a peaceful and inclusive political transition, emphasizing the need for elections and a new constitution (Lewis, S, 2024). Moreover, Türkiye, which has long supported Syrian opposition groups and perceived the Syrian Kurds as a primary threat, is today seeking to secure greater influence over Syria through its alliances and support for rebel groups.
The international landscape appears complicated, as major events are unfolding at a quick pace. However, what is clear is that Syria is at risk of becoming an object of ambitions for regional actors, whether ambitions to seize its land or to exert political hegemony and influence. In both cases, these actions might escalate the situation posing great risks to regional security and ruining any chances of stability.

Finally, historical evidence from Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein era and Libya in the post-Gaddafi phase shows that the fall of autocratic regimes often results in internal instability accompanied by military and political conflicts. Both Iraq and Libya serve as similar examples to Syria. So, is Syria destined to face the same fate? There is no doubt that Syria today faces significant challenges both internally and externally. Many efforts are required to put Syria on the path to stability and prosperity. However, the importance lies first in conducting these efforts within the framework of democratic and freedom-based values, and second, in respecting Syrian sovereignty and independence to keep it safe from foreign intrusion and invasion. Finally, lessons must be learned from historical evidence of similar cases to confront challenges with the best approaches and avoid repeating the same mistakes.

References:

Al Jazeera Staff. (2024, December 8). What happened in Syria? How did al-Assad fall? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/8/what-happened-in-syria-has-al-assad-really-fallen

Bazzi, M. (2024, December 14). Syria’s future must be determined by Syrians, not outside powers. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/dec/14/syria-future-foreign-influence

Diyab, H. (2014, November 28). All in the family: Building the Assad dynasty in Syria. Al Arabiya. https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/2014/11/28/All-in-the-family-Building-the-Assad-dynasty-in-Syria

Lewis, S., & Al-Khalidi, S. (2024, December 14). US, regional diplomats urge respect for minorities in Syria after Assad, Blinken says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-regional-diplomats-meet-discuss-syrias-future-2024-12-14/

Picheta, R., & Regan, H. (2024, December 9). After decades of brutal rule, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has been toppled. Here’s what you need to know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/09/middleeast/syria-assad-rebels-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html

Plitnick, M. (2024, December 13). Inside Israel’s opportunistic invasion of Syria. Mondoweiss. https://www.mondoweiss.net/2024/12/inside-israels-opportunistic-invasion-of-syria/

Quilliam, N. (2023, May 10). Hands of power: The rise of Syria’s Assad family. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2015/11/hands-power-rise-syrias-assad-family

Zeidan, A. (2024, December 16). Syrian civil war: Conflict, refugees, and destruction. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War

[1] The buffer zone is a demilitarized area created upon the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria that the United Nations established. Check the UN Security Council resolution Number 350: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93704?ln=en&v=pdf

[2] The United States, the United Kingdom, and most European countries have designated in the past the HTS as a terrorist group due to its past affiliation with al-Qaida during Syria’s civil war