by Ms. Zinab Mostafa Roweha•Published on July 15, 2026

French officers seen in Chad in mid- April, as part of renewed security cooperation between France and chad, this action indicates success and credibility of the promises both countries announced when Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby was welcomed by French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris last January, they both agreed to put an end to a diplomatic rift lasted more than one year. Sahel region is countering a violant level of terrorism that pushed N’Djamena to call for help, at the same time France is offering its potentials as a way to return to its traditional stakeholders.

France back in Sahel

Leaders in France and Chad realized that breaking off the bilateral cooperation was no longer viable, moving to forge a new form of partnership. This shift was signaled by Chadian President’s visit to Paris on January 29, 2025. During his meeting with Macron at the Élysée Palace, the two leaders agreed to open a new chapter in their relations, pledging in a joint statement to work on “a series of orientations that will serve as the guiding thread for revitalising the Franco-Chadian partnership in areas of shared interest”.

To translate this political momentum into act, both countries have adopted specific strategic approaches:

1- Bilateral military cooperation

A handful of French officers returned to N’Djamena in mid-April 2026 to resume cooperation with the Chadian army, as part of Paris and N’Djamena’s new military arrangement that aims at overhauling past frameworks. Under this renewed cooperation, there is no provision for permanent French bases or deploying combat forces; instead, collaboration is limited to training, technical expertise exchange, and enhanced intelligence sharing. Moreover, France is expected to support the command and operational planning capabilities of the Chadian military, particularly in air power including potential sales of helicopters and aircraft to help Chad address critical gaps in rapid medical evacuation and air support for ground forces challenges the Chadian army has struggled with since the withdrawal of French troops.

2-Economic reset

Beyond security, shared economic interests have facilitated the rapprochement between France and Chad. By prioritizing its pursuit for financial aid and foreign investment during the Paris talks, N’Djamena has leveraged economic cooperation to repair diplomatic ties, establishing a crucial cornerstone to move past previous tensions.

As part of its broader efforts to reposition itself in Africa, French President Macron announced $27 billion in new investments at the Africa Forward Summit, co-hosted by France and Kenya in May. Macron said the Africa Forward Summit marked a financial shift in relations between France and African nations. This initiative demonstrates that France is adopting a specific economic strategy aims at engaging the continent through development and investment, which directly aligns with Chad’s current aspirations.

Drivers of reengagement

A set of incidents serve as drivers to reconnect Paris and N’Djamena:

1- When alternatives fall short

Chad sought to distance itself from France’s military footprint to assert its sovereignty following other Sahel states, Russia seized the moment to replace French influence, but Moscow’s ambitions suffered a major setback, The decisive defeat of the Russian corps in Mali, marked by the assassination of Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara and the retreat from Kidal and Tessalit under joint pressure from Azawad rebels and JNIM, as well the Sahel’s alarming standing on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) shattered the narrative of Russian security guarantee. Ultimately, this incident underscored the strict limitations of Russian military capabilities in protecting its African partners, leading Chadian authorities to reconsider their alliances.

Charles Cutter, director of investigations at The Sentry, previously stated that the Wagner Group’s intervention in Mali was a failure. He added, “Their violent and poorly planned counterterrorism operations strengthened alliances between armed groups challenging the state, inflicted heavy battlefield losses on Wagner forces, and led to a rise in civilian casualties. Ultimately, Wagner’s deployment served neither the interests of the Malian people, nor the military government, nor even the mercenary group itself”.

In light of these setbacks, the current security environment has forced Sahel states to look beyond Russian promises toward proven security partnerships. This has driven Mali and its neighbors to reconnect with the United States, as demonstrated by a flurry of recent visits by U.S. officials to the region, showcasing a willingness to resume security and intelligence sharing initiatives. as well the pursuit to security experience exchange is considered as a major reason why Sahel states neutralized tensions with Algeria after long conflict. 

These security approaches align with Chad’s strategic shift. Essentially, Chad was the last state in the Sahel to expel the traditional French military presence. However, the current government, which represents a continuation of the late Idriss Déby’s regime and was historically supported by Paris, is now seeking a new, restructured partnership rather than permanent troops.

2-Esclating terriorism

Geopolitically, Sahel has solidified its position as the global epicenter of terrorism. Sahel countries accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2025. This crisis is the culmination of long-term instability; Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger together have recorded nearly 4,500 terrorist attacks and 17,000 deaths over the past two decades.

The scale of the security crisis is underscored by unprecedented terrorism across the region. In Mali, al-Qaeda-affiliated group (JNIM) expanded its operational reach from Bamako in the south to Kayes in the west and northern regions, enforcing an ongoing economic and fuel blockade on Mali, then their strategic alliance with Tuareg separatists, successfully drove the Malian military out of Kidal and Tessalit in April, imposing intense pressure on the ruling military regime. Niger faced a parallel threat; JNIM attacked Niamey’s international airport on 18 June —the second such attack this year, which claimed 13 lives—highlights a significant shift in jihadist tactics aimed at directly testing the resilience and readiness of Niger’s defense forces.

Chad faces mounting security challenges on multiple fronts including armed group threats in the Lake Chad Basin, the rising activity of JNIM and ISIS across Sahel. The civil war in Sudan is also creating pressure on Chad’s eastern border, and the spillover effects of security crises in Libya and neighboring states

3- Regain access

Historically, France’s deep geopolitical investment and post-colonial heritage have been heavily entrenched in Sahel and West Africa, following its systematic expulsion from these nations, it was profoundly difficult for Paris to completely abandon its historic sphere of influence. Instead, Paris sought to re-engage the region through its most accessible diplomatic channel. Chad became the logical choice for this pivot, as its leadership refrained from adopting the hostile stance toward France that characterized other neighboring Sahel regimes. and Chad’s decision to evict French troops was not driven by a military coup.

France’s primary objective is to reclaim its strategic access, political influence, and operational relevance within Sahel, and securing the ability to land, take off and operate the Adji-Kosseï air base in N’Djamena which remains a vital hub for French power projection in the region. This military repositioning closely aligns with Paris’s persistent efforts to engineer a diplomatic comeback with Algeria, which represents as a regional power can play a vital role is Sahel.

4- Rebuilding its image

France is approaching cautiously, following a series of troop withdrawals and the closure of major bases across Sahel and West Africa, it realized the fact that the political and military context is now different, so that it has to remodel its existence. Responding to sovereignty concerns of African countries, President Emmanuel Macron planned to downsize the French military footprint in the region, instead of combat missions, the new model is more modest with fewer soldiers: less visibility, small detachments, specific missions, air access, training, counter-terrorism support, cooperation requested by partner states, and more dependence on political consent.

In the same context, in front of 30 heads of state and government from Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Rwanda and Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia and Botswana etc. at Africa-France summit, Macron said Paris will respect each African country’s independence, adding that “sovereignty and autonomy are shared, and your success is our success”. To assert his commitment to African countries’ sovereignty, he proposed investment instead of aid, stating “The days of offering assistance are behind us”.

Aligning with this reshaping across military and economic dimensions, France actively entered culturally, returning sacred talking drum looted during colonial rule to Ivory Coast. Constantly, French lawmakers passed a bill in April to simplify the return of artworks looted during the colonial era to their countries of origin, which is part of a broader commitment made in 2017 by President Macron to return African heritage.

To conclude, Paris and N’Djamena are beginning a new phase of military cooperation. Chad represents a real test for France; Paris must prove that it now understands the reasons that previously fractured its relations with African countries. At the same time, the critical security situation in Sahel forces France to demonstrate its actual ability to make a difference on the ground.