by Ms. Zinab Mostafa Roweha •Published on June 1, 2025

On 23 May 2025, the Algerian-Mauritanian Economic Forum convened in Nouakchott (capital of Mauritania), where three agreements were signed between Algerian and Mauritanian operators, covering pharmaceutical production, and maritime transport products. This Forum followed the first Mauritanian-Moroccan Parliamentary Economic Forum which sought to create structured collaboration between Morocco and Mauritania in strategic sectors such as fishing, agriculture, and infrastructure.

Both active Algerian and Moroccan engagement in Sahel is a response to the shifts Sahel and West Africa are going through that threaten dramatically Algeria’s classical influence in the region, and open up new horizons for Morocco.

Algeria is losing its cards

Over the past three years analysts began to indicate the Algerian retreat from the African Sahel in relation to some incidents:

In a blow to Algeria, Niger has halted the launch of final studies for the trilateral gas pipeline project with Nigeria and Algeria, this project was expected to build a trans-Saharan gas pipeline connecting Algeria, Nigeria to Europe via Niger, it lies in Algeria’s ambitious plan to confront the Atlantic pipeline that will link Morocco to Nigeria. Moreover tensions between Algeria and Niger flared due to Algeria’s migrant policy, between April 1-21, Algerian authorities forced out 2,753 Nigerien citizens, as well, it returned back nearly 20,000 migrants to Niger last year in harsh conditions as Alarme Phone Sahara NGO described, hence, Niger summoned the Algerian ambassador to Niamey to protest against the violent nature of repatriation operations and deportations.

Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have recalled their ambassadors from Algeria in condemnation of the downing of a Malian drone by Algerian forces last April, that accident which considered by the Sahel Alliance (AES) as an “act of aggression towards the entire confederal space”. And to continue its sharp interaction, Mali has withdrawn from the Comité d’Etat-Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC), which played as a security coordination with Algeria and Mauritania especially in providing training support for nearly 15 years, the same did Niger in a supporting step to Mali’s position, in the same context, Mali decided to close the country’s airspace to all civil and military aircraft flying to and from Algeria until further notice. Additionally, Mali accused Algeria of spreading terrorist propaganda at the UN Security Council meeting last September.

Lately, Mauritania has neared Morocco through several economic initiatives, distancing itself from Polisario Front, declaring senior Front’s officials are no longer welcome in Mauritania.

Rivalry in Sahel

Since military councils tightened their grip on power in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, they decided to reorient their compass and reset all their commitments choosing new partners which placed Algeria in a challenging position amid unfavorable geopolitical shifts.

Withdrawing the western troops created vacuum in the Sahel region, which attracted instantly Russia as Sahel has emerged as a central arena in the rivalry between eastern and western powers, therefore, Moscow spread Wagner members in  Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso who were deemed accountable for the destabilizing activities in the region and threatening Algeria’s border security.

Amid contest in Sahel, Türkiye has provided Sahel states with fighters and arms deliveries, the TB2 Bayraktar and Akinci are particularly valuable to leaders in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, given their acute need for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and air support, Iran is also weaving  its influence network in the region investing in Shi’a communities in Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, northern Nigeria, and Senegal. A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed between Iran and Niger during a visit by Iranian Internal Security Chief Ahmad Reza RADAN to Niamey last May. Tehran has also signed drone supply agreements with Burkina Faso and Mali in 2024, including Tehran’s indigenous Ababil-2 and Mohajer-6 drones.

Morocco with a pragmatic strategy has been trying to contain Sahel states’ needs and fears, since the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on the three countries led by the military junta, which pushed the three Sahel countries to withdraw from ECOWAS, meaning to be deprived of the group’s maritime frontier and isolating them from coastal ports in the Gulf of Guinea, then Morocco unveiled in December 2023, a promising trade initiative to facilitate Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s access to the Atlantic Ocean using Moroccan ports, and to transform the Atlantic region into a space for economic integration, in addition, Morocco included Mauritania to this initiative to block any other attempts from threatening the Moroccan mega-project. Furthermore, Morocco convened the first Moroccan-Mauritanian Parliamentary Economic Forum last May. It focused on promoting sustainable development, supporting joint projects through coherent legislative support, and accelerating regional integration. Sahel states are also a part of the Nigeria-Morocco Atlantic African Gas Pipeline which stretches over 5,600 kilometers and is expected to pass through 15 countries before reaching Morocco, with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year.

Figure 1. Shows Nigeria-Morocco gas Pipeline.

Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Co, 2022.

Morocco’s ambitions to dominate Sahel are confirmed by its launch of the Atlantic Africa Initiative on June 8, 2022, aiming to involve 23 countries located between the Strait of Gibraltar in the north and the Cape of Good Hope in the south, in an economically integrated regional group, targeting political dialogue and security, the blue economy, and maritime and energy connectivity.

Algeria’s options

Currently, Algeria is struggling to keep its feet on the ground in Sahel, as evident its attempts to foster its economic cooperation with Mauritania which plays a strategic gateway for Algeria to Atlantic Africa and the Sahel region. The last Algerian-Mauritanian Exchange Forum was held under the theme “Highlighting Algeria’s Production Capabilities in Various Sectors” including the pharmaceutical, energy and mining, and renewable energy. Additionally, the sea line between Algeria and the port of Nouadhibou on the Atlantic ocean began operating last April, and received the first Algerian ship “TIMGAD”. This line projected to tie Algeria with west African markets as a cornerstone in the regional integration. Besides in July 2022, Algeria announced a plan to build a 700-km-long road linking Tindouf to Zoueirat in Mauritania, the purpose of this infrastructure is to transport goods to the port of Nouadhibou. The trade exchange between the two countries also recorded $414 million in 2023 up from $50 million in 2018. As to the defense strategies, last April, Algeria and Mauritania signed an agreement for cooperation as they have a mutual perspective towards security challenges in Sahel.

Unfortunately, the Russian presence in Sahel did not represent as an opportunity for Algeria, but also it represents a source of concern, the Wagner paramilitary group in Sahel states has sidelined Algeria from managing the security dynamics, and directly competes with traditional Algerian influence. In the same context, the declining Algerian role in the political and security landscape in Sahel undermines its standing in front of western powers which shifted their engagement from Algeria towards Morocco, such as the escalating divergences between France and Algeria that broke out as a consequence to France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which strengthened Morocco’s position in its rivalry with Algeria.

The main issue Algeria faces in Sahel is that it lacks appeal with the region. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and Algeria states have different vision in dealing with armed groups, the latter relies on political solutions considering its mediating role in Mali’s internal conflicts, particularly between the government and Tuareg rebels. As well, Algeria sent a mediation proposal to Niger in October 2023 suggesting a six-month, civilian-led transition leading to reinstatement of the previous constitution, while AES prefers military solutions as it happened in January 2024, when the Malian military rulers announced the termination of the 2015 peace agreement with separatist rebels, also known as the Algiers Accords.

To conclude, the long-standing patterns for cooperation in Sahel are being transformed, but Algeria is a fact in the security balance in Sahel that should never be ignored, whilst Morocco has also achieved significant breakthroughs in the region. Furthermore, the foreign competition in Sahel can bring numerous chances for development, but the lack of coordination between the initiatives launched by different actors can erase all these efforts.

Ms. Zinab Mostafa Roweha

Ms. Zinab Mostafa Roweha is a PhD researcher in political science at Cairo university, specializing in African affairs and the middle east. With academic interests include foreign policy analysis, regional security, and conflict studies.